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Abstract 
 
This dissertation focuses on answering whether the Government of Japan considered the 
normative principles of Just War Theory when deciding to participate in international 
military operations. Just War Theory, which has its origins in Ancient Rome and 
influenced to international law on war, has been developed to explain the elements which 
government leaders and soldiers must observe when participating in international military 
operations. By focusing on the importance of considering the normative principles of Just 
War Theory, this dissertation examines whether the Government of Japan considered the 
normative principles when decided to participate in the 2001 Afghanistan War and the 
2003 Iraqi War. It also examines whether the government considered the normative 
principles of Just War Theory when enacting Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security 
because it enables Japan to participate in international military operations without 
enacting any temporary statutes as had been required before. 
 
 By examining whether the perspectives of the Government of Japan on 
participating in recent international military operations accord with the normative 
principles of Just War Theory, this dissertation points out the contribution and the 
necessity for further study in the two different fields of study, Japanese Studies and 
jurisprudence, because there have been several international conflicts between Japan and 
its neighbouring countries, such as China, North Korea, South Korea, and Russia. This 
dissertation, therefore, offers guideline for Japan in seeking to resolve international 
conflicts with those countries, so as to maintain peace and order in international society.  
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Introduction 
 
More than 70 years have passed since the United Nations (UN) was instituted to maintain 
international peace and security; however, stability has not yet been achieved in the 
international order and the instability is evident in the sheer numbers of international 
armed attacks. Resolving this issue, however, is no easy objective, given the difficulty of 
prosecuting the offenders under public international law on war. Notwithstanding the 
legal limitations, various international organisations, such as the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), have urged the necessity of 
finding and implementing effective solutions, because the committee members and their 
peers believe in the necessity to maintain peace and stability in international society. It 
can, therefore, be observed that international society has been seeking to reduce the 
numbers of international armed attacks.  
 
Based on the necessity to control the numbers of international armed attacks, 
some jurisprudence scholars claim to have found a solution in Just War Theory, which 
has been influential for public international law on wars, because it provides a doctrine 
for states to act the justifiable way in potential conflict situation. The theory has been 
adopted by some politicians, such as Tony Blair, former British Prime Minister, (term of 
office: 2 May 1997 - 27 June 2007) and Michael Ignatieff, former Canadian President, 
(term of office: 10 December 2008 - 2 May 2011), when deciding to participate in actual 
international military operations targeting the abolition of international armed attacks. 
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Michael Ignatieff, for instance, evaluates that the Kosovo War to have been strictly illegal 
under public international law on war, but it was legitimate and even necessary from a 
moral-philosophical perspective (Ignatieff, 2003, p. v). Tony Blair also found a just cause 
to attack Iraq when he and the former United States (US) President George W. Bush made 
a joint press conference at Camp David in 2003: “ (…) though of course our aim is to rid 
Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and make our world more secure, the justice of our 
cause lies in the liberation of the Iraqi people, and to them we say we will liberate you, 
the day of your freedom draws near” (Blair, 27 March 2003). While politicians adopt the 
normative principles when deciding to conduct international military operations, the 
jurisprudence scholars, such as Michael Walzer and Larry May, have reviewed the 
governmental decisions to launch international military operations under the normative 
principles of Just War Theory to develop a theory that is applicable to the practice. Thus, 
Just War Theory has played an important role for politicians when engaging in 
international military operations and for jurisprudence scholars when evaluating the 
government decision on participating in international military operations.  
 
 While politicians, particularly in Western countries, have focused on Just War 
Theory when forming policy for international military operations to maintain 
international peace and security, this dissertation will examine whether the Government 
of Japan (GOJ) took the normative principles of Just War Theory into consideration when 
deciding to participate in various international military operations. In concrete terms, 
Japan has twice dispatched Japanese Self Defence Forces (JSDF) personnel for the 
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purpose of preserving international peace and order: the Koizumi administration sent the 
JSDF to the Indian Ocean to support the US during both the 2001 Afghanistan War and 
the 2003 Iraqi War. The decision to dispatch the JSDF took the national and international 
community by surprise, as Japan had refused to dispatch forces during the 1990 Gulf War. 
Thus, the decision to dispatch the JSDF to engage in two different international military 
operations was a significant internal matter because it potentially violated Article 9 of the 
Japanese Constitution Law (JCL), which specifies the renunciation of war and potential 
war. These governmental decisions were also meaningful from an international 
perspective, particularly for the US: in dispatching the JSDF within the framework of the 
US-Japan alliance, the GOJ seemingly manifested its intent to strengthen US-Japan 
relations.  
 
 Seeking to enable Japan to participate in international military operations to 
maintain international peace and order, the Koizumi Junichirō administration (term of 
office: 24 April 2001 - 26 September 2006) and the second Abe Shinzō administration 
(term of office: 26 December 2012 - present) have pursued changes to Japanese security 
policies without attempting to revise the JCL, particularly Article 9. The Koizumi 
administration, for instance, enacted two temporary statutes to dispatch JSDF personnel 
to provide logistical support to the US military. Subsequently, the second Abe 
administration enacted legislation allowing Japan to participate in international military 
operations without enacting any temporary statutes or revising Article 9 of the JCL. 
Through these governmental decisions which have enabled Japan to participate in 
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contemporary international military operations, it seems the GOJ has sought to establish 
a reputation for attempting to preserve international stability. Therefore, this dissertation 
will describe the political elements that the GOJ has considered when deciding whether 
or not to provide logistical support to the US and to participate in international military 
operations to maintain international and national order. It will then examine whether the 
GOJ’s perspectives on participating in recent international military operations accord 
with the normative principles of countermeasures to international armed attacks. By 
examining, this dissertation seeks to answer the following research question: whether or 
not the GOJ took the normative principles of Just War Theory into consideration when 
deciding to participate in international military operations. By answering the research 
question, this dissertation seeks to point out the necessity for further research in this area 
because there have been several international conflicts between Japan and its 
neighbouring countries, such as China, North Korea, South Korean, and Russia. This 
dissertation, therefore, offers guideline for Japan in seeking to resolve international 
conflicts with those countries, so as to maintain international peace and order in 
international society.  
 
 Chapter One reviews the existing literature on Japan’s participation in 
international military operations and its security policy. As noted earlier, the Koizumi 
administration decided to dispatch the JSDF to participate in two international military 
operations being conducted by the US, while the second Abe administration passed the 
Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security to allow Japan to expand its military 
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capabilities. Reviewing the existing literature on Japan’s participation in international 
military operations and its security policy, this chapter considers whether the prior 
literature reviewed Japan’s governmental decisions on participating in international 
military operations with the normative principles of Just War Theory. To demonstrate the 
importance of the normative dimension in governmental policy-making, the first section 
introduces the literature on governmental decisions to participate in international military 
operations under the normative principles of Just War Theory. By reviewing the literature, 
an attempt is made to understand the necessity of reviewing governmental decisions to 
participate in international military operations from the moral-philosophical standpoint. 
The second section outlines how constitutional scholars in Japan have evaluated Japan’s 
participation in such operations. This review argues that, while the JCL specifies 
renunciation of war, the GOJ decided nevertheless to dispatch the JSDF to participate in 
international military operations; however, it also provides some supportive points to the 
GOJ which can be theoretically developed to allow for the possibility of participating in 
international military operations. The third section outlines the literature on how Japan’s 
behaviour in participating in international military operations have been reviewed by 
International Relations (IR)-derived theories, such as realism (neo-realism), liberalism 
(neo-liberalism), and constructivism By reviewing the existing literature on Japan’s 
participation in international military operations, it is concluded that prior works do not 
address whether the GOJ considered the normative principles of Just War Theory when 
deciding to participate. Consequently, this dissertation aims to review Japan’s 
participations in international military operations from the moral-philosophical 
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perspective to fill in the gap between those elements that the GOJ did take into 
consideration and those that it should have considered when deciding to participate in 
international military operations. To achieve the aim set for this dissertation, this 
dissertation raises the following research question: whether or not the GOJ took the 
normative principles of Just War Theory into consideration when deciding to participate 
in international military operations. 
 
 To answer the research question proposed above, Chapter Two develops the 
theoretical approach by elaborating the normative principles of Just War Theory. As the 
basis of these normative principles, Just War Theory asserts the necessity for sovereign 
states to pursue the ideal aim of international peace and order, particularly in protecting 
human rights. Many jurists have thus advocated the necessity to consider moral-
philosophical principles dating back to Ancient Rome. Therefore, the first section 
introduces the influence of moral-philosophical considerations on how to conduct wars 
with reference to public international law, particularly war treaties. By referring to moral 
philosophy, it is possible to identify the normative principles of Just War Theory is the 
basis of public international law on wars. As various formulations of Just War Theory 
have been developed by jurisprudence scholars, it is essential to elaborate a version of the 
theory that is must applicable to and suitable for this dissertation. The works of Michael 
Walzer (1977), John Rawls (2002), Larry May (2007), and Brian Orend (2007) are used 
to elucidate the main criteria for engaging in international military operations. By 
consulting these works, this dissertation clarifies specific elements for states to consider 
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when determining whether or not to participate in international operations.  
 
 Chapter Three explores Japan’s first participation in international military 
operations, the 2001 Afghanistan War (OEF), and examines whether the GOJ took the 
normative principles of Just War Theory into consideration when deciding to send the 
Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) to the Indian Ocean. As the first case of 
Japan’s participation in such operations, this is an essential example for academic 
examination. By ways of background, the OEF was launched in retaliation for the 9/11 
terrorist attacks. Therefore, the details of this crucial event are introduced in the first 
section. The second section, then, outlines the Koizumi Cabinet’s aim in participating in 
OEF, for which purpose the so-called Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML) 
was enacted as a temporary regulation to authorise the dispatch of the JSDF overseas. 
The third section reviews discussions in the Diet on Japan’s participation in OEF. Since 
it is difficult to analyse all such discussions, the focus is limited to four points. The first 
is whether the GOJ found the right intention or a just cause for participation in OEF. As 
Article 2.4 of the UN Charter forbids the use of force, international military operations 
are, in principle, banned. However, under Article 51 of the UN Charter, all UN members 
may exercise military force if just cause is found. Therefore, we examine whether the 
GOJ considered a just cause in evaluating their decision-making for OEF. The second 
point is the quality and quantity of OEF. As the principle of proportionality in jus ad 
bellum specifies the importance of considering the scale of international military 
operations, this dissertation investigates the related discussion in the Diet. The third point 
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is the role played by JSDF personnel in OEF. This point refers to the principle of necessity 
in jus in bello and analyses whether Diet members considered in what situations JSDF 
personnel may take military action against others. The fourth point is the scale of Japan’s 
actions in OEF. The JSDF had already been dispatched outside of Japan for peacekeeping 
operations (PKO), when the Miyazawa Kiichi administration (term of office: 5 November 
1991 - 9 August 1993) sent forces to Cambodia in 1992. However, OEF was the first time 
the JSDF was dispatched to participate in an international military operation. Therefore, 
it was necessary for the GOJ to consider the scale of the JSDF’s role in OEF before 
participating in the operation. Through these analyses, we will clarify the elements 
considered by the GOJ in the course of its decision-making. This review enables 
comparison between those elements considered by the GOJ and the normative criteria 
proposed by Just War Theory. In examining whether the GOJ took the normative 
principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello into consideration in the case of OEF, the gap 
between their actual consideration and the normative principles is elucidated in the fourth 
and fifth sections of this chapter.  
 
 Chapter Four, which concerns the 2003 invasion of Iraq (OIF), is structured the 
same as Chapter Three. This chapter demonstrates whether the GOJ took the normative 
principles of Just War Theory into consideration when deciding to participate in OIF. The 
Koizumi administration’s declared purpose was to provide logistical support to the US 
military; therefore, their reasons for invading Iraq was introduced in the first section of 
this chapter. By the time Saddam Hussein’s administration collapsed, the Koizumi 
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administration had not yet reached a decision to dispatch the JSDF to provide logistical 
support to the US military because the GOJ had to enact a new temporary statute; 
therefore, Japan did not participate directly in the invasion. The Diet then discussed 
whether or not to dispatch the JSDF after the invasion had concluded. These discussions 
continued after the US-led coalition began its reconstruction activity in Iraq and Japan’s 
participation in reconstruction was also discussed in the Diet. Focusing on these 
discussions regarding both military and reconstruction activities in the Diet, this chapter 
will compare the elements considered by the GOJ regarding Japan’s participation in OIF 
with the normative principles of Just War Theory .  
 
 The final case study, Chapter Five, investigates the issues related to the Japan’s 
Legislation for Peace and Security. Pursuant to this legislation, Japan can take military 
actions and to participate in reconstruction activities without enacting any temporary 
statutes. As Japan has not yet participated in international military operations by applying 
this legislation, this chapter explores five hypothetical cases to clarify the GOJ’s 
assumptions in enacting the legislation. These hypothetical cases are based on the 
conditions set by the GOJ and discussions in the Diet. The chapter begins by describing 
the intention of the second Abe administration in passing the draft of the Japan’s 
Legislation for Peace and Security. Since this legislation was not enacted in response to 
existing international military operations, this chapter begins by examining the purpose 
of bringing the draft to the floor of the Diet. It then describes the roles of JSDF personnel 
under the legislation, by exploring the hypothetical cases proposed by the GOJ and Diet 
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members.  
 
 The final chapter of this dissertation, Chapter Six, recapitulates the findings and 
draws together the theory and case studies to answer the research question posed earlier, 
“whether Japan’s participation in international military operations is justified from the 
moral-philosophical perspective.” It begins by reassessing the literature reviewed in 
Chapter One in light of the findings of the case study chapters, before restating these 
findings and summarising the theoretical approach. It then proceeds to summarise Just 
War Theory in relation to the practical cases. In this dissertation, contemporary Just War 
Theory elaborates the normative principles considered throughout the discussions set out 
in each case study chapter. Subsequently, the implications of the findings from these 
examinations are presented. This chapter then proceeds to assess the contributions to two 
different fields of study: jurisprudence and Japanese Studies. It then discusses the 
implications of the research findings for the normative principles of Just War Theory, by 
focusing on the difficulty for Japan to consider from the moral-philosophical perspective. 
The final section of the Conclusion demonstrates the necessity of continuing the research 
on Japan’s participation in international military operations as Japan seeks to apply to 
practice the Legislation for Peace and Security. By introducing a case to which Japan 
might apply the Legislation for Peace and Security, this dissertation addresses the issues 
which the GOJ should consider before dispatching the JSDF to international military 
operations and reconstruction activities.  
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Chapter One. Literature Review 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the prior literature on Japan’s participation in 
international military operations. As touched upon in the Introduction, this dissertation 
adopts Just War Theory, a doctrine of military ethics that policy-makers should consider, 
to answer the question ‘how can we evaluate Japan’s decision using its policy-making 
procedure to participate in international military operations?’. The literature in this 
chapter is reviewed in light of this research objective, to demonstrate that the existing 
literature does not satisfactorily answer the research question raised by this dissertation.  
 
The existing literature on Japan’s participation in international military 
operations can be divided into two types according to the approach used: the legal 
approach and the political, specifically International Relations (hereafter, IR), approach. 
This categorisation is useful because these are the two separate factors for Japan to 
consider in deciding to dispatch the Japanese Self-Defence Force (hereafter, JSDF). The 
legal approach is brought to the forefront of discussion because Article 9 of the 
Constitution of Japan (hereafter, JCL) regulates the renunciation of war. Therefore, legal 
scholars, particularly those specialising in the JCL, disagree with Japan’s decision to 
participate in international military operations because they believe that doing so 
contravenes the JCL. Political scholars on the other hand, particularly those specialising 
in IR, consider that the decision to dispatch the JSDF was due to the United States 
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(hereafter, US) -Japan Security Treaty. Therefore, this chapter examines the existing 
literature on Japan’s participation in international military operations to ascertain how 
scholars in law and politics have evaluated the governmental decision from the 
perspective of their specialised fields of research.  
 
1.1. Normative Approach to Participation in International Military Operations 
 
As noted in the Introduction, some politicians, particularly those in decision-making 
positions, have adopted the normative principles of Just War Theory when deciding 
whether or not to engage in international military operations. For instance, former 
Canadian President Michael Ignatieff established four criteria for justifying interventions: 
“1) the human rights abuses at issue have to be gross, systematic, and pervasive; 2) they 
have to be a threat to international peace and security in the surrounding region; 3) 
military intervention has to stand a real chance of putting a stop to the abuses;” and 4) the 
region in which the infringement of human rights is undertaken must be of significant 
interest for cultural, strategic, and geopolitical reasons to one of the hegemonic states, 
and no other hegemonic nations must be against to the intervention (Ignatieff 2003, p.40). 
With the fourth condition, Michael Ignatieff found the intervention in Kosovo to be 
legitimate.  
 
 On the other hand, jurisprudence scholars have reviewed such governmental 
decision-making on the use of military force from a moral-philosophical perspective. For 
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instance, Michael Walzer and John Rawls, whose theories will be analysed in the next 
chapter, both evaluate the US decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
to conclude World War II (hereafter, WWII). Rawls contends that the decision of then US 
President Harry S Truman (term of office: 12 April 1945 – 20 January 1953) to drop the 
bombs was morally wrong because the aim was to kill Japanese civilians (Rawls 2006, 
pp. 99-103). Rawls’ focus on this issue reflects his view that the protection of human 
rights is a fundamental normative principle of war. Michael Walzer, on the other hand, 
offers an alternative perspective: he reasons that, unlike the Nazis, Japan did not pose a 
threat to international peace and security and thus dropping the atomic bombs was not a 
proportionate way for the US to attack Japan (Walzer 2006, pp. 263-8). In summary, the 
US decision to drop the atomic bombs was not legitimate because these acts were 
inhumane and disproportionate to the threat posed by Japan.  
 
 By reviewing how the normative principles of Just War Theory have been 
adopted for political decision-making processes related to engagement in international 
military operations and to review governmental decisions to eliminate the numbers of 
international military conflicts, the following sections will explore how the prior literature 
on Japan’s participation in international military operations has been developed. 
Compared with the existing literature that reviews the justification of international 
military operations with the normative principles of Just War Theory, the prior research 
on Japan’s participation in international military operations focuses on whether 
governmental decisions have been constitutionally justified or reviews the governmental 
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behaviour from the perspective of IR theories.  
 
1.2. Legal Approach  
 
As is well-known in the field of Japanese Studies, innumerable discussions on Japan’s 
participation in international military operations have been held in the Diet since the end 
of WWII. Related issues have also been explored by a significant number of scholars in 
Japanese politics and law. One of the issues commonly tackled by scholars is whether or 
not dispatching the JSDF to participate in international military operations is 
constitutional. This section will outline the two principal positions that are adopted by 
these scholars: absolute renunciation of war and limited renunciation of war. Proponents 
of the former position interpret Article 9 of the JCL as stating Japan should not participate 
in any kind of international military operations. Conversely, those who adopt the position 
of limited renunciation of war insist that, despite the constitutional prohibition on the use 
of force, Japan may participate in international military operations without revising the 
JCL.  
 
1.2.1. Absolute Renunciation of War 
 
The position of absolute renunciation of war (zenmen sensō hōki) is conceptualised based 
on three elements: first, all of wars, including defensive wars, may be the means of 
settling international disputes; therefore, it is not necessary to distinguish whether or not 
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they are defensive; second, the JCL was enacted after the use of nuclear weapons; 
therefore, the statute should be understand as what is written in the phase; and third, it is 
difficult to distinguish between defensive war and aggression (unjust war). This 
subsection will, therefore, analyse these three elements to understand the idea of absolute 
renunciation of war.  
 
 The first reason adopted for the idea of absolute renunciation of war is 
comparison with the constitutional law of other countries. Compared to countries in Asia, 
Africa, and Central and South America, the JCL is the only constitution to specify both 
renunciation of war and no war potentials. Paragraph one of Article 9 specifies the 
renunciation of aggressive wars; however, paragraph two unconditionally rejects the right 
to belligerency. Therefore, Article 9 of the JCL specifies the renunciation of all wars 
including defensive wars (Hōgaku Kyōkai, 1953, pp. 221–6; Satō, 1955, p. 114; 
Yamauchi, 1992, p. 65). Compared with other constitutions that specify the renunciation 
of war, however, scholars believe that the JCL is special; however, Nishi (1998, p. 24) 
criticises this belief as a myth.  
 
 The second reason comprises the historical issues behind the enactment of the 
JCL. It is common knowledge that the JCL refers to the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact and 
the UN Charter. However, those who adopt the idea of absolute renunciation of war 
contend that international treaties and the JCL differ with respect to their embodiment of 
abstract or concrete ideas: they believe that while international treaties aim to secure a 
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safe and stable international order, the JCL protects the right of Japanese civilians to 
pursue peaceful lives. As it is difficult to establish policies to maintain stable international 
order, they classify international treaties as being based on abstract ideas or an idealistic 
view. Conversely, because it is possible for Japan to realise the policy stated in the JCL’s 
preamble, they classify the JCL as based on concrete ideas (Tsujimura, 2013, pp. 226–7).  
 
 The last reason to support the idea of absolute renunciation of war comprises 
the historical difficulty in distinguishing between defensive war and aggressive war, 
therefore, Article 9 of the JCL renounces all wars including defensive wars (Miyazawa 
and Ashibe, 1978, pp. 161–5; Kiyomiya, 1979, p. 112; Higuchi, 1994, p. 155). Okudaira 
(2013, p.418) adds that the majority of Japanese people support this idea due to their 
experience of suffering during WWII, particularly in Okinawa. At this time, many people, 
particularly in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, suffered from the dropping of atomic bombs in 
1945, while people in many cities in Japan suffered from air strikes.  
 
 For all these reasons, scholars who adopt the idea of absolute renunciation of 
war believe that Japan should not engage in any wars, including defensive action. This 
position is widely accepted by scholars specialising in the JCL (Urabe, 2008, p. 409; 
Okudaira, 2013, p. 409).  
 
1.2.2. Limited Renunciation of War 
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The second position on Japan’s security policy is the limited renunciation of war (gentei-
teki hōki.) Those who adopt this position believe that the Japanese people do not renounce 
war when it is necessary as a means of self-defence and retaliation; in this view, Japan 
can exercise the right to self-defence if attacked by others. This subsection will further 
elucidate the reasons why scholars specialising in the JCL adopt the idea of limited 
renunciation of war.  
 
 The first reason stems from the following phrasing of Article 9: “(…) the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or 
use of force as means of settling international dispute.” In this context, the definition of 
“war” is decisive with regard to whether or not Japan may take defensive action against 
others (Sasaki, 1950, pp. 194–200; Oishi, 1957, pp. 199–206).  
 
 The second reason is based on the history of the JCL, particularly the reasons 
for the enactment of Article 9. It is widely believed that the JCL adopted the idea of 
international treaties, such as the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact and the UN Charter, which 
prohibit the use of military force (Nishi, 1999, pp. 22–4). Taking the Kellogg-Briand Pact 
as an example, it was also well-known as the General Treaty for Renunciation of War as 
an Instrument of National Policy. Under Article 1 of this treaty, the signatory states are 
prohibited from conducting wars “for the solution of international controversies” and “as 
an instrument of national policy.” By contrast, defensive war is not prohibited by the 
treaty. As Article 1 of the Kellogg-Briand Pact specifies that engaging in defensive war 
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is acceptable, scholars who hold the limited renunciation of war view believe that the JCL 
allows Japan to use military force when threatened by others or when necessary to 
maintain international peace and order (Komuro, 2013, p. 313).  
 
 The third element refers to the three principles which represented by Douglas 
MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Power in Japan. According to the second 
principle, “War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an 
instrumentality for settling its disputes and even for preserving its own security. It relies 
upon the higher ideas that are now stirring the world for its defense and protection. No 
Japanese Army, Navy, or Air Force will ever be authorized, and no rights of belligerency 
will ever be conferred upon any Japanese force” (General Headquarters Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers, p. 39). The characteristics of the second principles 
represented in MacArthur note are: “1) Japan renounces all wars, including defensive and 
retaliation ones; 2) Japan does not possess any war potentials; and 3) Japan denies the 
right of belligerency” (ibid).  
 
 While scholars understand that Japan has the right to engage in defensive wars 
despite the JCL specifying the renunciation of war, the interpretation of “war potential” 
differs between scholars. Paragraph two of Article 9 specifies as follows: “In order to 
accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other 
war potential, will never been maintained.” The interpretation of the words “the aim” is 
controversial among scholars who believe that Japan has the right to exercise (individual) 
 29 
self-defence, despite the JCL specifying the renunciation of war.  
 
 A large number of scholars specialising in JCL understand “the aim” to mean 
“an international peace based on justice and order” (Ashibe, 1992, p. 261; Takami, 2000, 
p. 408). In this perspective, “war potential” means military force; on this basis, Ashibe 
(1992) and Takami (2000), like the majority of scholars, believe that Japan should give 
up all military force. Since they adopt this position, their idea can be identified as similar 
to absolute renunciation of war insofar as Japan does not have the right to attack 
aggressors. On the other hand, Nishi and Sasaki analyse the JCL differently: for them, 
“the aim” means “(to) renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation;” therefore, they 
believe that Japan may use military force against aggressors if it is attacked (Nishi, 1995).  
 
 By analysing how various scholars specialising in JCL interpret Article 9, it is 
possible to demonstrate that the majority of such scholars believe that Japan should not 
use military power against aggressors despite the JCL allowing Japan to take defensive 
action against others. There seems to be a difference in their interpretation of Article 9 of 
the JCL; however, both of them have the common understanding that Japan cannot take 
physical defensive action against aggressors. Thus, a significant number of JCL scholars 
disagree with Japan’s participation in international military operations and Japan’s 
military reform.  
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1.3.  The Political Approach: the View of International Relations 
 
While the constitutionality of Japan’s participation in international military operations 
has been discussed by jurists both inside and outside of Japan, extensive analyses from 
the IR perspective have been conducted by scholars of Japanese security. This section 
will clarify the existing Japanese political literature on this issue. Although it is difficult 
to analyse the Japanese state and its people within the IR discipline (Hook et al., 2012, p. 
36), innumerable studies on Japanese security and politics have been developed by 
applying IR theories, such as realism (neo-realism), liberalism (neo-liberalism), and 
constructivism, to the background of governmental decisions. Therefore, this section will 
review the existing Japanese political literature from these three different methodological 
approaches.  
 
1.3.1. Realism/ Neo-Realism 
 
The theory of realism, the first British literary school of IR, have developed based on the 
idea that nation-states are the main actors in international society. Building up with 
individual nation-states, international society is missing the government which controls 
the actors: the international system is named anarchy in realism. Being anarchical causes 
a “security dilemma,” because individual nation-states intend to develop its security 
policy, such as increasing military capabilities, to overcome the other nation-states (Waltz, 
1979; Mogenthau, 2006).  
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Reviewing the case of Japan, the GOJ has been pursuing the normalisation of 
military power since the enactment of the JCL, a phenomenon that can be observed from 
the analyses conducted by the Institute for Strategic Studies. According to a report by 
them, Japan’s defence budget has increased annually, and the 2018 budget was 2.5 percent 
higher than that of the previous year (Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018, p. 224). 
Although the GOJ aims to become a normal state with a normal military capability, Japan 
has been hesitant to develop its military power by, for example, possessing nuclear 
weapons. Due to the dilemma which Japan is in and the deterioration of international 
society since the end of the Cold War, the GOJ has seemingly found it necessary to 
strengthen its relationship with the US to pursue national interests (Shinoda, 2006, p. 77; 
Izumikawa, 2010, p. 151; Singh and Shelter-Jones, 2011, p. 516). From the realist 
perspective, this may be referred to as the conceptual idea of a “security dilemma” 
because Japan has felt a “fear of abandonment” since the 1970s (Tsuchiyama, 2014, p. 
298). As an example of Japan’s fear of abandonment, Tsuchiyama (2014, p. 296-7) raised 
the Kuril Islands dispute (the Northern Territories dispute): in the late 1970s, while Japan 
strengthened its relationship with the US under the US-Japan Security Treaty, Russia 
strengthened its military power, particularly in the Kuril islands. Japan is not only in 
dispute with Russia; however: as is well-known, it is also in dispute with China over the 
Senkaku (Diaoyu) Island and with South Korea over the Liancourt Rocks. Territorial 
disputes between Japan and other East Asian nations are not the only factors that cause 
Japan to feel a “fear of abandonment.” The possibility of North Korea attacking Japan is 
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also an issue. The quick decision of the Koizumi administration to provide logistical 
support to the US military, for example, can be explained by the concern that the US 
would not otherwise support Japan if North Korea were to attack (Wada, 2010, pp. 422–
3). Being on the horns of this “security dilemma” caused by its disputes with other East 
Asian nations has prompted Japan to strengthen its relationship with the US (Ota, 2006, 
p. 64).  
 
While realism explains why Japan has strengthened its relationship with the US 
to pursue its military power, neo-realism theory explains why Japan has strengthened its 
relationship with the US from the perspective of the polarity of the system (Waltz, 1979). 
This idea is widely supported by scholars identify Japan as a “reactive state” (Calder, 
1988, p. 518) which reacts to “external pressure (gaiatsu),” particularly by the US. Not 
all scholars agree with this interpretation; however, others explain Japan’s activity as 
reflecting the characteristics of Japanese diplomacy which they identify as “quiet 
diplomacy” or “aikido diplomacy” referring to the idea of Hook et al. (2001) (Potter and 
Sudo, 2003, pp. 321–2). Hook et al. have also identified Japanese diplomacy as “quiet 
diplomacy,” as reflected in its proactive consensus-building in its foreign policy (Hook 
et al., 2012, p. 73). Although scholars specialising in Japanese security policy have 
different perspectives on Japan’s diploma policy, those who adopt the position that Japan 
is a “reactive state” have the following view: the GOJ believes that Japan has the 
responsibility to react to the US, in particular, because of the US-Japan Security Treaty; 
as the US military has remained in Okinawa, Japan arguably depends on the US to assure 
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its national security; due to its important role in Japan’s security, the US has applied 
invisible pressure (gaiatsu) upon Japan; for instance, requesting logistical support from 
Japan in US-led international military operations. Under strong gaiatsu from the US, the 
GOJ had to dispatch the JSDF to participate in international military operations. However, 
the idea that the GOJ was forced to respond to the US’s request has been criticised on the 
basis that, during the Koizumi administration, gaiatsu from the US to dispatch the JSDF 
was not strong (Midford, 2003, pp. 333; 337–338; Hughes, 2004, p. 431). This can be 
inferred from the GOJ’s decision not to dispatch the JSDF to participate in the Gulf War 
(Soeya, 2005, p. 108). Instead of sending troops, the GOJ decided to support the US and 
its allies in the Gulf War by sending large sums of money to support the multinational 
forces. However, this financial contribution to the Gulf War was not appreciated by 
Kuwait and became a source of shame for Japan. As a result, the GOJ was politically 
determined to avoid a repetition of this situation by offering to participate in subsequent 
international military operations. Due to this stance of the GOJ, the US seemed to expect 
that Japan would participate in US-led international military operations, such as OEF and 
OIF, without gaiatsu (Sato, 2003 p. 2).  
 
 Although the realist-derived theory seemingly explains the reason for 
expenditure on Japan’s military capabilities, the GOJ has put the brakes on Japan’s 
military reform.  
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1.3.2. Liberalism/ Neo-Liberalism 
 
While the theory of realism is based on the idea that states compete to pursue their own 
national interest, liberalism is based on the idea that the conflict of national interests is 
not always an outbreak of war. This theory is derived from the basic idea that states are 
the actors of realism, while individuals and social groups, which are organised to 
exchange common interests, are the actors of liberalism (Moravcsik, 2003, pp. 161–2). 
Although liberalists have found the behaviour of states to lie in such exogenous causes, 
they do not believe that pursuing their own interests is linked to cooperation and an 
international regime. In liberalism, the term “cooperation” is often referred to as the idea 
of “policy coordination,” defined as follows: “A set of decisions is coordinated if 
adjustments have been made in them, such that adverse consequences of any one decision 
for other decisions are to a degree and in some frequency avoided, reduced, or 
counterbalanced or overweighed” (Lindblom, 1965, p. 227). Referring to the idea of 
“policy coordination,” the theory of liberalism emphasises the necessity for cooperation 
as follows: “Cooperation takes place only in situations in which actors perceive that their 
policies are actually or potentially in conflict, not where there is harmony. Cooperation 
should not be viewed as the absence of conflict, but rather as a reaction to conflict or 
potential conflict. Without the specter of conflict, there is no need to cooperate” (Keohane, 
1984, p. 54).  
 
While liberalism explains why Japanese people in general mainly support the 
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non-violation of the idea of pacifism, neo-liberalism explains Japan’s participations in 
the UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKO). Since the JCL specifies the renunciation of 
war; therefore, Japan should not engage in military reform. The majority of people in 
Japan support the idea of anti-militarism, but the GOJ has nevertheless dispatched the 
JSDF to participate in UNPKO activities. The reason for this political shift regarding the 
role of the JSDF can be explained using the theory of neo-liberalism which is based on 
the idea that the aim of the international regime is to pursue public goods. “Public goods” 
is “(…) is as valuable in explaining the forms that cooperation must take, to avoid 
problems of collective action, as it is in accounting for discord” (Keohane, 1984, p. 78). 
Keohane (1984, pp.77-8) gives as example of public goods, the International Energy 
Agency (IEA), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The reason for identifying these international organisations is 
as follows: only members of the IMF, for instance, can borrow from the Fund to solve the 
balance-of-payment problem to avoid a negative impact on the international economy; 
however, non-members may obtain the benefit from the IMF by preventing a negative 
impact on the international society. In Japan’s case, it has found the importance of 
assuming leadership at the regional and global levels: for example, the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum and the UN (Katzenstein and 
Okawara, 2001, p. 162; Hughes and Fukushima, 2004, p. 56; Cooney, 2005, p. 146). 
Therefore, cooperating with other organisations in financial and security issues to pursue 
public goods, therefore, is the key to the idea of neo-liberalism.  
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Focusing on the Japanese security issue, Japan’s contribution to UNPKO 
activities can be explained by the theory of neo-liberalism (Keohane, 1984, p. 177). The 
dispatch of the JSDF to the UNPKO for the purpose of international cooperation (kokusai 
kōken), the key phrase used to evaluate Japan’s security issue under the theory of neo-
liberalism, is a big step forward. As touched upon above, Japanese legal scholars, and 
indeed Japanese people in general, adopt the idea of pacifism to pursue the goal of living 
in peace and order; however, Japan’s security policy has seemingly shifted to neo-
liberalism enabling the JSDF to dispatch the military to engage in UNPKO activities to 
pursue the goal of maintaining international peace and security (O’Hanlon, 2007).  
  
Although the shift in Japan’s security policy from anti-war pacifism to 
international cooperation can be explained using the theories of liberalism and neo-
liberalism, the reason for participating in the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq cannot 
be explained by either of those theories.  
 
1.3.3. Constructivism 
 
The last IR theory examine in this dissertation is constructivism. Unlike realism (neo-
realism) and liberalism (neo-liberalism), constructivism develops the theory by paying 
attention to the so-called “ideational factors,” which are based on the knowledge, based 
on the ideological and socio-cultural ideas, and the so-called “material factors,” which 
are based on power and national interests (Wendt, 1999). Regarding the definition of 
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constructivism, the constructivism-derived theory can explain the reason why a state 
which possesses a nuclear weapon does not use it to its enemy nation which does not 
possess such powerful weapons: this is because a state put brake on using a nuclear 
weapon because it knows how terrible it would be from the lessons of WWII. With the 
knowledge or norms that nuclear weapons should not be used, a nation-state would not 
use it although it is the simple way of defeating its enemy.  
  
In relation to Japanese security policy, Thomas Berger (1993, 1998) points out 
that the “culture of anti-militarism” has been deeply rooted and prevalent in Japanese 
society. The idea “culture of anti-militarism” is the “ideational factor” of Japanese people, 
as the JCL specifies the renunciation of war and the academics support the idea of 
absolute renunciation of war (see 1.2.1.). While the “culture of anti-militarism” lies in 
Japan, the GOJ expands its physical capability in its security by increasing the defensive 
budget (see 1.3.1.). Japan’s goal would not become a normal independent state, as realists 
analyse: it is making the peoples in Japan’s neighbour countries, such as China, South 
Korea, North Korea, and Russia, feel relief by proposing that Japan’s position of the 
“culture of anti-militarism,” which is not widely accepted among normal states (Kimijima, 
2003, p. 17), at the same time, making the peoples in Japan feel the same by expanding 
its physical military capabilities (O’Hanlon, 2007, p.100) 
 
By combining the “ideational factors” and the “material factors,” 
constructivists review Japan’s behaviour on keeping the idea of “culture of anti-
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militarism” and expanding its military capability.  
 
1.4. Conclusion 
 
By reviewing the previous literature on Japanese security, it can be concluded that legal 
scholars have concentrated on the constitutionality of Japan’s participation in 
international military operations, while IR scholars have focused on how Japan’s 
diplomatic strategies can be analysed using IR theories. To conclude this chapter, this 
section will address the issues which scholars in each field of study should have 
considered.  
 
 The arguments of legal scholars on Japan’s participation in international 
military operations regard whether or not the government’s decision is constitutional. 
Since the constitution is a basic norm of the country, Japan should follow its specifications. 
The idea of pacifism is one of the fundamental principles specified in the JCL; therefore, 
many JCL scholars believe it necessary to strictly follow Article 9 of the JCL. However, 
other scholars adopts a different interpretation of “the limited renunciation of war,” and 
see the constitution as a guideline for the state that may be interpreted differently based 
on the situation that Japan is currently facing. Although legal scholars have developed 
innumerable arguments on Japan’s participation in international military operations, this 
dissertation focuses on the lack of consideration of the reasons for Japan’s participation 
in international military operations. Since international military operations occur outside 
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of Japan, Japan should also consider whether participation in such operations violates 
public international law on war rather than whether it violates Japanese domestic law.  
 
 While legal scholars have developed their discussion of Japanese security by 
focusing on whether Japan’s decisions violate the JCL, political scholars have analysed 
why the GOJ reacts in specific ways to incidents using IR theories, such as realism (neo-
realism), liberalism (neo-liberalism), and constructivism. Referring to the theory of 
realism, political scholars have focused on why the GOJ strengthens its relationship with 
the US: “fear of abandonment’ and “security dilemma.” The liberalism-derived theory, 
on the other hand, explains why Japan participates in international military operations, 
particularly international reconstruction activities. Constructivism develops by 
combining with the knowledge based on the ideological, socio-cultural approach and the 
material factors, such as power and interest, so as to interact with others to reconstruct 
international society intersubjectivity. Although IR theories explain why the GOJ made 
such decisions on Japan’s security, such theories have not been used to evaluate whether 
the governmental diplomatic strategy is justified with a moral-philosophical standpoint.  
 
 Due to the lack of consideration of Japan’s participation in international 
military operations, this dissertation seeks to examine whether the GOJ took the 
normative principles of Just War Theory into consideration when deciding to participate 
in international military operations and reviews whether Japan’s participation is justified 
from the moral-philosophical perspective. As touched upon in the Introduction, some 
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politicians, particularly those in Western countries, have adopted the normative principles 
of Just War Theory when deciding to participate in international military operations. 
Moreover, jurisprudence scholars have also reviewed governmental decisions to conduct 
international military operations using the normative principles of Just War Theory. 
Therefore, this dissertation adopts the normative principles of Just War Theory, first 
developed in the Ancient Rome, to answer the research questions proposed: whether or 
not the GOJ took the normative principles of Just War Theory into consideration when 
deciding to participate in international military operations. The next chapter, which 
describes the methodology, will introduce the reasons why the normative principles of 
Just War Theory may be used to answer the research questions. It will then elaborate the 
normative principles of Just War Theory because multiple theories have been developed 
by jurists and philosophers since the Ancient Rome.  
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Chapter Two. Theoretical Approach 
 
As seen in the previous chapter, a huge volume of research has focused on Japan’s 
participation in international military operations from the legal and political, particularly 
the IR, perspectives. However, previous researchers have not evaluated Japan’s 
commitment to international military operations from the moral-philosophical 
perspective, although jurisprudence scholars have examined whether or not the US’s and 
the UK’s decision on engaging in international military operations, such as the 
Afghanistan War and Iraqi War, are justified from the moral-philosophical perspective. 
Thus, this dissertation aims to examine whether the GOJ has considered the moral-
philosophical elements that all states should take into consideration when deciding upon 
participation in international military operations. To this end, this chapter explains what 
the moral-philosophical elements are; the criteria are necessary for all states to consider 
before/during/after international military operations. The moral-philosophical elements 
are established in tandem with an exploration of the Just War Theory, which has its origins 
in Ancient Rome. The first section explores how Just War Theory has influenced to 
international law on war. Based on this foundation, it is clarified that applying moral-
philosophical criteria is a suitable method to answer the research question: whether or not 
the GOJ took the normative principles of Just War Theory into consideration when 
deciding to participate in international military operations. This chapter then proceeds to 
explain Just War Theory. While traditional Just War Theory was developed based on two 
categories, jus ad bellum (the law to war) and jus in bello (the law of war), contemporary 
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Just War Theory has added jus post bellum (the law after war) as a third category. As this 
dissertation deals with the current international situation with respect to war, the moral-
philosophical criteria will be developed under these three terms. To further clarify Just 
War Theory, this dissertation uses two principles applied in public international law on 
war to judge whether war is legally justified: the principles of necessity and 
proportionality (Jennings, 1938; Gray, 2008, pp. 148–56; Greenwood, 2015, paras 25–9). 
Therefore, this chapter develops the moral-philosophical criteria by applying these two 
principles to each term (jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum).  
 
2.1.  Classical Just War Theory  
 
As mentioned above, this section demonstrates how Just War Theory has influenced the 
current international law on wars. Since its inception by Cicero, many philosophers have 
developed Just War Theory over the centuries. This section analyses the traditional ideas 
on just war to clarify the general features thereof. Above all, this section focuses on the 
ideas developed by Cicero, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Francisco de Vitoria, 
Francisco Suarez, and Hugo Grotius. Through the works of these six authors, we will 
define the traditional form of Just War Theory and its influence on the current 
international law on war.  
 
 Cicero (106-43 BC) was amongst the most famous of Roman philosophers and 
statesmen and is well-known as the founder of Just War Theory. His book De Officiis, 
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published in 44 BC, explains how to live, how to act, and how to fulfil duties. Here, 
“duties” means those things that all people must undertake to achieve and maintain well-
being. In this context, he clarifies under what conditions one may use force against others’ 
guilt of wrong-doing. Cicero, however, does not believe that all kinds of military force 
are justifiable: “there is a limit to retribution” (XI Cicero, 45AD bk. I; May, Rovie and 
Viner, 2006, pp. 5–7). “The aggressor”, states Cicero, “should be brought to repent of his 
wrong-doing, in order that he may not repeat the offence and that others may be deterred 
from doing wrong” (ibid). Qualifying his idea that self-defence permits the use of force 
against wrong-doers, Cicero clarifies three principles to follow in responding to wrong-
doings; first, the wrong-doing should be discussed with the wrong-doers before using 
military force; second, we should ensure to mercifully protect those who are unarmed; 
and third, we should avoid unnecessary harm against wrong-doers (ibid). Cicero suggests 
that by following these three principles, we may live in peace and unharmed, which he 
describes as the best way to live.  
 
 In the contemporary context, Cicero’s idea can be compared with those on self-
defence in the UN Charter: Charter VII specifies that the use of force is the last resort that 
should be used to settle disputes. Cicero’s Just War Theory, therefore, seems to describe 
the legitimate conditions under which all states are permitted to use force against an 
enemy; in contemporary terms, this legitimate use of force is identified as individual self-
defence, following Cicero’s original idea. 
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 After Cicero, St. Augustine (354-430 AD) developed his idea of Just War 
Theory in his book Civitas Dei published in 420. This book focuses on five doctrines that 
he believes all Christians should follow: the misery of righteousness, the existence of 
evils, the struggles between the determination of people (violation), the intelligence of 
God (omniscience), and original sin. In explaining the elements that all Christians must 
follow, St. Augustine lists two exceptional cases in which people must kill others: first, 
when homicide is commanded by the government, i.e., jurists and the most reasonable 
source of power; and second, when it is ordered by God (21 Augustine, 420AD bk.I. Ch. 
22; May, Rovie and Viner, 2006, p. 15). In the former case, St. Augustine imagines the 
execution of the death penalty. For him, it is simple to determine the legitimacy of the 
death penalty in each specific case, by verifying that the conditions for imposing that 
sentence have been satisfied. However, the latter case, the obedience to the God’s will, is 
not simple because there are no written necessary conditions to justify homicide in this 
case. Civitas Dei, therefore, refers to two rules that all Christians must follow to comply 
with God’s orders; first, do not harm others; and second, give support to everyone you 
possibly can (14 Augustine, 420AD bk. XIX; May, Rovie and Viner, 2006, pp. 15–20). 
Overall, these two rules reflect his idea of just war.  
 
 Unlike Cicero, St. Augustine pays no attention to the righteousness of war; 
however, he does emphasise the importance of minimising harm. For St. Augustine, it is 
difficult to define the righteousness of peace; while everyone seeks peace, each might 
have a different perspective on its meaning. Nevertheless, he believes that the first rule, 
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do not harm others, is a common understanding of peace. Therefore, his idea is 
encapsulated as, “there is no man who does not wish for peace” (May, Rovie and Viner, 
2006, pp. 16–17) . Since people have different backgrounds, such as language or religion, 
they may have different values regarding peace; however, he believes that people’s 
response to the question of whether waging war is legitimate is the same for all. Therefore, 
he sets the first condition, not to violate others, because he believes that this rule reflects 
the words of the Apostle Paul: “anyone who does not take care of his own people, 
especially those in his own household, is worse than an unbeliever” (14 Augustine, 
420AD bk. XIX; May, Rovie and Viner, 2006, pp. 15–20).  
 
 The next prominent figure to develop Just War Theory was St. Thomas Aquinas 
(1224-1274), in his book Summa Theologicae published in 1265. This book outlines the 
Christian theologies, such as Theology Proper (the existence of God), the Creation, 
Theological Anthropology (human being), Hamartiology (the purpose of human 
existence), Christology (the existence of Christ), the Sacraments, and Soteriology (the 
callings to Heaven). His idea of Just War Theory can be roughly divided into three 
elements: the law of God, natural law theory, and human law, and is located in the second 
idea. St. Thomas Aquinas thereby establishes his theory based on natural law theory with 
these seven Christian theologies from the legal more than the moral perspective. He refers 
extensively to the ideas of St. Augustine in examining the conditions under which it is 
legitimate for people to use military force against others. In Summa Theologicae, he 
clarifies that there are three conditions that must be satisfied for a war to be justified: the 
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authority of sovereign states, a just cause to engage in war, and the right intention to 
conduct a war, such as the elimination of wrong-doers (Thoma, 1265 para. 28656 q. 11 a. 
1 ad. 1-3; May, Rovie and Viner, 2006, pp. 27–28). St. Thomas Aquinas specifies that 
killing people who engage in wrong-doing is justified because he identifies them as 
beasts: as he deems it lawful for us to kill beasts, he also believes we may kill wrong-
doers. Killing wrong-doers, he says, will be for the wealth of the whole community (q. 
11 Thoma, 1265 para. 28654; May, Rovie and Viner, 2006, pp. 27–28). Regarding the 
killing of innocent people, he contends that this can only be justified when it is God’s 
will. By way of explanation, St. Thomas Aquinas uses the story of Abraham as an example. 
He asserts that Abraham’s decision to sacrifice his son was justified because it was 
commanded by God’s will. Although he accepts that killing innocents is justified when 
ordered by God, he considers it otherwise unlawful to kill innocents, since this act does 
not bring us any happiness. In sum, St. Thomas Aquinas accepts the legitimacy of killing 
innocents in obedience to God’s will. However, he criticises the killing of innocents 
without God’s will because doing so means destroying the world that God has created.  
 
 St. Thomas Aquinas also mentions self-defence as a situation in which it is 
lawful to kill others. He specifies two conditions that must be satisfied to justify the use 
of force: first, it is necessary in order to save one’s life; and second, it is necessary in 
order to destroy the homicide of the aggressors (Thoma, 1265 v. 7; May, Rovie and Viner, 
2006, pp. 31–33). These conditions are based on the idea that we should preserve as it is 
the world that God has created for us. He believes that the use of force to protect others 
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might contravene God’s will. Therefore, he does not fully accept self-defence as a lawful 
justification for using force against aggressors or wrong-doers. He also emphasises the 
necessity of considering the degree of force used against wrong-doers as people should 
avoid killing others in order to be saved from God. Therefore, people must consider these 
three elements to justify acts in self-defence.  
 
 Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546), a Spanish Renaissance Roman Catholic 
philosopher, theologian, and jurist, expands his Just War Theory based on the conflict 
between Christians and non-Christians. His idea on Just War Theory is specified in his 
book De Jure Belli published in 1532, and his lecture De Indis delivered in the same year. 
He believes it necessary to regulate through laws, one of which is Just War Theory, to 
maintain public goods (Vitoria, 1532 sec. 14; May, Rovie and Viner, 2006, p. 40). 
Therefore, he asserts that it is necessary to follow Just War Theory for the sake of common 
(or public) goods, referring to peace and security. On that basis, de Vitoria believes it is 
lawful to wage war to maintain peace and security: self-defence is the only case in which 
physical power may be used against wrong-doing. He also specifies, in De Jure Belli, 
how much physical power should be used against wrong-doing: according to his book, it 
is legitimate to kill wrong-doers because such homicide may help to recover the common 
good of peace (Vitoria, 1532 sec. 15; May, Rovie and Viner, 2006, p. 40). In this sense, 
de Vitoria regards the death penalty as a legitimate means to maintain peace and security. 
He also insists that killing innocent people may be inevitable in a necessary attack to 
eliminate the guilty or wrong-doers (Vitoria, 1532 sec. 35; May, Rovie and Viner, 2006, 
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pp. 40–41).  
 
 Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), a Spanish Jesuit priest and philosopher who 
taught in Rome and Salamanca, published his book De virtute et statu religionis in 1608-
09. He develops his Just War Theory from the scholastic perspective, dividing the theory 
into three elements: jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum. His idea of jus ad 
bellum comprises six components related to the fundamental elements of Just War 
Theory: moral permission to engage in war; the difference between defensive and 
offensive war; moral justification to declare war; the requirements to defend others; 
theological constraints to avoid war; and the moral effects of waging war. He then 
proceeds to deal with six components of jus in bello: the classification of innocent people 
and their exemptions; the “doctrine of double effects,” namely military action with 
unintended consequences and that with intended consequences; the relationship between 
defensive rights and incidental damage; the possibility for an alliance to participate in 
war; the characteristics of civil war; and the justification for deceiving the enemy (May, 
Rovie and Viner, 2006, pp. 59–62). Suarez gives two examples to develop his idea of jus 
in bello: participating in highly risky missions in South America and committing a suicide 
attack within a civil war (May, Rovie and Viner, 2006, pp. 62–63). Finally, Suarez 
identifies three elements of jus post bellum: justification of victory; the right to conclude 
a peace treaty; and the right for the victor to acquire property in the defeated enemy’s 
territory (May, Rovie and Viner, 2006, p. 64). Considering all three factors related to Just 
War Theory, jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum, Suarez concludes that a just 
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cause is not a necessary component for his Just War Theory, because he believes that the 
other elements of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum are more important. He 
seems to see justice only in the context of a war situation. Therefore, he believes it 
necessary to satisfy the elements of all three factors of Just War Theory in order to justify 
war.  
 
 Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), one of the best-known lawyers of the seventeenth 
century and a specialist in public international law, published his book De jure beli ac 
pacts in 1625. This book details his idea of Just War Theory, in which he attempts to 
combine theology and jurisprudence to examine what conditions should be fulfilled for 
states to wage war. He attempts to ground his Just War Theory not only in law and 
morality but also in the concept of rights, a newly developed idea of jurisprudence in the 
Enlightenment. This is explained in his book as follows: “where juridical settlement fails, 
war begins” (Grotius, 1631 bk. II Ch. I, sec. II, para. II; May, Rovie and Viner, 2006, pp. 
66–68). He specifies self-defence as a justifiable use of force, believing that states have 
the right to protect their territory and people from enemies. Grotius then considers the 
conditions for determining the legitimacy of war. He asserts that there is only one 
situation in which a state can legitimately wage war: when attacked by an enemy (Grotius, 
1631 bk. II. Ch. I. Sec. I para. 4; May, Rovie and Viner, 2006, p. 70). This is the 
requirement for jus ad bellum. With regard to jus in bello, Grotius identifies three 
conditions: when a war will end; how to carry out a military operation; and how to treat 
soldiers (ibid). Although his conditions for jus in bello lack clarity, he explains the 
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necessity for a state to engage in war in terms of rights.  
 
 By analysing six prominent authors involved in the development of classical 
Just War Theory, we have identified many different elements of the theory as posited by 
philosophers and jurists since Ancient Rome. We have also observed that, in developing 
Just War Theory, some philosophers and jurists, namely St. Thomas Aquinas, de Vitoria, 
Suarez, and Grotius, have combined theory and jurisprudence. They apply theology to 
the situation of just war to explain why rules must be observed in using military force 
against wrong-doing. As regards necessity, they unanimously consider self-defence a 
justifiable reason for using force against others. In sum, this analysis of classical Just War 
Theory has clarified the necessity to combine theology and practice to develop Just War 
Theory.  
 
2.2.  Just War Theory as a Methodology  
 
This section describes the elements required to justify the use of force against wrong-
doing. Since there is limited research applying Just War Theory to contemporary cases of 
international military operations, this dissertation seeks to extend and adapt existing 
research on just war.  
 
 To apply Just War Theory to contemporary cases of international military 
operations, this section will separately consider each of the three categories of Just War 
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Theory: jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum. The first category, jus ad bellum, 
establishes certain criteria to determine whether a war is justified. The second category, 
jus in bello, examines whether the way in which war is conducted is justifiable. Finally, 
the third category, jus post bellum, examines whether the victors of war fairly treat the 
defeated opponents.  
 
 Based on these three categories of Just War Theory, this dissertation will adopt 
two principles applied by public international law on war to elaborate the legitimacy of 
war: the principle of necessity and the principle of proportionality. Although neither 
principle is specified in contemporary regulations on war, such as the UN Charter, the 
Rome Statute of the International Court, or the Geneva Convention, both principles have 
been commonly recognised in customary international law (Gray, 2008, pp. 203–207). 
These two principles were first applied to the case of the Caroline affair in 1837 (Jennings, 
1938). US Senator Daniel Webster (1841-1843) explained the foundational criteria of 
these two principles as follows: the “necessary of that self-defense is instant, 
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation” 
(Webster, 1842). The Webster’s doctrine has been widely accepted as the locus classicus 
for self-defence. For example, it was applied by the International Court of Justice to 
examine whether the US actions in Nicaragua constituted legitimate self-defence (Merits, 
1986). Thus, Webster’s doctrine can be considered an accepted tenet of public 
international law on war. While it has been widely applied to solving practical issues on 
self-defence, Walzer suggests that the Webster’s doctrine also sustains moral-
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philosophical considerations as an appeal to war (Walzer, 2006, pp. 74–75).  
 
 By combining the two applicable principles of public international law on war 
(the principles of necessity and proportionality) with the three categories of Just War 
Theory (jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum), there are six composite 
components to explore in relation to the contemporary situation of international military 
operations.  
 
2.2.1. Jus ad Bellum 
 
The idea of jus ad bellum has been widely developed by many modern jurists and 
philosophers, such as Michael Walzer, John Rawls, and Larry May. Their ideas of jus ad 
bellum comprise five factors for consideration, which seem to have been taken from 
classical Just War Theory: just cause; right intention; proper authority; last resort; and 
proportionality. This section will explain the required considerations for jus ad bellum. 
By analysing modern Just War Theory, its application to the contemporary situation of 
international military operations will be elaborated.  
 
2.2.1.i. The Principle of Necessity 
 
The principle of necessity considers why military force needs to be deployed to a just 
cause and the right intention. These two ideas represent the principle of necessity in this 
dissertation. Therefore, this section will examine how modern philosophers and jurists 
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interpret just cause and right intention in their ideas of Just War Theory. To describe this 
principle, two cases will be separately considered: individual self-defence and collective 
self-defence.  
 
 Beginning with individual self-defence, this should first be examined from the 
legal perspective. The legal justification for resorting to war is specified in the UN Charter, 
while illegal use of force is identified in the UN Charter, the Rome Statute of the 
International Court, and the Geneva Convention. According to Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, defensive action to resist an external attack is legally justified; since attack 
violates sovereignty, force may be used to protect territorial integrity and innocent 
citizens. Thus, in legal terms, the state can exercise the right to individual self-defence if 
subjected to an armed attack.  
  
 With regard to collective self-defence, this involves third parties, used in this 
dissertation to mean sovereign states (sometimes in alliance) that are not participants in 
the original conflict but become involved to maintain international peace and security. 
Given our primary focus on current international military operations, collective self-
defence is more relevant than individual self-defence. The legal justification for 
exercising the right to collective self-defence is also specified in Article 51 of the UN 
Charter; therefore, the same approach applied in justifying the exercise of the right to 
individual self-defence would be taken with respect to the legal examination. However, 
the justifications for exercising the two distinct rights appear to be distinguished by 
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moral-philosophical perspective; therefore, this subsection will analyse how moral-
philosophers view the exercising of the rights to individual self-defence and collective 
self-defence.  
 
a) Michael Walzer 
 
Michael Walzer (b. 1935), a well-known American political theorist, published his book 
Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations in 1977. He 
explains his idea of just war by referring to classical works on the theory, such as those 
of Francisco de Vitoria and Hugo Grotius. To develop his idea of Just War Theory, Walzer 
examines under what conditions a state can wage a war. He commences his examination 
by formulating a state as an entity “for the sake of life and liberty” (Walzer, 2006, p. 61). 
Defining aggression against a state as the violation of “life and liberty,” Walzer criticises 
such action on two grounds. The first criticism is that acts of aggression force a state’s 
civilians, the victims of attack, to fight for their lives and liberty against their will (Walzer, 
2006, pp. 51–52). As the second criticism, Walzer continues that acts of aggression violate 
“rights to which we attach enormous importance (…) that are worth dying for”, as the 
second criticism (Walzer, 2006, p. 53). With these two reasons, Walzer believes that a 
state can wage war to protect its political rights. Brian Orend summarises Walzer’s view 
as follows: the government is obliged to “shape its domestic policies within its own 
borders, free of foreign coercion or control” (Orend, 2000, p. 89).  
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 Walzer also insists on the necessity for allied states to take defensive action, 
defined as collective self-defence. Referring to alliance, Walzer reasons that because an 
aggressor may violate the alliance of a state with others, the alliance has the right to use 
military power against the aggressors (Walzer, 2006, p. 53). This is because protecting an 
alliance or political community is related to the “life and liberty” of individual states. 
Therefore, Walzer contends that an alliance has the right to exercise collective self-
defence, if the “life and liberty” of a state can, thereby, be maintained.  
 
 In concluding, in his idea of Just War Theory, Walzer stipulates three conditions 
that must be satisfied for a state to use force against others: first, the aggressor must 
demonstrate a clear intention to violate the state; second, the aggressor must have 
prepared sufficiently to carry out its plan to violate the state; and third, exercising military 
force against the aggressor must be the only way for the state to resolve the situation 
(Walzer, 2006, pp. 80–81). When all three conditions are satisfied, Walzer asserts that the 
state or its allied countries has the right to exercise self-defence against an aggressor. For 
Walzer, these three conditions collectively form the principle of necessity in jus ad bellum.  
 
b) John Rawls 
 
John Rawls (1921-2002), an American moral and political philosopher, deals with Just 
War Theory in his book The Law of People: with “the Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 
the first version of which was published in 1999. His idea of Just War Theory is developed 
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by attempting to apply a liberal idea of justice to “the Law of Peoples.” Before developing 
his idea of Just War Theory, Rawls specifies what he means by “the Law of Peoples.” He 
gives eight principles, based upon a liberal idea of justice: people should respect the 
freedom and independence of other peoples; people should observe treaties; people 
should treat others equally; peoples should not interfere with others; people have the right 
to exercise self-defence; people should pay attention to human rights; people should 
follow the rules of conducting war; and people should help others if their human rights 
are violated (Rawls, 2006, p. 37). In these eight principles of “the Law of Peoples,” Rawls 
focuses particularly on protecting human rights.  
 
 Based on his description of “the Law of Peoples,” Rawls divides people into 
two categories: those who obey “the Law of Peoples” and those who do not. He names 
the first category “well-ordered peoples,” comprising “reasonable liberal peoples,” who 
follow “the Law of Peoples” without any hesitation in their relationship, and “decent 
peoples,” who accept and follow “the Law of Peoples.” Rawls’ second category is “not 
well-ordered peoples,” which comprises three types: first, “outlaw states,” whose people 
refuse to obey “the Law of Peoples”; second, “the societies burdened by unfavorable 
conditions”; and third, those characterised by “benevolent absolutism,” who deny “the 
Law of Peoples” in making political decisions (Rawls, 2006, p. 4).  
 
 According to his categorisation of peoples, aggressors, those people who 
initiate territorial disputes and violate human rights, are defined as “not well-ordered 
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peoples” in the subcategory of “outlaw states,” because they ignore the principles of “the 
Law of Peoples.” As Rawls believes that “well-ordered peoples” do not use military force 
against others without justification, he considers the case in which “well-ordered peoples” 
would have the right to wage war (jus ad bellum). According to his idea of the principle 
of necessity in jus ad bellum, “well-ordered peoples” have the right to wage war when it 
is necessary to defend their human rights from aggressors or “outlaw states.”  
 
 As well as justifying military action in pursuit of individual self-defence, Rawls 
also argues that exercising the right to collective self-defence is moral-philosophically 
justified: “peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions 
that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime” (Rawls, 2006, p. 37). 
Overall, Rawls considers that it is justifiable to exercise the right to collective self-defence 
to protect human rights. This purpose derives from one of the principles of “the Law of 
Peoples,” pursuant to which a threatened state’s alliance has the right to exercise 
collective self-defence. 
 
 Rawls develops his idea of Just War Theory on the basis that a state obeying 
“the Law of Peoples” has the right to exercise self-defence. He stipulates only one 
situation in which war can be justified: when the people of “outlaw states” violate the 
human rights of others (Rawls, 2006, p. 90). According to The Law of Peoples: with “the 
Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” Rawls insists that it is incumbent on “well-ordered 
peoples” to make other peoples who do not obey “the Law of Peoples” follow said law 
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(Rawls, 2006, pp. 36–37). Thus, Rawls limits the use of military force by “well-ordered 
peoples” to situations in which an aggressor violates their human rights.  
 
c) Larry May 
 
Larry May is an American political philosopher specialising in international criminal law. 
In his book War Crimes and Just War, published in 2007, he considers the principle of 
necessity in jus ad bellum. As his theory of just war is based on public international law 
on war, including customary international law, he only accepts self-defence as a 
justification for war. Although he bases his Just War Theory on public international law 
on war, he specifies the difficulty of applying Article 1 of the Annex to the Hague 
Convention to contemporary cases. Because the soldiers of contemporary international 
armed attacks do not wear uniforms and do not carry weapons openly, it is difficult to 
distinguish between combatants and non-combatants (May, 2007, pp. 93–103) . 
Recognising the difficulty of identifying whom to attack, May clarifies four conditions 
that must be satisfied to justify the use of force against others: first, the prevention of 
significant harm; second, this harm must be an imminent threat; third, there must be no 
other way to prevent this harm; and fourth, the harm inflicted by the defensive action 
must not exceed the harm that would otherwise have been caused (May, 2007, p. 292). 
May asserts that all four conditions must be satisfied to justify defensive military action.  
  
 Compared with Walzer and Rawls, May does not distinguish the cases of 
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collective and individual self-defence: instead, he considers his four conditions equally 
applicable to both forms of self-defence. May emphasises the importance of international 
society treating people with humaneness and mercy (May, 2007, pp. 104–118). In this 
regard, he believes that only the fulfilment of all four conditions can justify the use of 
force against others.  
 
d) Summary  
 
None of these three authors’ Just War Theory seems to facilitate applying the Annex of 
the Hague Convention to conflict today. Therefore, moral-philosophical criteria are 
needed to provide guidelines on minimising the damage or harm caused by defensive 
actions. To minimise the violation of human rights, there are two factors to consider in 
determining whether defensive actions are justified: first, whether resorting to war is the 
only option; and second, how combatants and non-combatants are distinguished. The first 
element was considered by all three authors in developing their own Just War Theory, 
while the second element is particularly relevant to the current situation in international 
society. Accurately distinguishing between non-combatants and combatants should 
reduce the number of people whose human rights are violated without justification. The 
goal of protecting human rights in general reflects a liberal perspective of justice, as 
advocated by Rawls. Therefore, a state should select its attack targets carefully to 
minimise the innocent victims of defensive actions.  
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2.2.1.ii. The Principle of Proportionality 
 
While the principle of necessity guides decision-makers on whether a situation requires 
military action, the principle of proportionality helps them to decide how much military 
power they can legitimately use for defensive actions. Even where a state satisfies the 
principle of necessity in jus ad bellum, a state or its allied countries cannot use excessive 
power against an aggressor because it may comprise paranoid aggression (Crawford, 
2015, p. 34). The theories of the three just war jurists and philosophers, Michael Walzer, 
John Rawls, and Larry May, will be further analysed in this section to clarify how much 
military power can legitimately be used for defensive action. With their description of the 
principle of proportionality, this section will extend Just War Theory to apply it to 
contemporary international military operations.  
 
a) Michael Walzer 
 
In Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, Walzer uses the 
word “vulnerable,” instead of “proportional” in relation to jus ad bellum. He suggests that 
vulnerability is one of the elements which politicians must consider before deciding to 
wage war. Adopting the words of David Hume, “the object in war is a better state of peace” 
(Hume, 1951, pp. 190–191), Walzer develops his idea on why vulnerability is essential in 
jus ad bellum (Walzer, 2006, p. 121). As explored above, Walzer believes that the 
violation of civilians’ “life and liberty” is a just cause for waging war. However, even 
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where violation by an aggressor exists, Walzer argues that politicians should not decide 
to wage war without considering the circumstances and political consequences of so 
doing: in particular, politicians should consider the idea of vulnerability. As Walzer 
emphasises, “war kills; that is all it does;” thus, a war may kill the civilians whose “life 
and liberty” should be protected by the state (Walzer, 2006, p. 109). Walzer, therefore, 
requires that politicians or other decision-makers decide which is safer: waging war or 
taking moderate action against the aggressor (status quo). This reflects Walzer’s meaning 
of vulnerability in this context: “states must evaluate and compare their vulnerability in a 
war situation and in maintaining the status quo.” If civilians’ “life and liberty” become 
less vulnerable by waging war than through the status quo, Walzer believes that waging 
war becomes justifiable. On the other hand, deciding to wage war that may increase the 
number of victims is not justifiable, even when there is a just cause for a state to wage 
war. This is Walzer’s boundary line for distinguishing between justifiable and 
unjustifiable defensive war. 
 
b) John Rawls 
 
Rawls only briefly elaborates his idea of the principle of proportionality in jus ad bellum. 
His approach to jus ad bellum is based on the belief that well-ordered people should obey 
the idea of “the Law of Peoples:” he also accepts that well-ordered people have the right 
to use military action against those who violate their human rights. Although Rawls thus 
accepts that “well-ordered peoples” have the right to exercise self-defence, he describes 
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self-defence as follows: “their [liberal and decent peoples’] defense is (…) only their first 
and most urgent task” (Rawls, 2006, pp. 92–93). Rawls, therefore, suggests that self-
defence should be the last resort. This is Rawls’ only allusion to the principle of 
proportionality. His idea that self-defence should be the last resort is evident in another 
part of The Law of Peoples: with “the Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” in which he 
emphasises the importance of diplomacy (Rawls, 2006, pp. 92–93). Thus, Rawls’ idea of 
jus ad bellum is that “well-ordered peoples” may exercise the right to self-defence if and 
when their negotiation with the peoples of “outlaw states” fails. 
 
c) Larry May 
 
May articulates that when deciding whether or not to exercise the right to self-defence, a 
state’s politicians must consider how to minimise the violation of human rights. To 
explain why this is important, he adopts the humanity point of view, based on the theories 
of Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbs (May, 2007, pp. 57–8). As May advocates respect 
for human rights in general, he emphasises that every individual should be treated 
humanely, including prisoners of war, according to the principle of proportionality in jus 
ad bellum (May, 2007, pp. 59–60). As the theory of Grotius has already been examined 
in 2.1, this section will only consider May’s recent study of the principle of 
proportionality, sometimes termed the humanity principle, as one of the normative 
principles in this dissertation.  
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 May explains the importance of considering the principle of proportionality as 
follows: “[the principle of proportionality is] a restraint on the principle of military 
necessity” (May, 2007, p. 218). May proceeds to emphasise that if a state is only takes 
the principle of proportionality into consideration by exercising the right to self-defence, 
it could be regarded “as a complete defense against the use of otherwise inhumane tactics” 
(May, 2007, p. 219). Taking the example of the Bush administration’s decision to invade 
Afghanistan in 2001, May asserts that they did not consider the principle of 
proportionality, because the attack did not treat all people humanely. The principle of 
proportionality is evidently intended to temper military necessity; thus, considering this 
principle potentially reduces the numbers of innocent victims. Overall, May believes that 
the principle of proportionality is the most important factor in jus ad bellum. Nevertheless, 
international humanitarian law pays less attention to this principle (May, 2007, p. 219).  
 
d) Summary 
 
From the works of these three authors, we can conclude that a state should consider the 
protection of human rights when deciding whether or not to wage war. Although, as May 
observes, international humanitarian law does not adequately consider this issue, this 
consideration is a missing-link to other authors, such as Walzer and Rawls. If a state’s 
politicians or decision-makers do not adequately consider the protection of human rights 
before waging war, the aggressors might retaliate against the defensive action. To prevent 
a chain of retaliation, a state should minimise the degree of force used in self-defence. 
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Therefore, it is important for a state to consider the principle of proportionality to justify 
its defensive action against aggressors.  
 
2.2.2. Jus in Bello 
 
Like jus ad bellum, the concept of jus in bello has been widely developed by many jurists 
and philosophers. Their ideas of jus in bello comprise two elements: first, a state’s 
politicians or decision-makers should observe the rules of war, such as the declaration of 
war; second, all soldiers should obey the rules of war, such as the prohibition on using 
weapons from which the victims would suffer. These two elements are taken from 
classical Just War Theory. This section will explain what kind of considerations in jus in 
bello are required to justify a war. To clearly illustrate the factors for consideration, the 
two principles used in the previous section, necessity and proportionality, will be used 
once more. By analysing modern Just War Theory, the theory’s application to 
contemporary international military operations will be elaborated.  
 
2.2.2.i. The Principle of Necessity 
 
It is widely believed that international humanitarian law, such as the Geneva Conventions, 
aims to protect human dignity (May, 2007, p. 9). Therefore, the principle of necessity in 
jus in bello specifies what actions are legitimate for combatants. Based on international 
humanitarian law, modern just war jurists and philosophers identify two key elements: 
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the first is the necessity to distinguish between combatants to be attacked and non-
combatants to be rescued; and the second is the importance of considering under what 
conditions a state’s soldiers may use military force. We will, therefore, analyse how 
modern jurists and philosophers have developed their respective ideas on these two issues.  
 
 This section will first consider how the issue of identifying combatants has been 
approached in the field of public international law. According to Article 1 of the Annex 
to the Hague Convention, four criteria can be used to define belligerents: responsibility 
for commanding operations or supervising soldiers; wearing uniforms bearing a symbol 
that shows membership of militant groups; carrying weapons openly; and conducting 
operations according to the laws and customs of war. The use of force by a state’s soldier 
is legitimate against any individual satisfying one or more of these four criteria because 
they are categorised as belligerents. Conversely, even persons meeting none of these four 
criteria should, from a legal perspective, be protected.  
 
 The four criteria can thus be seen as the basic elements in examining jus in 
bello. However, for the modern jurists and philosophers who have considered Just War 
Theory in relation to the current situation in international society, particularly Larry May, 
these four criteria are old-fashioned: the combatants of international militant groups, such 
as al-Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS,) neither wear uniforms nor carry 
weapons openly. Thus, in the complex situation facing international society today, moral-
philosophical perspectives can offer certain guidelines for a state’s soldiers to judge 
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whether people on the battlefield are identified as belligerents.  
 
(a) Michael Walzer 
 
In developing his idea of the principle of necessity in jus in bello, Walzer believes that 
those who fulfil the four criteria in Article 1 intend to kill their enemy by referring to the 
Annex of the Hague Convention (Walzer, 2006, p. 136). Walzer describes two specific 
situations in which people on the battlefield should be considered belligerents: the first 
situation is when soldiers are forced to fight; and the second situation is when soldiers are 
neither wearing uniforms with a symbol of militant affiliation, nor carrying weapons 
openly. This section will analyse the reason why Walzer defines people in these situations 
as belligerents.  
 
 First, why does Walzer believes that soldiers forced to fight should be identified 
as combatants? Walzer’s classification justifies treating military conscripts in the same 
way as commanders and willing soldiers, both professional and volunteers. Although he 
understands that military conscripts are forced to fight, he recognises them as combatants 
because they technically choose to accept their conscriptions. Walzer believes such 
individuals face a dilemma between two risks: of their human rights being violated by 
disobeying conscription orders and of killing their enemies by following commanders’ 
orders (Walzer, 2006, p. 306). Therefore, he contends that those who decide to serve as 
military conscripts, despite their option to refuse, should be categorised as legitimate 
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targets of military force.  
 
 Second, Walzer describes soldiers who seem to lack intent to kill or harm their 
enemies. Walzer considers five practical situations in which soldiers might lack the 
intention to harm or kill: when a soldier is escaping from the battle zone with his head 
down and his arms stretched out in front of him; when a soldier is taking a bath; when a 
half-dressed soldier is carrying out a message to an officer; when an armed soldier is 
wandering like a sleepwalker; and when a soldier is taking a break, such as talking, 
drinking a cup of coffee, or smoking (Walzer, 2006, pp. 139–142). The first three 
situations demonstrate how to deal with disarmed soldiers, while the fourth and fifth 
illustrate situations in which armed soldiers are leaving wars or international military 
operations. He uses these situations to argue that some individuals who should be treated 
as belligerents do not fulfil the third and fourth criteria. Walzer also believes that people 
who do not fulfil the conditions specified by the Annex to the Hague Convention may 
nonetheless be defined as belligerents, if they intend to kill their enemies (Walzer, 2006, 
p. 142). Based on Walzer’s perspective, terrorists and guerrilla fighters, for instance, are 
defined as belligerents.  
 
 Overall, to distinguish combatants from non-combatants, Walzer relies on 
whether an individual has chosen to kill their enemies: in other words, he classifies 
belligerents as those who have the intention to kill or harm their enemies. While Walzer 
gives a clear definition of belligerents, he also specifies situations when they should not 
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be subjected to military force: that is, when they are captured or surrender. Walzer argues 
that prisoners of war are not belligerents because they have usually lost their intent to kill 
or harm their enemies (Walzer, 2006, pp. 46–47). Thus, he distinguishes combatants from 
non-combatants by whether they have the intention to kill or harm their enemies.  
 
(b) John Rawls 
 
As seen in the previous subsection, Rawls believes that a defensive action in which “well-
ordered peoples” attack against those in “outlaw states” comprises just war. On the 
question of identifying combatants, Rawls believes that those people who belong to 
“outlaw states” can be categorised as such. However, to distinguish combatants from non-
combatants, Rawls divides the people of “outlaw states” into three groups: government 
leaders or commanders; soldiers; and civilians. Of these three groups, Rawls asserts that 
only the first group are a legitimate target for military force by “well-ordered people,” 
while those in the other groups should be protected from the principle of necessity, 
according to the “Law of Peoples” (Rawls, 2006, pp. 94–95). Rawls believes that since 
government leaders or commanders have prepared the acts of aggressions, they should be 
categorised as combatants. On the other hand, Rawls defines the soldiers and civilians of 
“outlaw states” as non-combatants because they are not responsible for the military 
actions. Asserting that it is possible for the soldiers and civilians of “outlaw states” to 
follow the “Law of Peoples” because they did not have any chance of knowing the 
normative elements of “the Law of Peoples” due to the restriction from government 
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leaders or commanders of “outlaw states,” Rawls adopts the position that they should not 
be accused of war crimes. Rawls’ idea of the principle of necessity in jus in bello can be 
summarised as follows: “well-ordered peoples” should not direct force against people 
pressured into following the rules of “outlaw states,” while the leaders or commanders of 
those states should be prosecuted as war criminals because they willingly disobey the 
“Law of Peoples” (Rawls, 2006, pp. 95–96). Overall, Rawls believes that the distinction 
between belligerents and non-belligerents is based on whether or not they accept the idea 
of the “Law of Peoples.” 
 
(c) Larry May 
 
Following the just war theories of Hugo Grotius, Francisco Suarez, and St. Augustine, 
May believes that all individuals should be treated with humaneness and mercy (May, 
2007, pp. 104–118). This is the basis for May’s development of his principle of necessity 
in jus in bello, which includes prisoners of war (May, 2007, p. 112). Compared with Rawls 
and Walzer, May does not attach importance to defining combatants, because of the 
current situation in international society prevent this: guerrilla activity, for instance, is 
conducted by people who neither wear uniforms nor openly carry weapons. Rather than 
focusing on defining combatants, May develops his idea on the principle of necessity by 
contemplating, “how should we treat people with humaneness and mercy?”. Answering 
this question, May develops his idea of the principle of necessity in jus in bello in the 
book War Crime and Just War. The protection of human rights is the most essential idea 
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to prevent military force from being used against others. However, May asserts that the 
use of military power may sometimes be permitted for the sake of “the agony of war” 
(May 2007, pp.192-194). The idea of “the agony of war” is based on the words of Harry 
Trumann when deciding to drop nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki as follows: 
“we have used it [the bombs] in order to shorten the agony of war, in order to save the 
lives of thousands and thousands of young Americans” (ibid). Adopting the idea of Harry 
Trumann, he specifies that the use of poisons and chemical weapons may sometimes be 
permitted. Thus, as long as its use would relieve the pain of those who are suffering from 
death, we may accept to the use of military force.  
 
 Overall, May’s idea on the principle of necessity in jus in bello is based on 
treating people with mercy and humaneness. Exercising military force violates rights, 
which is the antithesis of mercy and humaneness; therefore, we should not wield any 
military weapons against others. However, May does not prohibit the use of military force 
entirely: weapons may be used if their use would relieve the pain of the people. This is 
because he believes that struggling with the pain to the point of death contravenes mercy 
and humaneness.  
 
 While May mentions prisoners of war, he also touches on how government 
leaders and/or commanders and soldiers should be treated. He adopts the position that all 
government leaders and/or commanders and state soldiers should be treated with mercy 
and humaneness, and brought to international courts to be tried for their war crimes.  
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(d) Summary  
 
Each of the three philosophers and jurists described above comes to the conclusion that 
the violation of human rights should be minimised. To achieve this goal, each develops 
the idea of the principle of necessity in jus in bello. However, in the current situation 
faced by international society, it is difficult to distinguish between civilians and soldiers 
because the latter wear no uniforms or other insignia to demonstrate their affiliation to 
international militant groups. Therefore, “well-ordered peoples” are required to carefully 
consider how to treat the peoples of “outlaw states:” this problem includes the application 
of moral-philosophical judgment by 1) deciding what a state’s soldiers should consider is 
necessary to maintain international peace and security, in relation to those they encounter 
in battle; and 2) whether the use of military power is required to accomplish the purpose 
of military operations. At the same time, soldiers must consider whether to use force 
against injured people or provide medical treatment. The principle of necessity in jus in 
bello still does not clearly specify “under what conditions a state’s soldiers can 
legitimately use military force.” By combining the principle of necessity with the 
principle of proportionality, which we will analyse in the next section, this dissertation 
will offer clear answers to the question of what kind of tactics are justified.  
 
2.2.2.ii. The Principle of Proportionality 
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As outlined above, the principle of proportionality is an important element for developing 
the idea of jus in bello. Facing the issues of the current situation in international society, 
the principle of necessity in jus in bello cannot adequately stipulate under what conditions 
a state’s soldiers can legitimately use military force. This is due to the difficulty of 
identifying combatants, particularly in current international conflicts. States’ soldiers are, 
therefore, required to make rational decisions in distinguishing between combatants to be 
attacked and non-combatants to be protected. The principle of proportionality in jus in 
bello provides a guideline for making such a rational choice. 
 
 As regards jus in bello, public international law on war pays less attention to 
the principle of proportionality than to the principle of necessity (Walzer, 2006, p. 228). 
Therefore, the principle of proportionality in jus in bello will be clarified through the 
theories based on moral-philosophical perspective. On this subject, the development of 
Just War Theory by contemporary jurists and philosophers has two core rationales: first, 
how to minimise the victims of war; and second, what quantity and quality of weapons a 
state’s soldiers should use in defensive action. By examining these two considerations 
with reference to recent theories, certain criteria of the principle of proportionality in jus 
in bello will be clarified.  
 
(a) Michael Walzer 
 
Although Walzer shares the idea that violence against non-combatants should be 
 73 
prohibited, he asserts that military operations should be pursued even when non-
combatants are endangered thereby (Walzer, 2006, pp. 174–175). As this idea concerns 
the principle of proportionality in jus in bello, this section will analyse the reasons for 
Walzer’s position. His idea on the second element, the extent of weaponry a state’s 
soldiers may use during military operations, will then be introduced.  
 
 Walzer explains the principle of proportionality in jus in bello as follows: it 
serves to harmonise the absolute prohibition of attacking non-combatants with the 
legitimate use of force in military activity (Walzer, 2006, p. 152). Walzer specifies four 
conditions that must all be satisfied: military activity should be a legitimate act of war; 
the direct effect of military activity should be morally acceptable; the person who carries 
out the military activity should be legitimate, in other words, he or she should only aim 
to achieve morally acceptable effects; and a good effect should outweigh an evil effect, 
so that the result of military activity will ultimately be an improvement on the status quo 
(Walzer, 2006, p. 152). Walzer considers the third condition to be the most important for 
the principle of proportionality in jus in bello. Provided a state complies with these 
conditions in its defensive action, he insists that the harming or injury of non-combatants 
in the course of military operations should be tolerated.  
 
 Regarding the extent of weapons which a state’s soldiers may use in military 
operations, the use of certain types of weapon is prohibited by public international law, 
such as the Biological Weapons Convention, Chemical Weapons Convention, and 
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Nuclear Weapons Conventions.  
 
(b) John Rawls 
 
As noted in relation to the principle of necessity in jus in bello, Rawls requires all peoples 
to respect human rights. For Rawls, the only legitimate targets for use of military force 
by “well-ordered peoples” are the government leaders or commanders of “outlaw states.” 
Rawls, therefore, does not specify the extent of weaponry “well-ordered peoples” should 
use during military operations. Indeed, he does not develop any idea regarding the 
principle of proportionality in jus in bello in The Law of Peoples: with “the Idea of Public 
Reason Revisited.” 
 
(c) Larry May 
 
In developing his idea of the principle of necessity in jus in bello, May advocates using 
weapons to relieve injured people from pain. Although he acknowledges the necessity to 
use weapons, he requests that a state’s soldiers identify the extent of weaponry they use 
in military operations. May believes that this should be based on the principle of 
proportionality. To reiterate, May’s idea of just war emphasises humaneness and mercy, 
which together form the bases of his principle of proportionality.  
 
 To emphasise the importance of the principle of proportionality in jus in bello, 
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May cites the event in Israel in 1989 when Israeli security forces took military action 
against innocent civilians living in occupied territories, with the aim of stopping suicide 
bombings (May, 2007, pp. 212–218). The Landau Commission described the action of 
Israeli security forces as exhibiting a “moderate measure of physical violence” (the 
Government Press Office, 1989, p. 181). However, in 1992, the Israeli Supreme Court 
rejected this interpretation of the Landau Commission, adjudging this use of military 
force to constitute torture; that is, inhumane treatment (Kremnitzer and Segev, 2000, pp. 
509–590). Referring to this event, May analyses the decision of the Israeli Supreme Court 
regarding how prisoners of war should be treated as follows: the Israeli Supreme Court 
ruled that human dignity must be respected; in other words, prisoners of war should not 
be interrogated illegally.  
 
 The Supreme Court of Israel set three conditions for the treatment of prisoners 
of war: the measures should be rational; the measures should be minimal; and any harm 
should be proportional to the information thereby gained (May, 2007, p. 220). May 
believes that these three conditions are included in the principle of proportionality, which 
he interprets as “minimizing suffering or producing goals or values at least as important 
as those of the other states that are undermined by military assaults” (May, 2007, p. 220). 
May contends that minimising suffering or injury is a rational choice for a state’s soldiers, 
and even in war, this remains at the core of humane treatment.  
 
 Applying May’s idea of the principle of proportionality in jus in bello to 
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practical cases, he reasons that it is possible for a state’s soldiers to use poison weapons 
in certain situations: that is, when combatants are suffering to the point of death. As we 
have already considered this situation in relation to his idea of the principle of necessity 
in jus in bello, it suffices to conclude that May believes military force should be used 
where doing so will minimise suffering or injury.  
 
(d) Summary 
 
While Rawls does not really consider the principle of proportionality in jus in bello, the 
related ideas of just-war theorists, Walzer and May, work effectively on the principle’s 
application to battlefield situations. Although the use of poison weapons, for instance, is 
prohibited by public international law on war, they express that their use is sometimes 
required to relieve pain. The principle of proportionality, therefore, plays an important 
role when a state’s soldiers find a reason to use poisoned weapons. This idea seems 
contrary to the basic idea of Just War Theory that human rights should be protected. 
However, soldiers need to make a rational choice regarding whether or not injured 
combatants should be left to struggle with their pain or should be relieved therefrom. 
While it is difficult for a state’s soldiers to make a rational choice during military 
operations, it is an important factor for a state’s government leaders or commanders in 
considering what tactics are legitimate.  
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2.2.3. Jus post Bellum 
 
Recently, consideration of jus post bellum has been particularly important in developing 
Just War Theory (Osterdahl and Van Zadel, 2009, pp. 176–177). Although the idea of jus 
post bellum is believed to be a recent developments, Immanuel Kant, for instance, 
mentions issues related to jus post bellum from a moral-philosophical perspective: 
“[I]nternational right [or justice] is thus concerned partly with the right to make war, 
partly with the right of war itself, and partly with the questions of right after war, i.e. with 
the right of states to compel each other to abandon their war-like condition and create a 
constitution which will establish an enduring peace” (Orend, 2000, p. 118, 2007, pp. 574–
575). While Kant, in particular, emphasises the importance of considering the issues of 
jus post bellum, other just war theorists, such as Michael Walzer, have included this issue 
in the idea of jus ad bellum because “the object in war is a better state of peace”(Walzer, 
2006, pp. 121). In other words, Walzer believes that international military operations 
should make the people to live safer than before; therefore, the aftermath of international 
military operations should be clear before engaging in such operations. Aside from this 
interpretation, Orend has examined why the majority of just war theorists have neglected 
jus post bellum. He finds that they believed well-ordered peoples will deal with the 
reconstruction issue using moral-philosophical principles: therefore, they believed it 
unnecessary to consider the issue of jus post bellum (Orend, 2007, pp. 573–574). In 
practice, however, there have been appeals for proper consideration of the issues of jus 
post bellum, to ensure the legitimate reconstruction of former warzones. The ICISS, for 
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instance, highlighted this importance by quoting the words of Kofi Annan: “if 
humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should 
we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human 
rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?” (the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001, p. 2).  
 
 Responding to this request to develop the idea of jus post bellum, this 
dissertation will again employ the principles of necessity and proportionality. There are 
approximately two activities related to jus post bellum: the reconstruction of former 
warzones to allow people in general to resume their ordinary lives and the political 
reconstruction of “outlaw states.” This section will analyse the situation that occurs when 
these two activities have legal legitimacy to operate. This includes the prosecution of 
government leaders or commanders of “outlaw states” for war crimes. To clarify the legal 
legitimacy of reconstruction activities, this section will analyse how scholars of public 
international law have examined the reconstruction of battlefields. It is believed that the 
UNPKO commenced after the end of Cold War, based on the interpretation of such 
activities as “regional arrangements” under Article 52-54 of the UN Charter (Gray, 2008). 
However, since the interpretation is controversial among scholars of public international 
law, this section will introduce these scholars’ analyses of whether the UNPKO falls 
within the scope of “regional arrangements.”  
 
 Chayes (2013, pp.292-293), for instance, specifies that Article 39 of the UN 
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Charter demonstrates the legitimacy of the UNPKO activity. It seems that international 
society has the intention to commit to reconstruction activity: the execution of PKO, for 
instance, is a significant example that illustrates this tendency. Although a state may 
provide support for reconstruction activity, the contributing states cannot control the 
defeated government, as this would violate the principle of non-interventionism, one of 
the fundamental principles specified in the UN Charter (Article 2.7.). With no concrete 
regulation of the degree of support to provide during reconstruction activity, moral-
philosophical criteria will provide guidelines regarding what degree of support states 
should provide so that their activities do not contravene the principle of non-
interventionism.  
 
2.2.3.i. The Principle of Necessity 
 
The principle of necessity in jus post bellum concerns the reasons for engaging in 
reconstruction activities in the battlefield. As this related idea has recently been developed, 
this section will first introduce how just war theorists and philosophers analyse issues 
related to the principle of necessity. Recognising recent developments on this topic, the 
idea of philosopher Brian Orend is evaluated in addition to those two jurists and 
philosophers featured prominently in earlier sections: Michael Walzer and John Rawls. 
This section will conclude by elaborating the idea of the principle of necessity in jus post 
bellum. 
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(a) Michael Walzer 
 
While Walzer does not develop the idea related to reconstruction activities, he does 
specify that regional arrangements are legitimate for states to maintain international peace 
and order. According to Walzer, states can conduct “humanitarian intervention” where a 
government commits a massive violation of human rights, such as a genocide (Walzer, 
2006, p. 101). From Walzer’s perspective, a significant number of genocides have 
occurred in recent times. Therefore, the international community must engage in 
“humanitarian intervention.” Although the need to conduct “humanitarian intervention” 
is high, Walzer observes that it is necessary for states to have a clear reason for 
legitimatising the act of “humanitarian intervention” (Walzer, 2006, pp. 101–102). He 
identifies the protection of violated peoples as an appropriate reason for such intervention 
and points out that “humanitarian intervention” is conducted for the purpose of 
diplomacy: to contribute to the work of international society in maintaining international 
peace and order. Although a state’s reasons may vary, Walzer asserts that the most 
important consideration in determining the legitimacy of “humanitarian intervention” is 
a balance between a variety of reasons. This balance will be explained in relation to the 
principle of proportionality in jus post bellum.  
 
(b) John Rawls 
 
Though Rawls does not use the term jus post bellum, he does require the rebuilding or 
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reconstruction of defeated states. To reiterate, he advocates the importance of “well-
ordered peoples” protecting the civilians of “outlaw states,” as “well-ordered peoples” 
are obliged to teach the “Law of Peoples;” otherwise, the civilians of “outlaw states” will 
be denied their opportunity to know this law (Rawls, 2006, pp. 106–112). Overall, Rawls 
claims that reconstruction activity should be undertaken to allow people in “outlaw states” 
to become “well-ordered people.”  
 
 Thus, although he does not clarify what constitutes legitimate reconstruction, it 
might be inferred that Rawls bases legitimacy on the principles of “the Law of Peoples.” 
 
(c) Brian Orend 
 
Brian Orend is a philosophy professor specialising in Just War Theory and human rights. 
Unlike the other three authors, Michael Walzer, John Rawls, and Larry May, Orend 
focuses on issues related to jus post bellum. Orend explains that jus post bellum is equally 
important to jus ad bellum. Based on Kant’s idea, Orend emphasises the need to develop 
jus post bellum as follows: “the raw fact of military victory in war does not (…) confer 
moral rights upon the victor, nor ethical duties upon the vanquished” (Orend, 2007, p. 
578). 
 
 In developing his idea of the principle of necessity in jus post bellum, Orend 
specifies that there are two related elements for states to consider: “right vindication” and 
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“discrimination” (Orend, 2007, p. 580). This section will separately consider these two 
elements in order to analyse Orend’s idea.  
 
 “Right vindication” suggests that the respect for and protection of human rights 
is legitimate for states to consider during the various phases of war: beginning, middle, 
and after. Therefore, Orend asserts that it is necessary for states to respect human rights 
during all three phases. First, as Walzer also claimed, it is important for states to consider 
human rights at the beginning and during the war. However, Orend adds the importance 
for states, particularly victor states, to respect human rights after the war ends because 
any disrespect for human rights might cause another war. If the human rights of defeated 
states’ civilians are violated by victor states, they will have just cause to fight against the 
victor states. To cut the chain of war that is perpetuated by lack of respect for human 
rights, Orend emphasises that it is important for states, particularly victor states, to 
vindicate human rights (Orend, 2007, p. 580).  
 
 Regarding discrimination, Orend asserts that the people of defeated states 
should be divided into three categories when punishment for war is meted out: civilians; 
government leaders and/or commanders; and soldiers. Orend believes that civilians 
should be exempted from accusation of war crimes, while the government leaders or 
commanders of a defeated state should be prosecuted as war criminals (Orend, 2007, p. 
580). Soldiers of defeated states should also be “held accountable to investigation and 
possible trial” (Orend, 2007, p. 580). He insists that “proper punishment” is effective; 
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therefore, we need to develop the idea of jus post bellum by combining the idea on the 
principle of proportionality.  
 
 Orend develops his idea of jus post bellum with two aspects: reconstruction and 
compensation. According to him, victor states bear a responsibility to guide the civilians 
of defeated states to become well-ordered peoples; at the same time, they are also 
responsible for maintaining peace and order in international society (Orend, 2000, p. 124). 
Orend believes that the long-pursued goal of international society, the maintenance of 
peace and security, will be achieved if the numbers of well-ordered peoples increases.  
 
(d) Summary  
 
From these ideas regarding the principle of necessity in jus post bellum, it can be 
concluded that victor states should conduct reconstruction activities after a war, such as 
PKO. As the war was first triggered by the defeated states’ violation of human rights, the 
victor states must respect human rights to demonstrate to the people of defeated states the 
normative principles by which to live in international society.  
 
2.2.3.ii. The Principle of Proportionality 
 
While the principle of necessity in jus post bellum demonstrates why victor states should 
support the rebuilding or reconstruction of defeated states, the principle of proportionality 
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also merits consideration. The principle of proportionality in jus post bellum provides a 
guideline regarding how much support victor states should provide for defeated states, 
since an excess of support might be comprise interference in the internal affairs of those 
states. To analyse how modern jurists and philosophers, specifically Walzer, Rawls, and 
Orend, deal with this issue, this section will introduce their respective ideas regarding the 
principle of proportionality in jus post bellum. The section will then conclude by 
summarising their ideas. 
 
(a) Michael Walzer 
 
Walzer emphasises the need to consider the principle of proportionality in jus post bellum, 
by citing the words of international lawyer Montague Bernard: “Of two things, one; the 
interference in the case supported either turns the balance, or it does not. In the latter 
event, it misses its aim; in the former, it gives the superiority to the side which would not 
have been uppermost without it and establishes a sovereign, or a form of government, 
which the nation, if left to itself, would not have chosen” (Bernard, 1860, p. 21). Referring 
to these words, Walzer urges victor states to consider the principle of proportionality in 
jus post bellum: namely, the balance between interference and non-intervention. In this 
context, non-intervention is explained by Walzer as neutrality or ignoring. He defines 
non-intervention as neutrality on the basis that neutral states are the only ones “not 
engaged in war” (Walzer, 2006, p. 234). In this sense, “neutrality” is a form of the non-
intervention. Applying the same scheme, Walzer explains ignorance as the other form of 
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non-intervention, asserting that a state may elect not to intervene in an “outlaw state” 
despite being aware that it is violating human rights through its non-intervention. As the 
principle of proportionality in jus post bellum does not apply to either neutral or ignored 
states, this section does not further consider them.  
 
 By contrast, Walzer believes that well-ordered people use military force against 
“outlaw states” with the intention (see 2.2.1.i.). He expresses this belief by quoting Sir 
Basil Henry Liddell Hart, a military theorist, that “the object in war is a better state of 
peace” (Liddell, 1954, p. 338). Adopting Liddell’s position, Walzer believes that states 
that engage in war are the objects to be considered with regard to the issue of the principle 
of proportionality in jus post bellum.  
 
(b) John Rawls 
 
As noted in the previous section, Rawls only considers the principle of necessity in jus 
post bellum. This seems attributable to his belief that “well-ordered peoples” do not 
violate “the Law of Peoples,” according to which “peoples are to observe a duty of non-
intervention” (Rawls, 2006, p. 37). Therefore, Rawls believes that “well-ordered peoples” 
should not interfere in the internal affairs of “outlaw states.” Based on this belief, the 
principle of proportionality in jus post bellum is entirely absent from The Law of Peoples: 
with ‘the Idea of Public Reason Revisited.’ 
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(c) Brian Orend 
 
Orend discusses the idea of jus post bellum based on peace settlement. He states that the 
goal of jus post bellum is to change the defeated state to “a minimally just state” (Orend, 
2007, p. 581). He continues that there are two basic ways for a defeated state to become 
“a minimally just state:” first, purge the old regime, which might cause aggression, 
tyranny, or atrocity; or second, accept the new regime, which respects human rights in 
general (Orend, 2007, pp. 584–585) . The goal of jus post bellum and the process of 
achieving this goal are clear; however, Orend believes that we need to give more 
consideration to jus post bellum, in particular, who will be in charge of the reconstruction 
work. By considering this issue, we may reach an answer on how much support the victor 
states may provide for reconstruction activities.  
 
 Orend explains that there are two roles in reconstruction activities: the roles of 
victor states; and the role of the international community, which does not mean the UN 
in this context. Orend believes that the victor states should follow certain rules when 
reconstructing defeated states since the former have overthrown the previous regime of 
the latter (Orend, 2007, p. 588). On the other hand, Orend believes that the international 
community should also play the role of “watchdog” and “junior partner” in any 
reconstruction activities (Orend, 2007, p. 588). There are two functions as watchdog: first, 
to keep an eye that the defeated states follow the new regime; and second, to keep an eye 
that the victor states do not control the defeated states. On the other hand, the role of the 
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international community as junior partner is more complicated: to provide aid for 
reconstruction although the war itself was unjust (Orend, 2007, p. 588). To explain the 
role of junior partner, Orend refers to the reconstruction activities of Afghanistan and that 
of Iraq as examples. He examines the fact that the international community did not 
hesitate to provide support for reconstructing Afghanistan, but they did not provide 
sufficient support to Iraq. The difference in quality of support provided to these two 
countries was, Orend believes, led by the justification or legitimacy of war itself: in other 
words, the international community does not insist on participating in unjust wars (Orend, 
2007, pp. 588–589). While providing support for reconstruction is not a duty of the 
international communities, Orend emphasises that it is important for the international 
community to take the role of “junior partner.”  
 
 Returning to the issue of how much support victor states or the international 
community should provide for reconstruction of defeated states, Orend’s response is that 
they should create “a minimally just community” (Orend, 2007, p. 582). Orend believes 
that the post-war regimes in Germany and Japan (1945-55) were successful; therefore, it 
is possible for victor states and the international community to provide reasonable support 
to reconstruct a defeated state (Orend, 2007, p. 582). The most important factor, according 
to Orend, is that victor states bear in mind that local people continue to live in defeated 
states. Quoting Kant, Orend believes that the post-war period is the easiest time for local 
people to accept a new regime, which differs from the previous regime in which human 
rights were not respected (Orend, 2007, p. 582). Therefore, providing a new regime for 
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the defeated state is the only role that victor states should play: the construction of a new 
government based on the new regime will be conducted by the local people in the defeated 
state. If the defeated state should err once more in the direction it takes, the international 
community is there to prevent it; in this sense, the international community plays the role 
of both watchdogs and junior partner.  
 
 Overall, Orend’s idea of the principle of proportionality in jus post bellum can 
be summarised as follows: the reconstruction of defeated states should be based on the 
will of their civilians, although victor states should introduce the basic principles of the 
law of war or the political regime, to which the citizens of defeated states should adhere.  
 
(d) Summary  
 
From analysing these ideas of the principle of proportionality in jus post bellum, we can 
conclude that victor states should pay attention to the will of defeated civilians, since they 
will exercise sovereign power once reconstruction is completed. In this sense, victor states 
should consider the principle of proportionality in jus post bellum when conducting PKO 
activities: the soldiers of victor states should not force defeated states’ civilians to follow 
the principles of the “Law of the Peoples;” rather, they should ask the civilians to accept 
those principles on the basis that they are normative in contemporary international society.  
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2.3. Conclusion 
 
From analysing Just War Theory, it is clear that despite changes in the situation faced in 
international society, the basic consideration regarding war have remained the same since 
ancient times. To conclude this chapter, this section will summarise the three categories 
to develop in Just War Theory in response to the contemporary international situation: jus 
ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum.  
 
 First, jus ad bellum concerns whether a particular situation justifies waging war. 
A state can only use military force against another when this is required to defend its 
territory or to maintain international peace and security. Therefore, all states are permitted 
to use military force if international society is threatened by aggressors.  
 
 Second, jus in bello concerns the conditions under which a soldier can kill or 
harm others on the battlefield. This concept describes what soldiers should consider when 
conducting military operations. In their idea of jus in bello, philosophers and jurists 
considering Just War Theory’s application to the contemporary international situation in 
war require soldiers to respect human rights: for instance, they advocate the protection of 
civilians and/or soldiers of “outlaw states” because they have the chance to follow the 
normative elements to maintain international peace and security, namely respect for 
human rights. On the other hand, the government leaders or commanders of “outlaw states” 
should be prosecuted as war criminals because they are responsible for aggression against 
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other states. Overall, a state’s soldiers should remember to protect human rights while 
engaging in military operations.  
 
 Third, jus post bellum has received much more attention in the post-Cold War 
era, due to the increasing global roles of related activities, such as the UNPKO. The issue 
regarding jus post bellum eliminates the gap between the support activities of the UNPKO 
and interference in the internal affairs of defeated states. Prior to WWII, victor states 
occupied defeated states to maintain order. However, the system changed pursuant to the 
UN Charter’s prohibition of interfering in another state’s internal affairs. Therefore, the 
issue of jus post bellum indicates what victor states should consider when supporting the 
reconstruction of defeated or “outlaw states.” By examining the theories regarding jus 
post bellum, this chapter found that victor states should respect the will of defeated or 
“outlaw states” civilians. Though this might differ from victor states’ intention, it should 
be followed where this accords with the normative elements of respecting human rights.  
 
Overall, these three categories should all be considered when a state decides to 
wage a defensive war against wrong-doings. The next three chapters will examine how 
the Japanese government, particularly the Koizumi administration and the second Abe 
administration, reached decisions on committing to international military operations. 
These investigations will clarify whether, in setting government policy with respect to 
international military operations, the GOJ considered the applicable normative principles 
of Just War Theory.  
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Chapter Three. Japan’s Participation in OEF: the 2001 Afghanistan War 
 
This chapter examines whether the GOJ took the normative ideas of Just War Theory into 
considerations when deciding whether or not Japan would participate in Operation 
Enduring Freedom (hereafter, OEF). This operation, well-known as the 2001 Afghanistan 
War, is understood to have comprised retaliation for the 9/11 attacks (hereafter, 9/11). 
This case is selected for in-depth examination because it was Japan’s first instance of 
participation in an international military operation.  
 
 To examine the case, this chapter will open by introducing the US government’s 
purpose in conducting OEF. Since OEF is well-known to have comprised retaliation for 
9/11, the details of those attacks will also be described to clarify the reason for attacking 
Afghanistan.  
 
 The second section of this chapter will examine the GOJ’s reaction to the US 
decision. Although Japan was one of the sovereign states that voiced to support for the 
US, the JCL restraints made it difficult to dispatch the JSDF to the Indian Ocean (see 1.2.). 
To overcome this restraint, the GOJ decided to enact a temporary statute, called the Anti-
Terrorism Special Measures Law (tero taisaku tokusohō: hereafter, ATSML). This statute 
was enacted to dispatch the JSDF without the need to revise the JCL (which would have 
taken longer), and it reflects the government’s intention to support the US quickly (see 
1.3.). When the ATSML bill was passed in the Diet on 29 October 2001, PM Koizumi 
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declared that “… the Government of Japan has devoted its utmost efforts to cooperate 
with the rest of the international community in our endeavors to prevent and eradicate 
international terrorism in order to ensure the peace and security of the international 
community including Japan itself” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2001). This 
clearly furthermore demonstrates the government’s intention to participate in OEF; 
however, the second section will clarify what exactly the Koizumi administration had in 
mind in deciding to bring the ATSML bill to the floor of the Diet.  
 
 Based on the underlying rationale for Japan’s decision to participate in OEF, 
the third section will analyse what Diet members considered when the ATSML bill was 
brought to the Diet. Although the decision to participate in OEF was made immediately, 
innumerable debates were held in the Diet on the legitimacy of Japan’s participation. 
Since it is impracticable to examine all related discussions, this chapter will focus on four 
elements: whether Diet members found the right intention for engaging in OEF (3.3.1.); 
whether OEF was proportional to 9/11 (3.3.2.); what role was played by JSDF personnel 
in the operation (3.3.3.); and whether the measures taken by JSDF personnel were 
proportional to the situation in Afghanistan (3.3.4.). The first two elements are related to 
the principles of necessity and proportionality in jus ad bellum that set the conditions for 
the legitimate use of force: therefore, this analysis will help to examine whether the GOJ 
considered the normative principles in jus ad bellum when deciding to participate in OEF 
(3.4.). The third and fourth analyses reflect how the GOJ decided upon the role to be taken 
by the JSDF during the operation. The principles of necessity and proportionality in jus 
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in bello set the limitations upon the use of military weapons against others; therefore, 
these two analyses will help to examine whether the GOJ considered the normative 
principles in jus in bello before Japan’s participation in OEF (3.5.).  
 
 By examining whether the GOJ’s perspectives on OEF participation 
corresponded to the normative principles of combating international military actions, this 
chapter can come to a conclusion regarding whether the GOJ, particularly the Koizumi 
administration, considered these normative ideas when deciding to participate in OEF.  
 
3.1  Outline of the Crucial Events 
 
On 11 September 2001, al-Qaeda coordinated military attacks against four prominent 
buildings in the US: the North and South Towers of the World Trade Centre, the Pentagon, 
and either the White House or the Capitol Building (Bush, 2010, p. 132). The fourth attack 
was unsuccessful, so speculation over its intended target has been controversial. Since 
these attacks were conducted by hijacking passenger airliners, the victims included the 
airline passengers, people working in the buildings that were hit, and those who lived in 
the surrounding areas. Approximately 3,000 people were killed and more than 6,000 
injured in the attacks (CNN, 2015). In his diary, President George W. Bush (term of office: 
20 January 2001 - 20 January 2009) described this incident as “the Pearl Harbor of the 
21st century” (Woodward, 2004, p. 24).  
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 After 9/11, the US intelligence agencies determined that al-Qaeda had been 
responsible for the incident. Although President Bush had known of al-Qaeda as an 
Islamic extremist group since the time of his presidential campaign, he was unaware of 
its underlying ideology and the group’s supporters (Bush, 2010, pp. 134, 141). The US, 
therefore, focused on collecting detailed information related to the militant group. 
 
 The OEF, well-known as the “War on Terror,” was launched by the US on 7 
October 2001. Its coalition allies, such as the United Kingdom (hereafter, UK), declared 
their intention to provide military support to the US (Blair, 2011, pp. 341-470). However, 
before the US and its coalition allies commenced OEF, the UN Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1368 (hereafter, UNSRC 1368) on 9/11. This resolution “call[s] on all states 
to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsor of 
these terrorist attacks and stress[es] that those responsible for aiding, supporting or 
harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held 
accountable” (UN Security Council, 2001b). The resolution clearly demonstrates that 
issues related to 9/11 should be resolved by international courts. However, the US and its 
coalition allies were not satisfied with UNSCR 1368. For instance, John Negroponte, the 
US Ambassador to the UN, clarified his state’s position as follows: “in accordance with 
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, I wish, on behalf of my Government, to 
report that the United States of America, together with other States, has initiated actions 
in exercise of its inherent right of individual and collective self-defence following the 
armed attacks that were carried out against the United States on 11 September 2001” (UN 
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Security Council, 2001a). This message clearly reflects that the US believed in their right 
intention to exercise the right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, although 
UNSCR 1368 states that is should be left to international courts to accuse al-Qaeda of 
war crimes.  
 
3.2  The Intention of the Koizumi Administration in Passing the Bill of the Anti-
Terrorism Special Measures Law 
 
When the US clearly stated its opinion regarding 9/11, PM Koizumi responded with a 
clear statement on his position as follows: “[9/11 was] not an attack against just the 
United States but an attack against freedom and democracy” (Bush, 2010, p. 141). 
When PM Koizumi demonstrated his support of the US, the statutes that Japan could 
apply to send the JSDF outside of its territory were either the 1999 Surrounding Area 
Emergency Measures Law or the Act on Cooperation with the United Nations Peace 
Keeping Activities (Hagstrom and Williamsson, 2009, pp. 254–255). The former is 
applicable to situations in which US military activities are conducted in “areas 
surrounding Japan,” while the latter permits the JSDF to be dispatched outside of Japan 
to support UNPKO. However, neither situation was applicable to OEF: Afghanistan, 
where al-Qaeda were believed to be hiding, lies far beyond the “areas surrounding 
Japan” (ibid p.255), while OEF was neither conducted by the UN nor categorised as 
UNPKO (see 3.1.). Therefore, it was difficult for Japan to apply either statute to 
legitimise its participation in OEF. Nevertheless, PM Koizumi wished to support the 
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US, sympathising with its cause following 9/11, and as a result the ATSML bill was 
brought to the floor of the Diet. The intention in so doing was reflected in the purpose 
of the ATSML “to enable Japan to contribute actively and on its own initiatives to the 
efforts of the international community for the prevention and eradication of 
international terrorism, thereby ensuring the peace and security of the international 
community including Japan” (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2001).  
 
3.3 Diet Deliberations 
 
When the Koizumi administration brought the ATSML bill to the floor of the Diet on 5 
October 2001, innumerable discussions ensued. This section will focus on debates held 
by Diet members in relation to Japan’s participation in OEF: in particular, it focuses on 
whether Diet members pointed out the following four issues: the right intention or a just 
cause for engaging in OEF; the quality and quantity of OEF; the role of JSDF personnel 
during OEF; and the quality and quantity of measures to be taken by JSDF personnel 
during this operation. This examination will be based on Japanese Diet records1 provided 
by the National Diet Library, interviews conducted for this dissertation (see Appendix), 
and the general plan submitted by the Cabinet after the bill was adopted.  
 
                                                 
1 Although the ATSML bill was brought to the floor of the Diet on 5 October 2001, the 
related debate, particularly on the US conducting OEF, was held in the Diet from 12 
September. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the debates in the Diet between 12 
September and 29 October, the date of enacting the ATSML. 
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3.3.1. Reasons for Conducting OEF 
 
When the Koizumi administration brought the ATSML bill to the floor of Diet, members 
of the opposition parties, particularly the then DPJ, opposed the attack on Afghanistan. 
First, they argued that following the UNSCR, issues related to 9/11 should be resolved by 
the UN or international courts. For instance, a then DPJ member emphasised the necessity 
to prioritise the UN Resolution by asking Tanaka Makiko, the then Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, the following question: “although Japan has a close relationship with the US, 
which is now preparing for military activities against Afghanistan, Japan should enter into 
a negotiation with the UN Security Council to adopt a stricter resolution than UNSCR 
1368, so that the UN can accuse al-Qaeda of war crimes” (Azumi Jun, 18 September 
2001). He continued by referring to the words of Ueda Isamu, a member of Kōmeitō: 
“this diplomatic negotiation is required for Japan to maintain international peace and 
security because the Islamic people have been persecuted by the people of the US and 
Europe even though there is no relationship between the Islamic people and al-Qaeda” 
(Azumi Jun and Ueda Isamu, 18 September 2001).  
 
 Similar opinions were given in the Diet after PM Koizumi met with President 
Bush on 25 September 2001. A then DPJ member expressed his opinion as follows: “the 
war on terror should not be launched as retaliation with military force as it is prohibited 
by the Declaration on the Principle of International Law concerning Friendly Cooperation 
among States in accordance with the UN Charter, which was adopted in 1970: all 
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sovereign states have the duty to refrain from retaliation with force. Although 
international society, mainly the US, has been planning to launch the war on terror in 
retaliation for 9/11, you [PM Koizumi] should tell President Bush without reserve that we 
[international society] should not take any military action against al-Qaeda: we should 
accuse the members of al-Qaeda of war crimes” (Tsunoda Giichi, 2 October 2001). 
 
 Although opposition party members pointed out eight times that there was no 
right intention or just cause for attacking Afghanistan (Hatoyama Yukio, 1 October 2001; 
Shii Kazuo and Doi Takako, 2 October 2001; Ichida Tadayoshi and Okazaki Tomiko, 3 
October 2001; Ueda Isamu, 4 October 2001; Okada 12 October 2001; and Warashina 
Mitsuharu, 19 October 2001), Cabinet members supported the US position because they 
believed that al-Qaeda’s actions against the US had not been justified. Their opinion of 
the US decision to conduct OEF was formulated as follows: “not only the US but also the 
international society should take a resolute attitude toward terrorism” (Koizumi Junichirō, 
2 October 2001).  
 
As seen in the opinion of opposition parties on the decision to attack 
Afghanistan, Japan had no right intention for providing logistical support to the US 
military. PM Koizumi was also evidently aware of this lack of right intention: “Japan does 
not have the right to exercise individual self-defence as the three necessary conditions2 
                                                 
2 The three necessary conditions for Japan to exercise the right to self-defence are: 1) 
there is an imminent and unlawful infringement attack against Japan; 2) there are no 
other suitable measures to take against the offender; and, 3) the attack against the 
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to exercise the right to self-defence have not been met in this situation” (11 October 2001). 
Thus, the GOJ needed to find a reason for providing logistical support to the US military 
in OEF and Cabinet members subsequently provided three different reasons: to maintain 
the US-Japan security relationship; to advance Japan’s national interest; and to 
demonstrate that Japan would not make the same mistake as it had during the Gulf War. 
 
 First, the treaty-based necessity for strengthening Japan’s relationship with the 
US was specified many times in the Diet. For example, Asō Tarō, the then Minister of 
State for Economic and Fiscal Policy, contended: “Japan should contribute to the US in 
providing logistical support because there is a security treaty between Japan and the US” 
(1 October 2001). This opinion was echoed by Tanaka Makiko: “Japan would like to 
provide a lot of support to the US because Japan is willing to back up the US up in 
launching a war on terror to eliminate al-Qaeda” (18 September, 2001). It is important to 
note that Tanaka’s words came in response to a question from a LDP member, Yoneda 
Kenzō, who asked for the Koizumi administration’s view on how Japan, without 
considering the requests from the US, should approach the war on terror (18 September, 
2001). The responses of Tanaka and Asō seemingly adopt the position of realism in IR 
because Tanaka stated that providing support would strengthen the relationship between 
Japan and the US. Together with PM Koizumi’s statement, it can be inferred that the 
Koizumi administration believed that providing support pursuant to the US requests 
would strengthen their relationship with the US, and that this was more important than 
                                                 
offender should be the minimum and necessary military attack.  
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constitutional compliance.  
 
 Second, Diet members specified the necessity to strengthen the relationship 
with the US to advance Japan’s national interests. For instance, a then DPJ member raised 
the issue of intelligence on international militant groups, such as al-Qaeda, as an example 
of Japan’s national interests: he specified that Japan, particularly the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Japan (hereafter, MOFA), faces difficulty collecting information related to 
international militant groups and as such is dependent on the US for gathering related 
information (interview with a then DPJ member of the House of Representatives, 15 May 
2015). Information on international militant groups that is collected by the US is sent to 
the border controls operated by the Ministry of Justice: therefore, receiving this 
intelligence is important for Japanese security. He continued that MOFA, in particular, 
strongly believes that responding to the US requests would advance Japan’s national 
interests.  
 
 Third, participation in OEF was considered necessary to demonstrate that Japan 
had learned from its experience in the Gulf War. As noted in Chapter One, Diet members 
were conscious that the GOJ’s response to the Gulf War had been unsuccessful. Yoneda 
Kenzō, for instance, summarised this point as follows: “Japan should learn from the 
lesson of the Gulf War, having not been thanked by others despite providing a lot of 
financial support” (18 September 2001). Based on Japan’s Gulf War experience, Diet 
members insisted that Japan’s support for the US military should be more active than 
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merely providing financial assistance. They, therefore, concluded that Japan should 
participate in OEF by providing logistical support to the US military, as requested by the 
US (Koizumi Junichirō, 5 October; Ishiba Shigeru, 10 October; and Fukuda Yasuo, 25 
October 2001).  
 
  By elaborating these three reasons, Diet members claimed to have found the 
right intention for providing logistical support to the US military during OEF. The next 
issue for analysis is whether Diet members considered the quality and quantity of support 
they would provide for OEF.   
 
3.3.2. Quantity and Quality of OEF 
 
The US, the victim of 9/11, was not the only state that decided to carry out OEF. Its allies, 
including the UK, supported conducting OEF to eliminate al-Qaeda (see 3.1.). The GOJ 
had known that not only the UK but also Australia would become involved in attacking 
Afghanistan (Shirahama Kazuyoshi, 3 October 2001). Thus, Diet members asserted the 
need to set the goal of OEF (Ueda Isamu, 18 September 2001; Tsunoda, 2 October 2001). 
They pointed out the possibility that the scale of OEF would exceed the traditional level 
of retaliation because the US had identified this operation as a war (2 October 2001). 
Although anxiety regarding the scale of operation was mentioned, Cabinet members 
strongly recognised that the operation, or so-called war on terror, was a matter pertinent 
to all sovereign states and on this basis, Japan should also play a role in OEF (Tanaka 
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Makiko, 18 September 2001; Koizumi, 2 October 2001). Seemingly, therefore, Cabinet 
members did not consider the scale of the operation, because they believed that it would 
be accomplished by eliminating al-Qaeda.  
 
However, the necessity to consider the principle of proportionality in OEF was, 
in fact, mentioned by Abe Kōki, a professor of public international law, when invited as 
a speaker to a public hearing. He explained the legitimate use of force as follows: “as 
long as the quantity and quality of attack is balanced, the use of force is legitimate” (Abe 
Kōki, 25 October 2001). Although he pointed out that the quality and quantity of OEF 
would not be in balance with the 9/11 attacks, none of the Diet members questioned him 
further. Based on a search for the quality and quantity of OEF on the National Diet Library 
website, it seems that Abe Kōki was the only person to point out this issue when related 
debates were held in the Diet.  
 
Since no related issues were debated in the Diet, the interview was conducted 
to ascertain whether Diet members considered the quality and quantity of OEF. The 
interview shows that Diet members believed that the degree of support provided by Japan 
to the US should have comprised the minimum and only necessary use of force (interview 
with a then DPJ member of the House of Councillors, 6 July 2015). Since this idea was 
seemingly shared among Diet members, another question was brought to the 
interviewees: whether the support provided during OEF comprised the minimum and only 
necessary use of force. One Diet member responded that Japan did not need to consider 
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this issue because JSDF personnel did not harm anyone in Afghanistan. He believe that, 
as long as JSDF personnel do not harm or kill anyone, the military power they exert can 
be considered the minimum and only necessary use of force. Although a large number of 
innocent people were killed or harmed in Afghanistan during OEF, the harm was caused 
by US personnel (ibid); therefore, this issue was not necessary to be discussed in the Diet 
because Japanese civilians are not interested in the fact that many innocent civilians were 
harmed or killed. The same interviewee also expressed his belief that the innocent people 
killed during OEF would have been victims even if Japan had not participated in the 
operation. Therefore, he believes it unnecessary for Japan to consider how much support 
to give the US.  
 
Another Diet member specified that the difficulty lies in defining what is meant 
by the minimum and only necessary use of force is (interview with a then DPJ member 
of the House of Councillors, 6 July 2015). He believes that there is no just war because it 
is impossible not to harm or kill innocent civilians while engaging in war. Defining 
himself as a realistic person in this sense, he describes Japan as a non-independent state 
because the capital of Japan, Tokyo, is controlled by the US military stationed in Yokota 
Air Base. Since Japan is not independent from the US, particularly in terms of security, it 
is difficult to ignore US requests for support. While Japan should follow the principle of 
minimum and only necessary use of force, it is difficult to adhere to this principle because 
it is more important for Japan to adhere to US requests. In sum, the minimum and only 
necessary use of force is only an idealistic principle because Japan is not yet independent 
 104 
from the US.  
 
3.3.3. Role of JSDF Personnel 
 
With PM Koizumi’s intention to dispatch JSDF personnel to provide logistical support to 
the US military, he announced that Japan would implement seven measures to support 
OEF: providing medical, transportation, and supply support to the US military in 
Afghanistan; providing support to strengthen US military and Japanese facilities; 
dispatching the JSDF to collect information relevant to OEF; sharing information related 
to immigration control; expanding the area in which Japan would provide humanitarian 
and economic support to Pakistan and India, the US’s co-operating states, during OEF; 
supporting displaced people in the area within which Japan provided humanitarian 
assistance; and cooperating with other countries to avoid economic confusion (Koizumi, 
2001). Although these seven measures reflect the intention of PM Koizumi, due to the 
JCL restriction, the members also had to consider where the JSDF would be dispatched 
to achieve these goals of international policy (see 1.2.).  
 
Due to the JCL restriction, frequent discussions were held in the Diet on the 
area to which the JSDF would be dispatched and the activities they would undertake. For 
example, Yoneda Kenzō mentioned the difficulty of dispatching JSDF personnel to 
Afghanistan, with reference to the 1999 Surrounding Area Emergency Measures Law (see 
3.2.). According to Article 2 of this Act, the area in which Japan can provide logistical 
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support to the US military is specified as “the territorial waters of Japan and the open sea 
in areas surrounding Japan, which also includes Japan’s exclusive economic zone.” 
Referring to this Article, Yoneda pointed out that Afghanistan lies outside of the 
permissible area for dispatch, as it lies neither in the territorial waters of Japan nor in the 
open sea in areas surrounding Japan (18 September, 2001). He also raised the possibility 
of applying the US-Japan Security Treaty to support the US; however, he came to the 
conclusion that it would be difficult to apply this treaty because Afghanistan is far away 
from the Far East (ibid).  
 
 Despite Yoneda’s concern regarding the dispatch area, no Cabinet members 
provided a comprehensive response to his concern. As Tanaka Makiko noted: “I do not 
have any opinion regarding your concern because we do not know the tactics of the US 
on OEF yet” (ibid). Abe Shinzō, the then Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, added: “we 
would like to excuse ourselves from responding to your question as we do not know what 
kind of measures the US military will take during the operation” (ibid).  
 
Although Cabinet members did not answer the question on the dispatch area, 
a significant number of questions were posed in the Diet. When Japanese warships left 
port with Kitty Hawks on 21 September 2001, Diet members queried the legal basis for 
the departure. As outlined in 3.2., the 1999 Surrounding Area Emergency Measures Law 
and the Act on Cooperation with the United Nations Peace Keeping Activities provide 
the legal basis upon which Japan may dispatch forces overseas. Thus, Hatoyama Yukio 
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raised a question to PM Koizumi in the Diet, on the legal basis for Japanese warships 
leaving port (1 October 2001). In response, PM Koizumi cited Article 5 (18)3 of the Act 
of Establishment of the Ministry of Defence, explaining that their mission was to 
undertake investigation and/or research activities (ibid).  
 
 Azuma Shōzō continuously asked PM Koizumi for the legal basis upon which 
JSDF personnel had been dispatched to the Indian Ocean or Pakistan (2 October 2001). 
Doi Takako also proposed the impossibility of Japan dispatching JSDF personnel to either 
of these area to provide logistical support to the US (ibid). Despite these concerns, PM 
Koizumi did not provide a response regarding the legal basis for dispatching JSDF 
personnel to the Indian Ocean or Pakistan. Other Diet members expressed their opinions 
on the dispatch area as follows: “the active area [of JSDF personnel] should be drawn as 
a clear line from the battlefield” (Ōta Akihiro, 1 October 2001; Shirahata Kazuyoshi, 3 
October 2001). While large numbers of Diet members pointed out the necessity of 
drawing a clear line, a DPJ member stated that JSDF personnel should not be dispatched 
to Pakistan (Ito Hidenari, 10 October 2001). PM Koizumi replied as follows: “[Japan] 
would like to obtain sufficient information on Pakistan from the Pakistan government and 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (hereafter, UNHCR), because there are 
more than 2 million refugees in Pakistan at the moment” (10 October 2001). Thus, it 
seemed that the dispatch area was not an issue of concern to the Japanese Cabinet, as PM 
                                                 
3 When the Ministry of Defence became the Defence Agency in 2007, this article 
number changed to Article 4 (18).  
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Koizumi specified that accomplishing the operational objectives was more pertinent. 
 
 No further discussion on the dispatch area was held in the Diet after the Cabinet 
submitted the ATSML bill on 5 October 2001. The dispatch area was mentioned once by 
PM Koizumi after the submission of the bill; however, he merely stated that it was “not a 
battlefield” (11 October 2001), but did not clarify where this so-called “non-battlefield” 
would be. Therefore, it seems that the dispatch area was not a main concerns for Cabinet 
members: their main concern was the fact that Japan had followed the request of the US 
without revising the JCL.  
 
Warships 
Japanese Territories 
The Indian Oceans (including the Persian Gulf) and its Airspace 
Diego Garcia4 and its Airspace 
The Areas along the Coast of the Indian Ocean and its Airspace 
The Commutable Path between the Areas Specified in Above 
Aircrafts 
Japanese Territories 
The Territories of Guam and Diego Garcia 
The Areas are on the Coast of the Indian Ocean 
The Commutable Path between the Areas Specified in Above 
Figure 3-1 The Dispatch Areas for JSDF Personnel during OEF 
(Source: author based on the General Plan published by the Cabinet on 16 November 2001) 
                                                 
4 Diego Garcia is an atoll located in the central Indian Ocean. It is approximately 1,800 
kilometres far away from the southern of India.  
 108 
 
Figure 3-1 shows the dispatch area for JSDF personnel during the operation. As 
can be seen, they were dispatched to the Indian Ocean, the place that Diet members had 
in mind, but not to Pakistan. Although Cabinet members mentioned that JSDF personnel 
would be dispatched to both the Indian Ocean and Pakistan, Guam was added when the 
general plan was determined by the Cabinet. Overall, it is evident that the GOJ dispatched 
JSDF personnel as logistical support to the US army since the areas involved contained 
US army facilities.  
 
While the dispatch area of JSDF personnel was one of the significant issues to 
be discussed in the Diet, Diet members were also concerned about whether or not JSDF 
personnel would use military weapons during OEF (Hatoyama Yukio, 1 October 2001; 
Doi Takako, 2 October 2001; Shirahama Kazuyoshi and Okazaki Tomiko, 3 October 
2001; Kawai Masatomo and Azumi Jun, 11 October 2001; Yoneda Kenzō, 15 October 
2001). This was of concern because the scale of operation would far exceed any previous 
operations in which Japan had engaged, such as UNPKO. Referring to Article 3 of the 
1999 Surrounding Areas Emergency Measures Law, Ueda Isamu raised the possible 
measures to be taken by the JSDF during OEF as either logistical support5 or search and 
rescue activity6 (18 September, 2001). However, Ueda asserted the difficulty of applying 
                                                 
5 According to the Act, logistical support is defined as follows: the measures which 
Japan practices by providing military commodities and roles to the US military. 
6 This activity is clarified as follows: the activity by which Japan searches for and 
rescues combatants while an important influencing operation is underway.  
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this Act to the case of OEF (ibid). While he did not specify the reason for this conclusion, 
the reason can be deduced from the opinion proposed by Yoneda Kenzō when he was 
querying the dispatch area of JSDF personnel during the operation on 18 September 2001. 
The difficulty regarding the JSDF’s active involvement in the operation was not only 
mentioned by Ueda: Ōta Akihiro, a member of Kōmeitō, requested PM Koizumi to 
rethink the dispatching of the JSDF as follows: “we [Japan] should not provide any force 
to the US“ (1 October, 2001). Ōta believed that Japan should not violate the JCL, and 
therefore should take only non-military measures.  
 
Although the possible and legitimate JSDF activities were proposed as an issue 
for discussion, the Cabinet did not respond to this concern because PM Koizumi believed 
that the related issue should be discussed after an informal meeting of relevant Cabinet 
ministers (kankei kakuryō kaigi), which was due to be held after the Congress in the 
House of Councillors (2 October 2001).  
 
Following the informal meeting of relevant Cabinet ministers, the legitimate 
and possible JSDF activities during the operation were discussed in the Diet. The main 
issue was when JSDF personnel were permitted to take military action against others. 
Although the JSDF would be dispatched to a “non-battle field” as PM Koizumi had stated, 
Cabinet members found various possibilities for JSDF personnel to be endangered.  
 
According to the draft of the ATSML, JSDF personnel can use military weapons 
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to protect their lives when unavoidable and reasonable cause exists. In Japan, such a 
situation is explained as legitimate self-defence (seitō bōei) or an act of necessity (kinkyū 
hinan). Referring to the PCJ, legitimate self-defence and act of necessity are justifiable 
causes for the violation of others; therefore, JSDF personnel should not take any military 
actions unless the offender attacks them first. On this basis, Eto Seishirō, a member of the 
LDP, queried whether JSDF personnel may take military action against an offender before 
being attacked by him or her (11 October 2001). Nakatani Gen, head of the then Japan 
Defence Agency, responded to the question as follows: “ATSML allows JSDF personnel 
to use military weapons if the two conditions meet: first, an imminent and unlawful 
infringement attack may occur; and second, it is impossible to protect the lives and bodies 
of JSDF personnel without attacking the offender with military weapons” (11 October 
2001). Nakatani continued by explaining why JSDF personnel must be armed: “we need 
to state the regulation to allow JSDF personnel to be armed to protect their lives and 
bodies” (11 October 2001).  
 
Additionally, on 11 October 2001 at the Special Committee to enact ATMSL, 
Kawai Masatomo, a member of Kōmeitō, queried the difference between he Act on 
Cooperation with the United Nations Peace Keeping Activities and the ATSML in relation 
to legitimate JSDF activities. Fukuda Yasuo, the then Chief Cabinet Secretary, responded 
as follows: “the ATSML allows JSDF personnel to use military force not only to protect 
their lives and bodies but also to protect the lives and bodies of those who are in the camp 
of JSDF” (11 October 2001). Fukuda gave nine examples of persons to be protected: 
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patients of war; the soldiers of allies, such as the US; victims of war; medical assistants; 
the connector between the FJSDF and local organisations and militant groups of allies; 
press; translators or interpreters; and guides (11 October 2001). 
 
As the dispatch area for JSDF personnel had already been determined, Diet 
members seemingly became less concerned with this issue. This may be because they had 
identified the Indian Ocean, Guam, and Diego Garcia as non-battlefield areas. Although 
the possible weapons carried during OEF were not specified in the Diet because Cabinet 
members did not clearly understand the situation in the field (Nakatani Gen, 10 October 
2001), the seven measures proposed by PM Koizumi on 19 September 2001 were 
seemingly sufficient for Diet members to conclude that JSDF personnel would not use 
military weapons against others.  
 
 Warships Aircrafts 
Activities 
Oil Supply N/A 
Transportation of Oil and Necessary Goods for US Army 
Others  
(Providing Medical Service and Rebuilding the Destroyed Facilities) 
Figure 3-2 The Activities of JSDF Personnel during OEF 
(Source: Author based on the General Plan published on 23 April 2004) 
 
With the information in Figures 3-1 and 3-2, Diet members were satisfied with the seven 
measures taken in the areas identified as non-battlefields.  
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3.3.4. Quality and Quantity of Measures for JSDF Personnel 
 
Although the roles of JSDF personnel were expanded, Diet members had discovered that 
JSDF personnel would not be dispatched to the battlefield (see Figure 3-1). The measures  
to be taken by JSDF personnel during the operation were mainly to support the US Army; 
therefore, a large number of Diet members changed their mind when they discovered that 
JSDF personnel would not be active in the battlefield.  
 
Although a large number of Diet members were satisfied with the explanation 
given regarding the role of JSDF personnel, a member of the Japanese Communist Party 
(hereafter, JCP) raised the following question to PM Koizumi on this issue: “John Sidney 
McCain III said there is the possibility of accidental bombings. Referring to the case of 
the Kosovo War, the Chinese Embassy was bombed accidently and many civilians 
became the victims of the Kosovo War. If Japan would provide logistical support to the 
US, transporting weapons and ammunitions is included in logistical support, and there is 
a possibility of accidental bombings using the weapons and ammunitions transported by 
Japan” (Fudesaka Hideyo, 10 October 2001). PM Koizumi replied as follows: “innocent 
civilians became the victims of 9/11; therefore, the international society must fight against 
terrorism [which caused the incident of 9/11]. The international society must deal with 
the situation of terrorism, not to deal with the situation in which civilians became the 
victims of international military operations. When dealing with the situation of terrorism, 
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the US and the UK should pay attention not to violate innocent people” (10 October 2001). 
No further discussion on non-violation of innocent people in Afghanistan was held in the 
Diet. However, the equipment to be carried by JSDF personnel during the operation was 
decided after the enactment of the ATSML. The basis for the quality and quantity of 
equipment is unclear because no related discussions were held in the Diet; however, 
Figure 3-3 below demonstrates that JSDF personnel would not carry guns or other small 
military weapons and were only in possession of the equipment in either warships or 
aircrafts.  
 
 Warships Aircrafts 
Equipment 
Personnel Max. 800 Max. 180 
Equipment 
1 Supply Vessel and  
2 Escort Vessels 
(max) 
6 Transport Aircrafts and 2 
Multi-Supporting Aircrafts 
(max) 
Figure 3-3 The Equipment of JSDF Personnel During OEF 
(Source: Author based on the General Plan published on 16 November 2001) 
 
3.4. Jus ad Bellum 
 
Based on discussions conducted by the GOJ in its decision-making process (see 3.3.1. 
and 3.3.2.), this section will examine whether the GOJ took the two normative principles, 
necessity and proportionality, into consideration before deciding to participate in OEF. To 
separately consider this issue, this section will be divided into two parts. This first part 
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will examine the reasons for the GOJ’s decision to participate in OEF with reference to 
the principle of necessity in jus ad bellum. As states should have the right intention or a 
just cause for taking military action against others from the legal and moral-philosophical 
perspectives, the first part will examine whether the Diet found a justified reason for 
providing logistical support when the related discussions were held. We will then examine 
the permissible measures in contributing to OEF with reference to the principle of 
proportionality in jus ad bellum. As measures must be balanced to be justified from the 
moral-philosophical perspective, it is necessary to examine whether the Diet considered 
this issue when deciding to provide logistical support to the US.  
 
3.4.1. The Principle of Necessity 
 
As analysed in 2.2.1.i., the principle of necessity demands consideration of justification. 
According to jurists and philosophers’ analyses on the principle of necessity in jus ad 
bellum, an operation is justified if there is a just cause; i.e. self-defence is justified when 
an armed attack occurs. Therefore, this subsection will first analyse whether there was a 
just cause for conducting OEF, and then determine whether the GOJ found the necessity 
to participate in the operation with just cause.  
 
(a) Just Cause for Conducting OEF 
 
As the US was the victim of the 9/11 attacks, OEF seems to meet the condition of the 
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principle of necessity (see 3.1.). Therefore, the US had the right intention in taking 
military action against the offender, al-Qaeda. However, although there was a clear just 
cause for executing defensive action, the most controversial issue was whether attacking 
Afghanistan was necessary. Since Afghanistan, a sovereign state, was legally distinct 
from al-Qaeda, the US did not have the right intention in carrying out OEF in Afghanistan. 
The US explained that the operation targeted Afghanistan because al-Qaeda members 
were hiding there. However, this rationale would only justify an operation targeting al-
Qaeda members, and not the ordinary people of Afghanistan, as the violation of human 
rights of innocent people contravenes the normative principles of Just War Theory 
(Cooper, 2011). Thus, judging from the final result alone, OEF can be considered an 
unnecessary use of force because it was supposed to target only the members of al-Qaeda. 
Therefore, it is difficult to classify this operation as having a just cause. 
 
(b) Japan’s Justification for Participating in OEF 
  
This finding demonstrates that Japan did not have the right to attack Afghanistan. The 
aim of this dissertation, however, is to clarify whether the GOJ’s decision to participate 
in OEF met the principle of necessity in jus ad bellum. As discussions on the necessity of 
Japan’s OEF participation were examined in 3.3.1., this part will seek to answer whether 
the GOJ considered the principle of necessity in jus ad bellum when discussing Japan’s 
participation in the operation.  
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 As PM Koizumi expressed his opinion that there was no right intention for 
Japan to participate in OEF, we may conclude that Japan did not have the right intention 
for its attack on Afghanistan. This also means that Japan had no right intention for 
providing logistical support to the US either. As seen in 3.3.1., the main reason given by 
Cabinet members for providing logistical support was to strengthen the relationship with 
the US. As examined in 1.3., this reason can be explained by the theory of IR: realism 
(neo-realism), liberalism (neo-liberalism), and constructivism.  
   
 For all, it is evident from the Diet record and the interview results that some 
Diet members pointed out that Japan had no right intention to participate in OEF from a 
moral-philosophical perspective. At the same time, we also discover that many Diet 
members favoured relying on the decision-making of others, such as the UN Security 
Council, the US, and other coalition allies of the US. However, the GOJ should rely 
neither on the UNSCR nor the decision of the US, but rather on the principle of necessity 
in jus ad bellum.  
 
3.4.2. The Principle of Proportionality 
 
The second consideration factor for jus ad bellum, the principle of proportionality, guides 
judgment as to whether the quality and quantity of the military power used by the JSDF 
for OEF was proportional. Since the JSDF did not take any military action during OEF, 
some pointed out that the GOJ did not have to consider the principle of proportionality in 
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jus ad bellum. However, the GOJ should have considered the proportionality of the 
support provided to the US with reference to the principle of proportionality in jus ad 
bellum. To judge proportionality, this subsection will examine whether or not OEF fell 
within the scope of self-defence by comparing the norm and practice, before examining 
the issue through Japan’s participation in OEF.  
 
(a) Quality and Quantity of OEF 
 
It has been reported that approximately 26,270 civilians7 became casualties of OEF. Thus, 
the number of innocent civilians killed far exceeded the number of victims of 9/11 (see 
3.1.). Human life is uncountable, however; therefore, the number of victims is not the 
only way to judge whether the quality and quantity of OEF was justified. The length of 
the war is also an important factor in determining an answer to this question. Given that 
US military personnel remain in Afghanistan today (see 3.1.), the US military has been 
in the country for more than fifteen years. Evidently, OEF became a larger operation than 
was supposedly originally intended.  
 
(b) Quality and Quantity of JSDF Personnel 
 
With the number of victims and the length of OEF, this dissertation examines whether the 
                                                 
7 According to Crawford (2015), 26,270 civilians were killed and 29,900 injured in the 
2001 Afghanistan War. With other factors causing civilian deaths, e.g. unsafe 
environment, approximately 92,000 civilians in total suffered from the violence of war.  
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GOJ determined the quality and quantity of JSDF personnel focusing on the balance 
between 9/11 and OEF.  
 
Based on this analysis, this dissertation concludes that Cabinet members did 
not sufficiently consider the principle of proportionality in jus ad bellum because the 
quality and quantity of force used was explained merely with the words “minimum and 
only necessary use of force;” however, the meaning of “minimum and only necessary use 
of force” is seemingly not shared among Diet members (interview with a then DPJ 
member of the House of Councillors, 6 July 2015). This leads to the result that Diet 
members used the words of “minimum and necessary use of force” like a mantra so that 
they can pretend to be conscious of quality and quantity in operation. Although they did 
demonstrate some consciousness of the issue, the dialogues in the Diet and the interview 
results demonstrate that Diet members did not pay attention to the principle of 
proportionality in jus ad bellum when deciding to participate in OEF: participating in 
OEF to strengthen the relationship with the US was more important than paying attention 
to the quality and quantity of the operation. 
 
3.5. Jus in bello 
 
The debates in the Diet were not only related to the issues of jus ad bellum. Since the 
GOJ discussed the JSDF’s activities, another aspect with which to judge whether Japan 
followed the moral-philosophical theories of just war is to analyse whether the GOJ paid 
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attention to the principles of jus in bello. Therefore, to answer the research question of 
this dissertation, this section will examine whether the GOJ considered each of these 
principles. To develop these two examinations based on the normative principles of jus 
in bello, the discussions in the Diet and the results of interviews conducted as part of this 
dissertation (see Appendix) will be referenced.  
 
 Following the description of the principles of jus in bello, this section will be 
divided into two parts: to analyse the permissible JSDF measures during OEF, we will 
first apply the principle of necessity and then the principle of proportionality. This will 
allow us to identify whether the GOJ considered the JSDF’s role in conducting the 
operation. To develop these two examinations based on the normative principles of jus in 
bello, the discussions in the Diet considered in earlier sections, particularly 3.3.3. and 
3.3.4., will be referenced.  
 
3. 5. 1. The Principle of Necessity 
 
The principle of necessity in jus in bello required the government to consider in what 
situations JSDF personnel could use military power, so as to minimise the numbers of 
victims. Therefore, applying this principle will help to establish whether the GOJ clarified 
in what situations JSDF personnel could exercise military power. The normative principle 
provides that soldiers should not exercise any kinds of military power against their 
enemies except in emergencies, e.g. where their lives are threatened. We will first define 
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the areas to which JSDF personnel were dispatched in conducting the operation, to 
ascertain the degree to which their lives were threatened during the operation. By defining 
the situation faced by the JSDF, we can ascertain whether it was necessary for JSDF 
personnel to be armed. Having clarified the dispatch area, we will then evaluate whether 
the GOJ considered in what situations JSDF personnel would be permitted to use military 
weapons. By examining these two issues, we can ascertain whether the GOJ considered 
the principle of necessity in jus in bello.  
 
According to the dialogues in the Diet, Cabinet members considered the 
situation in which JSDF personnel may use military force, such as firing weapons, in 
emergency cases. Expanding the capability of JSDF personnel in operations, Cabinet 
members believed it possible for Japan to be active during the operation.  
 
 According to the discussion in the Diet, JSDF personnel may use military force 
against their enemies to protect the lives and bodies of their collaborators and themselves. 
This differs seemingly from legitimate self-defence and acts of necessity, as stated by the 
PCJ; however, the GOJ sufficient clarified the situations in which JSDF personnel may 
use military force against others. Hence, it is possible to conclude that the GOJ considered 
the principle of necessity in jus in bello when enacting the ATSML. 
 
 Seemingly the GOJ sufficient paid attention to the principle of necessity in jus 
in bello, this chapter points out the necessity of the GOJ to further consider this normative 
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principle: the GOJ should have considered not only the lives and bodies of their 
collaborators and themselves but also those of civilians in Afghanistan to fit with the 
principle of necessity in jus in bello. The lack of consideration on violating innocent 
people demonstrates that the GOJ insufficiently considered the principle of necessity in 
jus in bello: not considering on this point might be due to the confidence that JSDF 
personnel would not use military weapons against innocent people because they would 
be dispatched in non-battle fields; however, the normative principles of Just War Theory 
are based on the idea that all states should paying attention not to violate the rights of 
civilians before participating in international military operations. Overall, this chapter 
points out that the GOJ did not sufficiently consider the non-violation of human rights in 
general, particularly the rights of civilians in Afghanistan.  
 
3. 5. 2. The Principle of Proportionality 
 
The second principle, proportionality, guides us as to whether the quality and quantity of 
military power used by soldiers during an operation is proportional. Since JSDF personnel 
did not participate directly in OEF, it might be difficult to calculate how much military 
power they would use in this operation. However, it is possible to consider, for instance, 
whether the volume of oil that the JSDF transported to US aircraft was proportional.  
  
 As examined in 3.3.3. and 3.3.4., no discussions were held in the Diet regarding 
how much oil the JSDF would transport to US aircraft. Since the main discussion in the 
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Diet concerns compliance with the restrictions imposed by the JCL, the focus of debate 
was domestic legal matters.  
 
The possibility of JSDF personnel using military force was mentioned in the 
Diet; however, the quality and quantity of military weapons were not mentioned when 
members were discussing the issue of legitimate JSDF activities in OEF. While the words 
“minimum and only necessary use of force” were heard many times in the Diet, the 
quality and quantity of military force to be used were not made sufficiently clear. Overall, 
we can conclude that the GOJ did not sufficiently consider the principle of proportionality 
in jus in bello.  
 
3.6.  Conclusion 
 
From the discussion in this chapter, it is clear that, in deciding whether or not to participate 
in OEF, the GOJ’s consideration differed from the normative principles that all members 
of international society should follow when contemplating the use of military power. 
Although Japan did not participate directly in this operation, JSDF troops transported oil 
to refuel US aircrafts. Therefore, rather than focusing solely on legal matters, the GOJ 
should have considered moral-philosophical perspectives to properly justify Japan’s 
participation in OEF. Therefore, this section will summarise the gap between the GOJ 
consideration and the factors that all sovereign states should consider before launching or 
participating in international military operations. This will help to clarify the normative 
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perspectives to which the GOJ paid insufficient attention.  
 
 To identify the gap, it is necessary to highlight the principal reason behind the 
GOJ’s policy: contrary to PM Koizumi’s declaration that this participation would 
contribute to maintaining international peace and security, the most likely reason for 
participation was to strengthen Japan’s relationship with the US. Two grounds support 
this conclusion: first, Japan’s consideration of participation in OEF focused solely on 
Japanese domestic law, despite the contemplated military operation being international; 
and second, the GOJ failed to consider the protection of human rights in general. By 
clarifying these two explanations, which characterise Japan’s intention to participate in 
OEF, we can identify the gap between factors considered by the GOJ and the normative 
principles applied to participating in international military operations.  
 
 The first characteristics was the lack of consideration given to the justification 
for OEF. Although some Diet members raised the necessity to consider this issue before 
deciding to participate in the operation, the Japanese Cabinet did not address this point 
clearly: instead, they focused on responding to the US’s request to participate in OEF 
rather than clarifying the right intention for attacking Afghanistan. In addition, 
discussions on enacting the ATSML addressed concerns over how Japan would 
participate in OEF without revising the JCL. From our analysis of the related Diet 
discussions, it is clear that no consideration was given to the moral justification for OEF. 
The most important factor for the GOJ was to strengthen the US-Japan relationship, as 
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Asō specified in the Diet (see 3.3.1.). The gap between the factors considered by Japan 
in this instance and the normative factors demonstrates that the GOJ did not consider the 
moral-philosophical perspective.  
 
 The second characteristic of the GOJ’s decision-making procedure was the lack 
of consideration regarding the protection of human rights in general. The GOJ focused in 
particular on protecting the lives of JSDF personnel, contrary to the normative principles 
that states should not violate human rights in general. As seen in 3.3.3., the Diet discussion 
concerned not violating the lives and bodies of JSDF personnel and the collaborators and 
complying with the JCL restriction. If the OEF participation was premised on maintaining 
international peace and security, the GOJ should have considered the protection of human 
rights in general, particularly the rights of civilians in Afghanistan. However, no such 
discussion took place in the Diet when the issue of participating in OEF was discussed. 
Thus, in reaching the decision to participate, the GOJ seems not to have paid sufficient 
attention to the normative ideas of Just War Theory.  
 
 Since OEF was the first case of the GOJ deciding to participate in an 
international military operation, it might be argued that they lacked sufficient knowledge 
regarding the theory. Therefore, the next chapter will analyse another case in which the 
GOJ decided to participate in international military operations. This will clarify whether 
the GOJ improved its consideration of the normative principles of Just War Theory in the 
second case.  
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Chapter Four. Japan’s Participation in OIF: the 2003 Iraq War 
 
This chapter will examine the GOJ’s decision-making process in deciding to participate 
in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), also known as the 2003 Iraq War (2003 - present). This 
is the second case of international military operations in which Japan participated. This 
chapter uses the term OIF, as this encompasses the 2003 invasion of Iraq (20 March 2003 
- 1 May 2003) and the post-invasion reconstruction operation (2003 - present). When the 
GOJ decided to participate in OIF on 1 August 2003, the 2003 invasion of Iraq was 
already completed. Although the GOJ was unable to reach a decision on participating in 
the 2003 invasion, related discussions continued with respect to participating in the 
reconstruction activity. Therefore, Japan’s participation in OIF is suited to the second 
examination as to whether Japan took the normative principles into consideration when 
deciding to participate in international military operations.  
 
 This chapter will commence by introducing the background of OIF. Compared 
with the previous case study of OEF, the purpose of OIF was more complex because there 
was no clear rationale for invading Iraq. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify what 
prompted the US and its coalition allies, such as the UK, to invade Iraq and to conduct 
reconstruction activity there. By elucidating the reasons for each, we will clarify the 
rationale for OIF.  
 
 After completing the invasion of Iraq on 1 May 2003, the US and its coalition 
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allies engaged in reconstruction activity there. The GOJ had been unable to reach a 
decision on participating in the 2003 invasion before this operation concluded, despite 
Japanese Cabinet members, particularly PM Koizumi insisting that JSDF personnel 
should be dispatched to support the US military. Therefore, the second section will 
analyse why members of the Koizumi administration, in particular, sought to participate 
in OIF.  
 
 Based on the background of OIF and Japan’s intention to participate therein, 
the related debates in the Diet will be analysed. To facilitate comparison with the previous 
chapter, the same issues as those in Chapter Three will be investigated: whether Diet 
members found the right intention for participating in OIF (4.3.1.); whether the OIF was 
proportional to Iraq’s supposed possession of WMDs (4.3.2.); what the role of JSDF 
personnel was while reconstructing Iraq (4.3.3.); and whether the measures taken by 
JSDF personnel in the reconstruction of Iraq were proportional (4.3.4.).  
 
Based on the results of analyses, the examinations will explore compliance with 
jus ad bellum (4.4.) and jus post bellum (4.5.). As specified in Chapter Two, the principles 
of jus ad bellum and jus in bello should be considered when determining participation in 
OIF as these principles demonstrate what requirements it is necessary to justify before 
taking military action and supporting reconstruction activity. However, the GOJ could not 
reach a decision to participate in OIF before the invasion was completed, it was 
unnecessary to consider the normative principles of jus in bello. Despite considering the 
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normative principles of jus in bello, the GOJ should have considered the normative 
principles of jus ad bellum as the GOJ originally contemplated participating in the 
invasion of Iraq. Furthermore, the principles of jus post bellum should have been taken 
into consideration as the GOJ determined to participate in the reconstruction activities in 
Iraq. Therefore, this chapter will examine whether the GOJ considered the normative 
principles of jus ad bellum and jus post bellum by comparing what issues were actually 
discussed by the GOJ and what issues they should have considered. 
 
 In the final section of this chapter, we will clarify what issues the GOJ, 
particularly the Koizumi administration, should have considered when deciding to 
participate in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and to dispatch the JSDF to participate in the 
reconstruction activity.  
 
4.1. Background to Operation Iraqi Freedom 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, OIF comprised two different types of activity: the 
invasion of Iraq and reconstruction work. Therefore, this section will be divided into two 
parts to describe why the US and its coalition allies conducted these two activities. 
 
4.1.1. The 2003 Invasion of Iraq 
 
In essence, the US government believed that the then-Iraqi government, the Hussein 
 128 
administration (term of office: 16 July 1979 – 9 April 2003), posed a threat to 
international society. Two significant grounds were provided in support of the US 
opinion: first, the US believed there was a close relationship between Saddam Hussein 
and al-Qaeda; and second, the US presented evidence that Iraq possesses weapons of 
mass destruction (WMDs).  
 
 The first US argument to justify invading Iraq was the discovery that Saddam 
Hussein had been supporting Islamic extremist groups, such as al-Qaeda, both financially 
and physically (Rice, 2012, p. 169). Consequently, the US identified Saddam Hussein, 
the fifth President of Iraq, as a threat to international peace and order (Rumsfeld, 2011, 
pp. 421–422). In reaching its decision to carry out OEF in order to destroy al-Qaeda, the 
US expressed its concern that Saddam Hussein might provide financial and physical 
support to other Islamic extremist groups as he had done to al-Qaeda, to fight against the 
US. In other words, the US worried that major attacks, like 9/11, might be repeated by 
Islamic extremist groups, despite US efforts to destroy al-Qaeda. Therefore, the US 
believed it necessary to invade Iraq in order to destroy Saddam Hussein’s relationship 
with Islamic extremist groups.  
 
 The second reason for the US invasion of Iraq was the concern that Iraq 
possessed WMDs. After 9/11, two anthrax attacks occurred in the US (CNN, 2010). Since 
anthrax is categorised as a biological weapon, the US suspected that further attacks using 
WMDs might occur in the US. A concern over anthrax and/or WMD attacks was specified 
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as follows in the 2002 Bush Doctrine: “[o]ur second goal is to prevent regimes that 
sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass 
destruction” (Bush, 2002a). This speech clearly demonstrates the US’s evidently fear of 
being attacked with WMDs. In another occasion, President Bush delivered a similar 
speech specifying the US’s suspicion that Iraq possessed WMDs, and was exporting the 
weapons to Islamic extremist groups (Bush, 2002b). These reports delivered by US 
intelligence was sufficient for the US to identify the Iraqi government, particularly 
Saddam Hussein, as a menace. Hussein was therefore regarded as a serious threat to the 
US. At the same time, the US government had strong concerns that Iraq was developing 
nuclear weapons (Powell, 2003). Although it was unclear whether Iraq possessed nuclear 
weapons, some US Cabinet members, such as Dick Cheney, a former Vice President of 
the US, assumed that Saddam Hussein was endeavouring to develop “an aggressive 
nuclear weapons program” (Woodward, 2004, p. 165). Overall, the US was clearly very 
concerned about both the Iraqi government and Islamic extremist groups.  
 
 Based on these reasons, President Bush made a speech at the UN General 
Assembly on the necessity to conduct an inspection in Iraq (Bush, 2002c). Following his 
speech, the issue of Iraq was discussed at the UN Security Council, which was adopted 
as resolution 1441 (hereafter, UNSCR 1441) on 8 November 2002. Although the UN 
Security Council “decide[d] to remain seized of the matter” (Resolution 1441, 2002) , the 
US was not satisfied with the resolution and expressed concern that the Hussein 
administration might provide financial and physical support to Islamic extremist groups 
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(Bush, 2003). Given this suspicion, the US insisted on its right intention for attacking 
Iraq, so as to maintain peace and order in international society. This opinion was 
supported by several sovereign states, including Australia, Spain, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Poland, and the UK (Bush, 2010, p. 233), although Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Norway, and Russia disagreed, believing that UNSCR 1441 was sufficient to 
solve the issues regarding Iraq (BBC, 2003).  
 
4.1.2. The Reconstruction of Iraq 
 
Pursuant to the US intention to destroy the Hussein administration, the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq began on 20 March 2003. The invasion itself was swiftly completed, with President 
Bush declaring the end of the invasion on 1 May 2003 (CNN, 2003). After the Iraqi 
government collapsed and Saddam Hussein was captured by the US force on 13 
December 2003, the US Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) 
occupied Iraq to oversee its reconstruction. Later, the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA), organised by the US, UK, Australia, and Poland, was established on 16 May 2003 
to replace the ORHA, and served in a substitute role for Iraq until the Iraqi Interim 
Government was established8.  
 
Even after the establishment of the Iraqi Interim Government, the situation in 
                                                 
8 The Iraqi Interim Government was instituted until a new Iraqi government, the Iraqi 
Transitional Government, was established on 3 May 2005.  
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Iraq was not sufficiently stable for the US and its coalition allies to withdraw their 
occupation force. According to a report from The Guardian, between 20 March 2003 and 
31 December 2010, Iraq suffered more than 1,000 suicide bomb attacks, which killed 
12,284 Iraqi civilians and injured a further 30,000 (Boseley, 2011). Thus, despite the US 
declaration that the invasion had concluded, large numbers of Iraqi civilians became 
victims of OIF. Of course, the victims of OIF were not only Iraqi residents: approximately 
1,000 US soldiers were killed and 6,497 were injured (Weeramantry, 2005, p. xv), while 
13,500 - 45,000 Iraqi soldiers died during the operation (Steele, 2003). Three Japanese 
people also became the victims of OIF: two Japanese diplomats shot in Iraq on 29 
November 2003; and Japanese civilian found dead in Iraq on 31 October 2004 (Asahi 
Shimbun, 2004; Koizumi Junichirō, 2004) . Based on the above, OIF reconstruction 
activity was undertaken under such highly unstable conditions.  
 
4.2. Purpose of Enacting a Temporary Statute, Special Measures on Humanitarian and 
Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq 
 
When the US decided to destroy the Hussein administration, the GOJ supported the US’s 
stance, as it had before OEF was carried out (see Chapter Three.). PM Koizumi expressed 
his position as follows: “I deem it appropriate to support the use of force by the US” 
(Koizumi, 2003a). The GOJ, however, had to shift its discussions from supporting 
invasion activity to supporting reconstruction activity, as the invasion was completed 
before the GOJ had reached a decision on participation. Although Japan had to shift the 
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type of support it offered, the Cabinet’s intention to support the US remained stable. 
Therefore, this section will introduce the intention of the Cabinet to clarify why JSDF 
personnel were dispatched.  
 
 The Japanese international policy on participating in reconstruction activity in 
Iraq was expressed in the following statement of PM Koizumi: “the reconstruction of 
Iraq and stability of the livelihoods of people in Iraq is of importance for Japan from the 
perspective of not only stability in the Middle East region but also peace and safety in 
the international community as a whole, including Japan” (Koizumi Junichirō, 2003b). 
This statement manifests a strong intention to dispatch the JSDF to Iraq in order to 
maintain international peace and security. However, it can also be identified that the 
policy’s purpose was to strengthen the relationship with the US (see 1.3.). This became 
apparent at an earlier stage on discussions in the Diet, when Japan offered to supply oil 
to the US military without enacting a suitable statute. At that time, the GOJ had no legal 
legitimacy for refuelling the US naval fleets engaged in OIF; therefore, it was necessary 
to enact a new statute for Japan to dispatch JSDF personnel to participate in OIF for the 
following two reasons: first, the difficulty of applying the ATSML to a different 
international military operation; and second, the difficulty of applying the 1999 
Surrounding Areas Emergency Measures Law and the Act on Cooperation with the 
United Nations Peace Keeping Activities to participation in OIF (see 3.2.). Although 
required for Japan before dispatching the JSDF, the GOJ decided to provide such 
support to the US by applying the ATSML (Ito, 2003). It could be said that the 
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governmental decision was a holding step towards the government’s intended dispatch 
of the JSDF to participate in OIF. 
 
 Although Japan first dispatched the JSDF to refuel the US naval fleets engaged 
in OIF, it was necessary to enact a new temporary statute to legitimate Japan’s 
participation in OIF. Therefore, the bill of Special Measures on Humanitarian 
Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (SMHRA) was brought to the floor of the Diet on 13 
June 2003 (Japanese Communist Party, 14 June 2003).  
 
4.3. Diet Deliberation 
 
With the intention of the Koizumi administration, discussions were held in the Diet on 
how to provide support to the US military. This section will analyse how Diet members 
held debates on Japan’s participation in OIF when determining to enact the SMHRA, by 
focusing on whether Diet members pointed out the related issues: the right intention or a 
just cause for engaging in OIF (4.3.1.); the quality and quantity of military weapons used 
during OIF (4.3.2.); whether it was necessary to participate in reconstruction activity 
(4.3.3.); and the quality and quantity of measures which JSDF personnel would take 
during the reconstruction activity (4.3.4.). This analysis will be based on Japanese Diet 
records9 provided by the National Diet Library, interviews conducted for this dissertation 
                                                 
9 Although the bill of SMHRA was brought to the floor on 25 June 2003, the related 
debates, particularly on the US conducting OIF, were held in the Diet from 8 November 
2002. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the discussion in the Diet between 8 November 
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(see Appendix), and the general plan published by the Cabinet on 9 December 2003. 
 
4. 3. 1. The Reasons for Participating in OIF 
 
Before discussing this issue in the Diet, PM Koizumi made a speech justifying the 
invasion of Iraq on 20 March 2003, stating two clear reasons: first, Iraq ignored UN 
warnings; and second, the operation was required in order to liberate Iraqi civilians from 
Saddam Hussein (Koizumi, 2003b). PM Koizumi explained the first reason for invading 
Iraq as follows: although WMDs were not used in 9/11, Iraq’s possession of WMDs 
would threaten the lives of people throughout the world (ibid). The second reason was as 
follows: liberating Iraqi public from the Hussein administration would help Iraq to 
become a democratic society (ibid). Although PM Koizumi pointed out the reasons for 
supporting the US, the reasons for providing logistical support to the US were not 
mentioned in the Diet.  
 
The related discussion on the legal justification for attacking Iraq commenced 
after the adoption of UNSCR 1441. The foreign affairs committee in the House of 
Representatives held a meeting on the Iraq investigation on 15 November 2002. They 
invited three unsworn witnesses to the Diet: Ōno Motohiro 10 , Matsui Yoshirō, and 
Mizuguchi Akira. Ōno specified the threats posed by Iraq from the US perspective (see 
                                                 
2002 and 26 July 2003, the date of passing the bill of the SMHRA.  
10 Ono Motohiro was an officer working in MOFA (1989-2001). He was dispatched to 
Iraq and UEA from 1989 to 1993.  
 135 
4.1.), but insisted that there was no evidence to support the US’s opinion on Iraq (15 
November 2002). At the same time, he pointed out that there was less possibility for 
Saddam Hussein to order missiles or WMDs to be launched because it would be difficult 
for him to control the Iraqi government if he gave such order (ibid). Matsui, a scholar in 
public international law, pointed out the legal perspectives: although Iraq possessed 
weapons that should be abolished under UNSCR 678 and 687, UN members may not 
have the right to exercise self-defence (ibid). Another meeting was held on 26 November 
2003 with three unsworn witnesses: Magosaki Ukeru, a diplomat, Yamauchi Masayuki, a 
scholars specialised in IR, and Yokota Yōzō, a scholar specialised in public international 
law. During this meeting, Yokota mentioned that there was no legal justification for the 
US to exercise the right to self-defence (26 November 2002). Although these scholars in 
public international law noted the lack of legal justification for conducting the 2003 
invasion of Iraq, Kawaguchi Junko, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated as 
follows: “Iraq has not observed the UNSCR; therefore, [we] cannot legitimate the act of 
Iraq” (27 February 2003).  
 
Discussion on the legitimacy of attacking Iraq continued after the US 
commenced the 2003 invasion of Iraq. When Hironaka Wakako, a then DPJ member, 
asked PM Koizumi about the legitimacy of attacking Iraq, he responded that the legal 
basis for the operation was UN Resolution 678 (21 March 2003). He explained the reason 
as follows: “Iraq has not cooperated [with the UN] to discharge the obligation; therefore, 
Iraq has violated the stipulation in UNSCR 1441. Also, there is a significant violation of 
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UNSCR 687, a ceasefire resolution between Iraq and Kuwait and member states 
cooperating with Kuwait; therefore, the basis of [the 2003 invasion of Iraq] is UNSCR 
687. For all, attacking Iraq is not identified as either a pre-emptive attack nor preventive 
attack” (21 March 2003). It was not only PM Koizumi who found the legal basis in the 
UNSCR: the then Chief Cabinet Secretary, Fukuda Yasuo, also referred to the UNSCR to 
explain the legitimacy for attacking Iraq (25 March 2003). On the other hand, Kawaguchi 
Junko specified that the legal basis for the 2003 invasion of Iraq was Chapter 7 of the UN 
Charter (ibid); however, when an opposition party member asked for the specific 
regulation, a then director of the International Legal Affairs Division in MOFA was 
unable to specify the exact regulation that was applicable (Hayashi Keiichi, 25 March 
2003). 
 
 Despite the Cabinet’s professions that the attack on Iraq was legitimate, 23 
Japanese scholars in public international law, including Matsui Yoshirō, Mogami Toshiki, 
Igarashi Masahiro, and Furukawa Terumi, issued a statement that there was no legal 
justification for attacking Iraq (Japanese Communist Party, 19 March 2003). Although 
the invasion was illegal from the perspective of public international law on war, the LDP 
members, particularly Cabinet members, believed that the UNSCR was sufficient legal 
justification for the invasion.  
 
 While the lack of legal justification was one of the issues discussed in the Diet, 
Maehara Seiji, a then DPJ member, pointed out that the necessity of considering the issue 
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from the perspective of domestic law rather than public international law on war because 
Article 98 of the JCL states “the treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of 
nations shall be faithfully observed.” Maehara believed that Japan’s position supporting 
the invasion of Iraq by the US and its allies contravened Articles 98 and 99 of the JCL 
(20 March 2003).  
 
 Furthermore, opposition party members emphasised that Japan’s provision of 
logistical support to the US contravened Article 9 of the JCL (Ōide Akira, 20 March 2003; 
Haruna Naoaki, 12 December 2002; Shima Satoshi, 30 January 2003). The LDP members, 
however, insisted on the necessity to resolve the issue on Iraq due to the possibility that 
Japanese civilians would be attacked with the weapons transported by Iraq (Nakagawa 
Shōichi, 30 January 2003; Sengoku Yoshito, 20 March 2003). Thus, Cabinet members 
found legitimacy in participating in OIF, to prevent the possibility of Japanese civilians 
being attacked.  
 
4. 3. 2. Quality and Quantity of OIF 
 
This issue concerns whether the GOJ sufficiently considered whether the quantity and 
quality of the operation to invade Iraq was proportional to the threat posed by Iraq to 
international society. Focusing on this issue may elucidate the degree of support Japan 
should have provided to the US military and the related discussion will be analysed on 
that basis.  
 138 
 
With respect to the US engaging in international military operations, the 
possibility of violating human rights in general was a main concern of Diet members. For 
instance, four days after UNSCR 1441 was adopted, a then DPJ member pointed out the 
necessity to consider the human rights of victims (Kawahashi Sachiko, 12 November 
2002). Despite Kawahashi’s insistence, the Cabinet members to whom the query was 
addressed did not reply to this comment: he only responded to other issues, such as the 
restoration of diplomatic relations with North Korea (Fukuda Yasuo, 12 November 2002). 
A similar question was raised by members of the opposition parties before the invasion 
of Iraq (Kaneko Tetsuo, 30 January 2003; Doi Takako, 4 February 2003; Ichida Tadayoshi, 
5 February 2003; Hayashi Toshiko, 17 March 2003; and Kamimoto Mieko, 19 March 
2003). Although the opposition party members had been conscious of potential violation 
of the rights of Iraqi people if the US invaded Iraq, Cabinet members emphasised the 
importance of maintaining the relationship with the US rather than urging the US not to 
violate human rights (Koizumi Junichirō, 4 February 2003 and 5 February 2003). During 
the earlier operation, Cabinet members avoided responding to questions on human rights 
violation by stating that they did not know what the US’s tactics would be; however, after 
20 March 2003, the day on which the US began invading Iraq, they had to respond to this 
issue and PM Koizumi commented as follows: “I sincerely hope that the battle in Iraq 
will be terminated as soon as possible, and human and physical damage will be as little 
as possible” (21 March 2003). However, PM Koizumi also pointed out that the damage 
caused by passing on WMDs to dangerous dictators or terrorists would be unexpectedly 
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overwhelming (24 March 2003). In this regard, all Cabinet members found the quality 
and quantity of OIF to be balanced with the threats posed by Iraqi WMDs.  
 
4. 3. 3. Participation in Reconstruction Activity 
 
According to public international law, Japan was required to obtain permission from Iraq 
to participate in its reconstruction activity (see 2.2.3.i). However, the Iraqi government 
collapsed in April 2003 and therefore could not make such a request to Japan. As a 
substitute for the Iraqi government, the US and the UK were given the authority, 
responsibility, and obligation to govern Iraq (UNSCR 1483). Thus, Japan was required to 
obtain a request from these countries to provide logistical support in the reconstruction 
activity. Some claimed that the request should have been made by the CPA as the acting 
substitute for the Iraqi government (Musashi, 2005, p. 107). In any case, when asked 
about this issue, a Cabinet member responded that there had been no official request from 
the US to dispatch JSDF personnel to Iraq (Kawaguchi Junko, 13 June 2003). PM 
Koizumi also replied that providing support to reconstruct Iraq, including dispatching 
JSDF personnel, was Japan’s decision; and not simply in response to a request from the 
US (7 July 2003). Although no official request was made by the US, the GOJ believed 
that there had been a request from the US because Paul Dundes Wolfowitz, the then US 
Deputy Secretary of Defense, expressed his opinion that Japan would provide logistical 
support to the US, such as maintaining facilities and providing communication and 
transport services (Nishida Tsuneo, 2 July 2003). On this basis, the GOJ found it 
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necessary to participate in reconstruction activity.  
 
4. 3. 4. Quality and Quantity of Measures for JSDF Personnel during the 
Reconstruction Activity 
 
Before bringing the SMHRA bill to the floor of the Diet, PM Koizumi announced that 
Japan would implement eight measures to deal with Iraq: taking the necessary measures 
to protect the lives of Japanese civilians in Iraq; strengthening the security of important 
facilities in Japan, i.e. the facilities of the US military and other official residences; taking 
the necessary measures to maintain the safety of ship navigations; taking suitable 
economic measures; providing humanitarian assistance to the victims; providing support 
to Iraq and surrounding countries to relieve the economic influence; taking the necessary 
measures to destroy WMDs and mines under the sea; and finally, continuing to provide 
support under the regulations of the ATSML (The Cabinet Decision, 20 March 2003). 
Although the eight measures reflected the intention of PM Koizumi, Diet members had 
to consider the dispatch area for the JSDF. There had been a surge in the number of 
military attacks, including suicide bombings, in Iraq since President Bush declared the 
conclusion of the 2003 invasion on 1 May 2003 (see 4.1.). Due to the unstable situation 
in Iraq, the GOJ had to determine the dispatch area because the government was afraid of 
sending JSDF personnel to a battle zone because the JCL prohibits retaining war potential 
(see 1.2.).  
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 To determine the situation, the GOJ had to distinguish between combat zones 
and non-combat zones in Iraq. Questions related to the definition of combat zone and 
non-combat zone were frequently raised in the Diet (Shimba Kazuya, 3 June 2003; 
Tsuzuki Tsuzuru, 5 June 2003; Doi Takako, 11 June 2003; Suematsu Yoshinori, 12 June 
2003; Kokuta Keiji, 17 June 2003; and Nakagawa Masaharu, Ichikawa Yasuo, Kijima 
Hideo, and Kaneko Tetsuo, 24 June 2003); however, Cabinet members, particularly the 
then Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo, defined a combat zone as a place where “an 
international armed conflict of killing or injuring a person, or destroying an object” is 
ongoing (26 June 2003). He continued by stating that the GOJ would determine whether 
an area was a combat zone or non-combat zone based on the information provided by the 
Japanese alliance, comprising the US (ibid). A member of the Iraqi investigation team 
added the following to Fukuda’s comment: “according to my experience of staying in 
Iraq, (…) I believe it is possible to divide the area in Iraq into battle field and non-battle 
field” (Saitō Tetsuo, 26 June 2003). Cabinet members implied that a non-combat zone 
was anywhere hostile activities were not occurring; however, Diet members, including 
the ruling party members, were not satisfied with the response due to the unstable 
situation in Iraq and, eventually, PM Koizumi responded: “I do not know where the battle 
field is and where the non-battle field is” (23 July 2003). 
 
 Although innumerable discussions on defining non-battle fields were held in 
the Diet, the SMHRA bill was passed on 26 July 2003. Based on the bill, the Cabinet 
submitted a general plan on the measures based on the SMHRA on 9 December 2003. 
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This was in response to the fact that Article 4 of the SMHRA specifies that if a PM should 
find it necessary, countermeasures and response measures should be implemented and a 
basic plan made concerning such response measures at the Cabinet meeting. According 
to the general plan, the dispatch area for JSDF personnel would be determined by the 
roles they played during the operation (see Figure 4-1). According to the general plan, the 
participation activities during OIF are divided into two categories: humanitarian aid 
activity and safety support activity. The former would be undertaken by JSDF personnel 
and assistant staff for Iraqi reconstruction, while the latter would be conducted solely by 
JSDF personnel. Compared to the eight measures announced by PM Koizumi on 20 
March 2003, providing humanitarian assistance to victims is categorised as medical 
treatment service in humanitarian aid activities. Other measures that PM Koizumi insisted 
JSDF personnel should take, such as adopting the necessary measures to maintain the 
safety of ship navigations and to destroy WMDs and mines under the sea, were not 
mentioned in the general plan submitted.  
  
 143 
Humanitarian 
Aid 
Activities in 
Iraq 
JSDF 
Personnel 
Reconstruct and Maintain Medical 
Service, Water Supply Service, 
and Public Service 
Muthanna 
Government 
Transport 
Resources for 
Humanitarian 
Aid Activities 
By Vehicle 
Muthanna 
Government 
By Warship Indian Ocean 
By Air 
Airport 
Facilities in 
Kuwait and 
Iraq 
Assistant Staff 
for Iraq 
Reconstruction 
Medical Service Iraq 
Public Service Iraq 
Water Utilisation 
Muthanna 
Government 
Safety 
Support 
Activities for 
UN Members 
JSDF 
Personnel 
Medical Service, Transportation 
Service, Storage, Communication 
Service, Construction, Repair 
Service or Maintenance Service, 
Supply Service, and Disinfection 
Service 
Iraq 
Figure 4-1 The Dispatched Area of JSDF Personnel during the OIF 
(Source: author based on the general plan published on 9 December 2003.) 
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Regarding the dispatch area for JSDF 
personnel and assistant staff for Iraqi 
reconstruction, the general plan specified “the 
area where the act of hostilities would not take 
place during the operation” (The Cabinet, 9 
December 2003). The general plan also 
specified that JSDF personnel who were 
involved in humanitarian aid activity may have access to the facilities of CPA, the 
countries surrounding Iraq, and countries on the coast of the Persian Gulf, to collect 
necessary information; however, the JSDF would be mainly active in Samawah, 
Muthanna Government (ibid). The area of activity for JSDF personnel obviated the 
necessity for them to be armed or to take the same measures as in OEF (see Figure 3-3). 
However, the Cabinet decision on the quality and quantity of measures for JSDF 
personnel during the reconstruction activity was massive compared to the JSDF activity 
during OIF (see Figure 4-3). This was because the situation in Iraq was too unstable (see 
4.1.) for JSDF personnel to undertake reconstruction activity without carrying military 
weapons. To protect them from danger, the Diet insisted on the necessity for them to carry 
weapons, e.g. guns, while participating in the operation (Shiina Kazuyasu, 27 May 2003). 
Due to the unstable situation in Iraq, an ordinance was required for JSDF personnel. As 
Article 17 of the SMHRA specifies, the Cabinet needed to set the kinds and amount of 
ordinance in the general plan submitted on 9 December 2003 (see Figure 4-3).  
 
Figure 4-2 Map of Iraq 
(Source: BBC News on 19 February 
2004) 
 145 
 Personnel Facilities Equipment 
Ground SDF Max. 600 
Max. 200 Vehicles 
(Bulldozers, Armed 
Personnel Carrier, and 
Light Armed Vehicle) 
Guns, Rifles, 
Machine Guns, 
Carl Gustaf, and 
Anti-tank 
Weapons 
Air SDF 
(Depends on  
Military Units) 
Max. 8 Aircraft 
Guns, Rifles, and 
Machine Guns 
Maritime 
SDF 
(Depends on 
Military Units) 
Max. 2 Warships and Max. 
2 Escort Flotillas 
- 
Figure 4-3 The Equipment for JSDF Personnel to Carry during the OIF 
(Source: Author based on the General Plan published on 9 December 2003) 
 
Figure 4-3 shows that the Cabinet planned for JSDF personnel to carry military 
weapons with them. He Act on Cooperation with the United Nations Peace Keeping 
Activities also allows JSDF personnel to carry military weapons; however, they are only 
permitted to hold light weapons (Article 23-5). Compared to the JSDF personnel 
involved in PKO operations, those in OIF were heavily armed. The same conclusion 
could be arrived at by comparing the equipment carried by JSDF personnel during OIF 
and OEF (see Figure 3-3). From the list of equipment of JSDF personnel, it is clear that 
Cabinet members were aware that they were dispatching JSDF personnel to a dangerous 
area in Iraq, which necessitated the carrying of massive arms.  
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4.4. Jus ad Bellum 
 
Based on the analyses of Diet reports on the four different topics that should have been 
considered by Diet members, this chapter will now examine whether the GOJ took the 
normative principles of Just War Theory into consideration. The SMHRA was enacted 
after the declared conclusion of the invasion of Iraq, and some might therefore say that 
Japan did not need to consider about the principles of jus ad bellum. However, Japan 
should considered these principles because it had the opportunity to provide logistical 
support to the US military and this should have been legitimated. The main argument, 
therefore, is whether Japan’s decision to provide logistical support to the US military met 
the principles of jus ad bellum.   
 
 The first issue is whether the GOJ considered the principle of necessity when 
deciding to provide logistical support to the US military. As Japan decided to participate 
in OIF to support the US, the first examination will focus on why the GOJ believed it 
necessary for Japan to participate in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The second examination 
concerns whether the invasion of Iraq was proportional in terms of military power. The 
2003 invasion was executed by the US and its coalition allies because they identified Iraq 
as a threat to international peace and order. Even if they had the right intention for 
conducting OIF, the operation would be unjustified if the quality and quantity of weapons 
used was disproportionately large. The principle of proportionality, therefore, provides 
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certain criteria regarding whether the military power used by the US and its coalition 
allies in Iraq was balanced. We can also evaluate whether the GOJ took the principle of 
proportionality into consideration when deciding to provide logistical support to the US: 
if Japan believed that the quality and quantity of military power already committed to the 
operation was sufficient, it could be concluded that Japan did not have to provide 
logistical support to the US military. As Japan did decide to provide such support, it 
should have believed that the quality and quantity of military power committed to the 
operation was inadequate to tackle the threat posed by the Hussein administration. 
Therefore, it is important to examine whether the GOJ took the principle of 
proportionality into consideration when deciding to provide logistical support to the US 
military during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.  
 
4.4.1. The Principle of Necessity 
 
As seen in 4.1., the 2003 invasion of Iraq was not an act of self-defence because Iraq did 
not attack any UN members. It is legitimate to exercise self-defence when attacked by 
others (see Chapter Two); therefore, it is difficult to define the 2003 invasion as legally 
and moral-philosophically justified. Given this difficulty, Japan’s participation was 
undoubtedly not so justified. Although this conclusion is easily reached, it is important to 
examine whether Diet members considered the principle during discussions in the Diet.  
 
When the issue of right intention for conducting OIF was brought to the Diet, 
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Cabinet members and LDP members specified that the legal basis for attacking Iraq was 
UNSCR resolutions, while opposition party members criticized this opinion and said 
that the Iraq issue should be left to the inspection team. However, the principle of 
necessity in jus ad bellum means that Iraq should have attacked others before the US 
and its allies could insist on having the right intention for attacking Iraq. Although the 
principle of necessity in jus ad bellum specifies the condition of self-defence, none of 
the Diet members pointed out that Iraq had not used military force against the US and 
its allies or UN members. Those who noted that the issue should have been left to the 
inspection team might have implied that there was no just cause for the US and its allies 
to attack Iraq; however, the Diet members seemingly relied on UNSCR 1441, for which 
reason they did not consider why there was no just cause. Their failure to consider the 
issue of right intention is clearly demonstrated in the words of PM Koizumi, who 
agreed with the US position in attacking Iraq because he believed that Iraq’s threat to 
international society outweighed the attack of OIF. However, a threat is not an attack; 
therefore, none of the states should have exercised the right to self-defence.  
 
 While Diet members focused on ascertaining the US legitimacy for invading 
Iraq, they seemingly did not discuss the legitimacy in providing logistical support. 
Some Diet members found that, under domestic law, no legitimacy existed for Japan’s 
participation in OIF; however, Diet members should instead have considered whether or 
not Iraq had attacked UN members. If they had done so, the GOJ could have queried 
whether dispatching JSDF personnel to Iraq for self-defence was constitutional under 
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domestic law; however, since Iraq had not attacked others, this discussion was 
irrelevant.  
 
By examining Diet reports on the right intention for the US and its allies for 
attacking Iraq, we can conclude that Diet members did not consider the principle of 
necessity in jus ad bellum. While Japan did not ultimately provide support for the 
invasion of Iraq, it should have considered the principle of necessity for the two 
reasons: first, there was a possibility for Japan to provide logistical support to the US 
military; and second, Japan had refuelled the US naval fleets engaged in OIF by 
applying the ATSML (see 4.2).  
 
4.4.2. The Principle of Proportionality 
 
Although the principle of necessity in jus ad bellum was not considered in Diet discussion, 
this subsection will examine whether the GOJ considered the principle of proportionality 
in jus ad bellum. As this principle examines whether the quality and quantity of military 
power used by the US and its allies was well-balanced to the threat proposed by the Iraqi 
possession of WMDs, this subsection will examine whether the GOJ considered this issue 
when discussing Japan’s participation in the operation.  
 
 Because the US had taken massive measures when engaging in international 
military operations, a then DPJ member pointed out the possibility that the US had 
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violated human rights in general (see 4. 3. 2). Although this possibility was noted before 
the US engaged in OIF, the Cabinet members had not advised the US regarding the 
appropriate quality and quantity of force used in the operation. Nonetheless, PM Koizumi 
noted that the potential damage caused by passing on WMDs to dangerous dictators or 
terrorists would outweigh the potential damage caused by invading Iraq. If WMDs were 
found in Iraq, this comment may have proven valid; however, the inspection team 
reported that Iraq did not possess WMDs. Moreover, the possession of WMDs did not 
give the US and its allies the right to violate human rights in general. One official 
mentioned that Japan did not need to consider the rights of civilians in Iraq because they 
had elected Saddam Hussein as President of Iraq and thus the repercussions were their 
own responsibility (interview with a former director-general of the Ministry of Defense, 
24 July 2015). The above analyses lead to the conclusion that the GOJ did not consider 
the violation of human rights during discussions in the Diet, although Japan should have 
considered about the principle of proportionality in jus ad bellum when discussing 
participation in OIF.  
 
4.5. Jus post Bellum 
 
The examination of jus post bellum is highly relevant to Japan’s participation in OIF. As 
reflected in the name of SMHRA, its purpose was to enable JSDF personnel to engage in 
reconstruction activity in Iraq. As specified in Chapter Two, all sovereign states should 
follow the normative principles of jus post bellum despite having the intention to support 
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local people to live peacefully and safely. Therefore, this section will examine whether 
the GOJ attended to the normative principles of jus post bellum when deciding to 
participate in reconstruction activity in Iraq.  
 
 The first factor for consideration is the principle of necessity in jus post bellum. 
Based on the Diet deliberations analysed in the previous section, particularly in 4.3.3., 
the first part of this section will examine whether the GOJ considered the principle of 
necessity in jus post bellum. If Iraq or the CPA, the provisional government of Iraq, 
requested Japan’s support to recover Iraq from the 2003 invasion, the right intention or a 
just cause would exist for Japan to dispatch the JSDF to participate in reconstruction 
activity. Therefore, the first subsection will examine whether Japan’s support for 
reconstruction activity in Iraq was required from the moral-philosophical perspective.  
 
 The second consideration applies the principle of proportionality in jus post 
bellum. This is the most important factor to examine because it helps to identify whether 
the support provided by the GOJ was suitable in quality and quantity. This principle is 
most significant due to non-interventionism, as specified in the UN Charter, which means 
that Japan should not provide any support to Iraq without a request by the Iraqi 
government.  
 
4.5.1. The Principle of Necessity 
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According to the Diet report, a related question was brought to the floor of the Diet on 
13 June 2003 and a Cabinet member responded that those had been no official request 
from the US to participate in reconstruction activity; however, Cabinet members 
insisted that there had been a request from the US because the then US Deputy 
Secretary of Defense unofficially requested the specific measures which JSDF 
personnel would undertake during the reconstruction activity.  
 
Although the GOJ found the request from the then US Deputy Secretary of 
Defense to be sufficient for Japan to participate in reconstruction activity, it is difficult 
to conclude that Japan’s support was required. Speaking of the authority of Iraq at that 
time, the UN Security Council had given the US and the UK the responsibility to 
govern Iraq. Therefore, Japan should have obtained a request from both countries, not 
just the US, to provide logistical support in reconstruction activity. Some found that the 
CPA, the interim organisation established until a new Iraqi government was formed, 
were responsible for making the request. The CPA comprised not only the US but also 
the UK, Australia, and Poland. If the CPA had the authority to reconstruct Iraq, Japan 
should have received a request from this organization, not only from the US.  
 
For all the reason, this chapter points out that the GOJ did not sufficiently 
consider the principle of necessity in jus post bellum when related discussions on 
dispatching the JSDF to participate in the reconstruction activity was held in the Diet.  
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4.5.2. The Principle of Proportionality 
 
Although there was no official request from the CPA, the GOJ dispatched JSDF personnel 
to participate in the reconstruction activity. The second principle in jus post bellum guides 
us as to whether the quantity and quality of JSDF measures during the reconstruction 
activity were balanced.  
 
By analysing discussions on the role of JSDF personnel during OIF in the Diet, 
we can conclude that Diet members focused on the area to which personnel would be 
dispatched rather than on the role of JSDF personnel. The lack of interest in the role of 
JSDF personnel, including the quality and quantity thereof, is demonstrated in the 
procedure to be taken: their activity was to be decided by the Cabinet after the SMHRA 
bill was passed. Since no discussion occurred on their reason for being heavily armed, we 
cannot conclude that Diet members fully considered the principle of proportionality in 
jus post bellum.  
 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined whether OIF was legally and moral-philosophically justified. 
Through several examinations, we have discovered that Japan omitted to consider the 
principles of jus ad bellum and jus post bellum when discussing Japan’s participation in 
OIF. In closing this chapter, this section will explain why this conclusion was drawn. 
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There are two reasons to support this conclusion: first, there was a lack of consideration 
for the justification for invading Iraq, related to the principle of necessity; and second, 
there was a failure to effectively consider legitimacy in reconstructing Iraq.  
 
 Regarding the justification for invading Iraq, it is difficult to identify a legal 
justification because Iraq did not attack any UN members before OIF was conducted. 
There is a high possibility that the attack executed by the US and its coalition allies 
comprised the illegal use of force because they believed Iraq to comprise a threat to 
international society without evidence to that effect. Moreover, Iraq had not attacked other 
countries. Based on the reasons, it is difficult to adjudge the 2003 invasion of Iraq to have 
been theoretically justified. Regarding the result of analyses, the GOJ evidently only 
considered strengthening its relationship with the US, which insisted invading Iraq, 
despite its necessary to consider the legal and moral-philosophical bases for invading 
Iraq; therefore, we may conclude that the GOJ did not focus on the right intention for 
invading Iraq when discussing the legitimacy of invasion. 
 
 Regarding Japan’s reconstruction support, no official request was received 
from the US or its allies, such as the CPA, when discussing whether or not to dispatch 
JSDF personnel to participate in reconstruction activity. Although a small proportion of 
the Iraqi public were satisfied with Japan’s reconstruction support, this limited approval 
does not suggest that the GOJ seriously considered the reconstruction of Iraq: the GOJ 
was politically determined to dispatch JSDF personnel to avoid the shame of having only 
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sent financial support to the multinational forces in the Gulf War (see 1.3.). While the 
GOJ’s discussion can be explained with IR theory, it is not legally and moral-
philosophically justified. Thus, the examination demonstrates the lack of consideration 
of the principles of jus post bellum.   
 
 The two case studies, Japan’s participation in OEF and OIF, demonstrate that 
Japan did not sufficiently consider moral-philosophical issues when deciding to 
participate in international military operations. In the next chapter, dealing with Japan’s 
Legislation for Peace and Security, we will examine whether the GOJ considered moral-
philosophical issues when deciding to participate in international military operations. 
Although Japan’s enactment of Legislation for Peace and Security was unnecessary at the 
time, the GOJ seemingly sought to expand Japan’s ability to participate in international 
military operations. However, if Japan seeks to participate in international military 
operations, the normative principles of Just War Theory should have been considered 
before dispatching the JSDF to such operations. Therefore, by examining whether the 
GOJ considered the normative principles of Just War Theory when enacting Japan’s 
Legislation for Peace and Security, we can reach a conclusion on this matter by 
identifying what the GOJ should have considered when dispatching JSDF personnel to 
participate in international military operations.  
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Chapter Five. Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security 
 
Approximately 10 years after Japan participated in OEF and OIF, the Abe Cabinet 
submitted a Cabinet Decision to the floor of the Diet on 1 July 2014, specifying the 
possibility of Japan’s participation in international military operations without enacting 
any temporary statutes, as had been required for OEF and OIF. This chapter will analyse 
the related discussions in the Diet to examine whether the GOJ considered the normative 
principles of Just War Theory when holding the discussions on the Cabinet Decisions.  
 
 This chapter begins with the Abe Cabinet’s intention to call the Decision on 
Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its 
Peoples (kuni no sonritsu wo mattōshi, kokumin wo mamoru tameno kireme no nai anzen 
hoshō hōsei no seibi ni tsuite: hereafter, the Cabinet Decision). Unlike in the previous two 
cases, in this case, there were no international military operations in which Japan 
proposed to participate; therefore, the call for the Cabinet Decision by the Abe 
administration on 1 July 2014 is the starting point for the GOJ’s discussion.  
 
The second section will introduce the rules and conditions of JSDF personnel 
using military weapons under Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security (heiwa anzen 
hōsei). There are two possible measures for JSDF personnel to take because this 
Legislation combines two Acts; therefore, this section will demonstrate what rules and 
conditions JSDF personnel should adopt in various situations while participating in 
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international military operations.  
 
 Based on the basic knowledge of Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security, 
this chapter will analyse the discussions held in the Diet. As in Chapters Three and Four, 
this chapter will analyse Diet discussions under six different topics: Japan’s right 
intention for participating in international military operations; the quality and quantity of 
international military operation; justifiable situations for JSDF personnel to use military 
weapons; the quality and quantity of Japanese measures; the necessity to participate in 
reconstruction activities; and finally, the quality and quantity of Japan’s activity in 
reconstruction. After analysing these six topics, the same approach taken in Chapters 
Three and Four will be adopted. In the absence of a concrete situation requiring the 
development of Japanese security, hypothetical situations will be established to develop 
the examinations. In relation to each category of Just War Theory, we can judge whether 
the GOJ took the normative principles of the theory into consideration when enacting 
Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security.  
 
5. 1. Purpose of Enactment 
 
While the Cabinet introduced 11 security-related bills, it is impractical to analyse all bills 
as occurred in the Diet. Therefore, this section will divide the bills into two categories as 
the Diet did: the Peace and Security Legislation Development Act (heiwa anzen hōsei 
seibi hō) and the International Peace Support Act (kokusai heiwa shien hō). Based on this 
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division, this section will focus on the Abe Cabinet’s aim in bringing these bills to the 
Diet.  
 
5.1.1. Peace and Security Legislation Development Act 
 
This Act is based on the existing laws on Japan’s security, such as the Self-Defence Forces 
Law, the International Peace Cooperation Act, and the Law Concerning Measures to 
Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan. Based on 
the existing laws, some amendments were added and submitted to the floor of the Diet. 
The purpose of so doing was outlined in the press conference of 15 May 2014: “(…) 1.5 
million Japanese people live overseas and another 18 million travel abroad annually. 
Suppose a conflict suddenly arises in their destinations. Suppose also the attack is made 
in the sea near Japan, right when Japanese people who are escaping from where the 
conflict had occurred are being rescued and transported by our ally, the United States, 
which has the necessary capabilities to do so. Even in such cases, unless the Japanese 
nationals themselves were attacked, the JSDF could not defend the US vessels 
transporting the Japanese nationals. This is the current constitutional interpretation” (Abe, 
2014). This speech was made before the Cabinet Decision was submitted; however, it was 
sufficient to demonstrate Japan’s impatience to rescue its civilians when faced with 
danger. After submitting the Cabinet Decision, several Japanese civilians became the 
victims of crucial incidents in Algeria, Syria, and Tunisia. In response, PM Abe 
continuously expressed the necessity to protect the lives of Japanese people abroad (Abe, 
 159 
2015). He not only considered threats to the lives of Japanese civilians far away from 
Japan but also advocated the necessity to maintain international peace and security in East 
Asia: “(…) maintaining the peace and security of Japan and ensuring security as well as 
securing its people’s livings are the primary responsibilities of the Government. In order 
to adjust to the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan and to fulfil its 
responsibility for Japan, the Government, first and foremost, has to create a stable and 
predictable international environment and to prevent the emergency threats by advancing 
vibrant diplomacy with sufficient institutional capabilities, and has to pursue peaceful 
settlement of disputes by acting in accordance with public international law and giving 
emphasis to the rule of law” (Cabinet Decision, 2014).  
 
 For all, the intention of enacting the Peace and Security Legislation 
Development Act was to prevent innocent Japanese civilians from falling victims to 
emerging threats far away from and surrounding Japan.  
 
5.1.2. International Peace Support Act 
 
While the Peace and Security Legislation Development Act aims to protect Japanese 
civilians, the International Peace Support Act aims to collaborate with other nationals to 
maintain international peace and security. The purpose of this Act was explained in the 
Diet as follows: “since international peace and security have been threatened, 
international society should collaborate together by following the purpose of the UN 
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Charter. Japan, as a member of international society, should be active and positive to 
contribute to other national defence. This contribution will go far toward solving the 
problem of maintaining international peace and security” (The House of Representatives, 
2015). Compared with the purpose of the Peace Security Legislation Development Act, 
no clear background was demonstrated for the enactment of this Act; nevertheless, it 
demonstrates Japan’s intention to cooperate with other countries to maintain international 
peace and order.  
 
5. 2. The Roles of JSDF Personnel  
 
The former Act, the Peace and Security Legislation Development Act, allows Japan to 
protect its territory and civilians from threats, while the latter, the International Peace 
Support Act, allows Japan to participate in international military operations to maintain 
international peace and order. Both Acts were submitted with the will of the Cabinet to 
expand Japan’s military capability; however, neither of these Acts allow Japan to be fully 
active in international military operations. Therefore, this section will introduce the 
possible situations in which Japan may participate in international military operations and 
the conditions of JSDF personnel using military weapons during such operations.  
 
5.2.1. Peace and Security Legislation Development Act 
 
The Peace and Security Legislation Development Act specifies that JSDF personnel may 
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use military weapons against others by making amendments to two existing laws: the 
Self-Defence Forces Law and the International Peace Cooperation Act. The amendment 
of the former specifies three different situations in which JSDF personnel may take 
military action against others: when Japanese civilians are facing danger from threats (see 
Article 84-3); when it is necessary to use weapons to protect persons, weapons, and other 
equipment of the US Forces (see Article 95-2); and when Japan is in a situation that poses 
a threat to its survival (sonritsu kiki jitai) (see Article 88-1). Additionally, the amendment 
of the International Peace Cooperation Act sets three different situations in which JSDF 
personnel may use military weapons (see Article 25): when JSDF personnel needed to 
protect themselves from armed groups; when JSDF personnel are involved in so-called 
“kaketsuke keigo”11 operations (see Articles 3-5 and 25); and when JSDF personnel are 
involved in safety-ensuring (anzen kakuho) operations (Ministry of Defense, 2017, p. 
246).  
 
While specifying the situations in which JSDF personnel may use military 
weapons against others, the GOJ establishes the conditions for use of military weapons 
by JSDF personnel as follows: “when an armed attack against Japan occurs or when an 
armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs 
and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally 
                                                 
11 The situation of “kaketsuke keigo” is explained as “when reasonable grounds are 
found for the unavoidable necessity to protect the lives of bodies of themselves or 
individuals related to operations that they intend to protect (however, inflicting injury 
on a person is permitted only in the cases of legitimate self-defence and aversion of 
clear and present danger)” (Ministry of Defense, 2017, p. 246).  
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overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness; when there is no other 
appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its 
people; use of force should be limited to the minimum extent necessary” (the Government 
of Japan, 2016). The conditions for Japan to use military force are named the “Three New 
Conditions” (hereafter, TNC) to demonstrate the difference from Japan’s original 
conditions to exercise the right to self-defence set in 1990. Traditionally speaking, the 
GOJ set three original conditions that must be met to exercise the right to self-defence: 
“when there is an imminent and unjust infringement on Japan; when there is no other 
appropriate means available to repeal the attack; and use of force should be limited to the 
minimum extent necessary” (Kudō Atsuo, 25 October 1990).  
 
By comparing with the former conditions necessary to exercise the right to self-
defence, the TNC specifies more concrete situations in which military action can be taken 
against others. 
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 Original TNC 
First 
Condition 
When there is an 
imminent and unjust 
infringement on 
Japan 
When an armed attack against Japan occurs or 
when an armed attack against a foreign country 
that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and 
as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a 
clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s 
right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness 
Second 
Condition 
When there is no 
other appropriate 
means available to 
repel the attack 
When there is no other appropriate means 
available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s 
survival and protect its people 
Third 
Condition 
Use of force should be limited to the minimum extent necessary 
Figure 5-1 The Difference between the Original Conditions and TNC  
(Source: Author based on the answers in the Diet) 
 
The Director-General of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau explained the reason for 
changing the conditions from the original version to TNC as follows: “when an armed 
attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a 
result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn 
people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness” corresponds to the 1972 
government interpretation which specifies “the situation of an imminent and unjust 
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infringement which overturns people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness when 
Japan is attacked by other countries” (Yokohata Yūsuke, 14 July 2014). Therefore, he 
believes that the condition does not deregulated the original condition set for Japan’s right 
to exercise the right to self-defence.  
 
5.2.2. International Peace Support Act 
 
While the possible situations and conditions for JSDF personnel to take military action 
were demonstrated in the amendments to the Self-Defense Forces Law and the Act on 
Cooperation with the United Nations Peace Keeping Activities, the International Peace 
Support Act specifies the situation in which logistical support can be provided to 
maintain international peace and security. This situation, named an international peace 
cooperative situation (kokusai heiwa kyōdō taisho jitai), sets the following three 
conditions that must be identified: “situations that threaten peace and security of the 
international community;” “the international community is collectively addressing the 
situations in accordance with the objectives of the UN Charter to remove the threat;” 
and, “Japan, as a member of the international community, needs to independently and 
proactively contribute to these activities” (Ministry of Defense, 2017, p. 249). In these 
situations, Japan may work together with foreign armed forces to maintain international 
peace and security. 
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5. 3. Diet Deliberation 
 
Although the GOJ specified the possible situations and conditions for JSDF personnel to 
use military weapons against others and to provide logistical support to maintain 
international peace and security, no cases were applicable when holding the discussions 
in the Diet. For this reason, a question was frequently brought to the floor of the Diet, 
querying in what situations JSDF personnel would be dispatched (Ōtsuka Kōhei, 20 
March 2015; Okada Katsuya, 20 May 2015 and 26 June 2015; Ogata Rintarō, 22 May 
2015; Kamiyama Yōsuke, 22 May 2015; Ōta Kazumi, 26 May 2015; Matsuno Yorihisa, 
27 May 2015; Kitagawa Kazuo, 28 May 2015; Eto Akinori, 29 May 2015; Yasui Misako, 
2 June 2015; Ono Jirō, 4 June 2015; Tsujimoto Kiyomi, 5 June 2015; and Satō Masahisa, 
9 June 2015). At the same time, Diet members asked the Cabinet under what conditions 
Japan may participate in international military operations. Therefore, this section will 
analyse Diet debates explaining the situations and conditions in which JSDF personnel 
may be dispatched, either to take military action or to provide logistical support. Since 
this dissertation aims to examine whether the GOJ considered the normative principles of 
Just War Theory, this section focuses on whether Diet members noted the related issues: 
the right intention or a just cause for participating in international military operations; the 
quality and quantity of international military operations; the role of JSDF personnel; the 
quality and quantity of the JSDF role; the participation in reconstruction activities; and 
the quality and quantity of the JSDF role during reconstruction activities. This analysis 
will be based on Diet records provided by the National Diet Library and interviews 
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conducted for this dissertation (see Appendix). 
 
5. 3. 1. Reasons for Participating in International Military Operations 
 
According to the Peace and Security Legislation Development Act, there are two ways 
for Japan to participate in international military operations: one is to take military action 
against others, and the other is to provide logistical support for close-relationship 
countries. The GOJ found the right intention for participating in international military 
operations in each situation; therefore, this subsection will be divided into two to analyse 
how the GOJ found such an intention. 
 
5. 3. 1. (a) Military Actions against Others 
 
Although the Cabinet found legitimacy for Japan to use military weapons under the TNC, 
Diet members were not satisfied with the conditions. In particular, the first condition set 
in the TNC confused the Diet members; therefore, a question was asked regarding Japan’s 
legitimacy in exercising the right to self-defence: “According to the explanation of the 
Director-General of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, (…) Japan can exercise the right to 
collective defense in either a situation when a foreign country is attacked or Japan is 
attacked. At first, [I would like to] ask Prime Minister about it” (Kaieda Banri, 14 July 
2014). PM Abe responded that it is necessary to check the situation with the TNC to 
decide whether the right to self-defence can be exercised (14 July 2014). Based on this 
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answer, this dissertation will analyse in what situations the GOJ found the right intention 
for taking military actions against others.  
 
(i) North Korea vs. the US 
 
PM Abe was asked to explain in what situation Japan would take military actions against 
others, using examples (Okada Katsuya, 26 June 2015). While PM Abe did not give the 
actual names of countries, he responded as follows: “In the situation where armed conflict 
is imminent in the vicinity of our country [Japan], the US military has also been acting to 
control the expansion of the situation, Japan also undertook countermeasures under the 
Armed Attack Situations Response Act (buryoku kōgeki jitai taisho hō). However, the 
situation deteriorated further and armed attack against another country closely related to 
Japan, such as the US, occurred. Furthermore, although it was not recognised at that time 
that an armed attack against Japan had occurred, the attacking country possessed a 
considerable number of ballistic missiles that could be used to attack Japan, and the 
country expressed the intention to attack Japan” (26 June 2015). Based on this explanation, 
Figure 5-2 below is formulated.  
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Regarding this situation, one of the significant concerns for Diet members was how to 
define a possible violation of Japan by North Korea. The Director-General of the Cabinet 
Legislation Bureau explained as follows: “[the government] needs to judge whether the 
situation meets the TNC or not when there is no violation of Japan: if all three TNCs have 
been met, Japan can exercise the right to collective self-defence force” (Yokohata Yūsuke, 
29 June 2015). However, an opposition party member asked for clarification on whether 
or not Japan can exercise the right to collective self-defence when US vessels are attacked 
(Nagatsuma Akira, 29 June 2015). It was important to clarify this as there is some 
possibility for US vessels to be attacked in the imminent vicinity of Japan while they are 
not in operation to protect Japan and its people. As the discussion continued, the Director-
General of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau responded that North Korea would have to 
have a clear intention to attack Japan before countermeasures would be taken (Yokohata 
Yūsuke, 29 June 2015). Referring to the response of the former Director-General of the 
Cabinet Legislation Bureau (Akiyama Osamu, 16 May 2003 and 19 June 2003), the 
current government official responded that the way to examine a possible violation 
US Vessels North Korea 
Security 
Alliance 
Protect 
Japan Possible Violation 
Military Attack 
Figure 5-2 North Korea vs. the US 
(Source: Author based on the Japanese Diet reports) 
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against Japan by North Korea was as follows:. “When there is tension between the 
offender [North Korea] and Japan, the US vessels are sailed to support Japan. Under this 
situation, the first military attack [from North Korea] was against the US vessel. When 
this occurs, there is a higher possibility of authorising the attack [against the US] as an 
attack against Japan. If the reason that the US vessels are attacked [by North Korea] was 
not Japan, it is difficult to authorise the military attack as intending to attack Japan. In 
any cases, the government needs to judge the situation from the specific facts, situation, 
and the situation in which the US vessels were attacked” (Yokohata Yūsuke, 29 June 
2015).  
 
 Based on this explanation, it is possible to deduce that Japan may legitimately 
take up military weapons against North Korea when there is international tension between 
the two countries. However, the criteria for possible violation are not yet clear; thus, the 
government will decide based on the given situation. Several Diet members asked 
whether or not Japan would attack North Korea pre-emptively if there was no violation 
against Japan (Tsujimoto Kiyomi and Isa Shinichi, 6 June 2014); the governmental 
official responded as follows: “As long as there is a violation to the close-relation country, 
it is possible to exercise the so-called right to collective self-defence” (Yokohata Yūsuke, 
6 June 2014). A Cabinet member then continued: “According to public international law, 
it is necessary to have a request from the victims of the country; therefore, an occurrence 
of use of force is an assumption [of the need] to exercise the right to collective self-
defence” (Kishi Nobuo, 6 June 2014).  
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(ii) Protecting Japanese National Residents 
 
The second situation is when Japanese national residents are facing danger. As mentioned 
in 5.1.1., protecting Japanese national residents abroad reflects the intention of PM Abe 
in submitting the Cabinet Decision to the floor of the Diet. The GOJ provided several 
hypothetical scenarios in which the lives and bodies of Japanese national residents might 
be threatened; however, this dissertation does not examine each of these individually 
because the GOJ seemingly found a legitimate reason for using military weapons when 
protecting Japanese national residents. 
 
The GOJ seems to have found the right intention for using military force against 
others when the purpose is to protect Japanese national residents. However, PM Abe also 
specified the possibility of a US vessel rescuing Japanese national residents abroad; 
therefore, military weapons could also be used against others to protect US vessels 
engaged in operations to rescue Japanese national residents (16 February 2015). Again, 
PM Abe did not specify the country; however, this dissertation formulates North Korea 
as the offender to understand the situation clearly.  
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In the situation delineated above, North Korea has not attacked Japan; therefore, an 
opposition party member asked PM Abe to confirm that this situation would comprise a 
legitimate reason for Japan to use military force against the offender (Gotō Yūichi, 3 July 
2015). PM Abe responded as follows: “the country in the imminent vicinity of Japan 
[North Korea] is attacking the US vessel which is transporting Japanese national residents, 
so that this situation is possibly identified as a situation posing threats to the survival of 
Japan12” (3 July 2015).  
 
 Although PM Abe specified that Japan may take military action to protect US 
vessels engaged in an operation to transfer Japanese national residents to Japan, the 
Minister of States responded differently: “whether the Japanese national residents are in 
the US vessels or not is not an absolute factor for the government to take military actions. 
The fact that Japanese national residents are transferred by US vessels is one of the 
elements for decision; however, it is not an absolute factor” (Nakatani Gen, 26 August 
                                                 
12 Japan may use military weapons against others in a situation posing threats to the 
survival of Japan (sonritsu kiki jitai). 
US Vessel 
Japan 
North Korea Transporting 
Japanese National 
Resident 
Military Attack 
Figure 5-3 US Vessel Transporting the Japanese National Residents 
(Source: Author based on the Diet Reports) 
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2015).  
 
 By analysing the responses of Cabinet members, their understanding seems to 
differ on when it is legitimate for Japan to take military action against others. Therefore, 
the Japanese criteria for using military weapons remain unclear, however, meeting the 
conditions set in the TNC is a decisive reason for the GOJ to take military measures 
against others.  
 
(iii) Minesweeping Operations in the Strait of Hormuz 
 
While the two scenarios described above were to protect Japan and its peoples from 
physical violation, another scenario was given to exemplify protecting Japan and its 
people from indirect threats, i.e. the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. In this instance, 
any attack on tankers transferring oil to Japan would threaten the survival of Japan and 
the lives of its people due to lack of oil.  
 
Tankers (Japan) Japan 
Strait of 
Hormuz 
Iran? The blockade of strait 
by laying mines 
Figure 5-4 Minesweeping Operations in the Strait of Hormuz 
(Source: Author based on Diet report) 
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The legitimacy of Japan’s participation in minesweeping operations in the Strait of 
Hormuz was frequently discussed in the Diet. PM Abe explained as follows: “[the 
government will evaluate] whether a delayed supply of petroleum and other energy 
sources would result in not only economic impacts but also shortages of living goods and 
electricity, and judge whether the situation is identified as posing threats to the survival 
of Japan” (18 May 2015).  
 
Although PM Abe specified Japan’s legitimacy in participating in 
minesweeping operations in the Strait of Hormuz, the opposition party members were not 
satisfied. A Diet member in the then DPJ raised the following point: “Japan has enough 
oil stocked to allow Japanese people to live for more than six months; therefore, there is 
no point in participating in minesweeping operations in the Strait of Hormuz” (interview 
with a member of the House of Councillors, 6 July 2015). Other Diet members also 
queried the lack of reasons for participating in minesweeping operations in the Strait of 
Hormuz: “According to the website of JOGMEC, Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National 
Corporation, 870,000 kilo-litters of oil with state stockpiles and private stockpiles are the 
common property of our citizens, and if we convert that amount into the number of days 
of stockpiling, as of the end of March 2015, it is about 197 days. Even if the import of 
petroleum ceases, it can maintain the same life as it is now. I repeat, it is written on the 
website of JOGMEG, a government agency. Due to this fact, the blockade of the Strait of 
Hormuz does not apply to the first condition of the so-called TNCs, which specifies ‘a 
clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life’ as much as armed attacks 
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on our country” (Edano Yukio, 18 September 2015). Although the difficulty in meeting 
the TNCs was pointed out by opposition party members, PM Abe explained the right 
intention for participating in minesweeping operations as follows: “it is not only the 
economic affect caused by the international conflicts. Nor is it not only because one of 
the necessities of life will be in shortage due to the conflict. It is important for Japan, 
surrounded by the sea, to maintain the safety of transporting life necessities. (…) Japan 
has six months of oil reserved; however, if it is not possible to remove the mine, and Japan 
faces a constant energy crisis. (…) Someone has to remove the mine” (27 May 2015). 
Thus, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz was categorized as posing threats to the 
survival of Japan, despite its distance from Japan.  
 
Based on PM Abe’s response, a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would incur 
“a result that threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally 
overturn people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness;” therefore, the Cabinet 
found legitimacy in participating in minesweeping operations in the Strait of Hormuz.  
 
5. 3. 1. (b) Provision of Logistical Support to its Allies 
 
Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security not only specified the possibility of Japan 
taking military actions against others. PM Abe also explained scenarios in which 
logistical support would be provided: “when the situation to essentially affects Japan’s 
peace and security” (26 June 2015); however, this explanation was not sufficiently clear 
 175 
because the difference between the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and 
Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the Peace and Security 
Legislation Development Act was not sufficiently clear (Okada Katsuya, 26 June 2015). 
This confusion was evident from the interview with an opposition Diet member: “I cannot 
find any points on legislating this act [Peace and Security Legislation Development Act] 
because no cases apply to the existing law [Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace 
and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan]” (interview with a 
member of the House of Councillors, 6 July 2015).  
 
Due to the unclear definition and unclear reason for enacting the legislation, 
Diet members entered the discussion based on an example of a situation in which Japan 
may provide logistical support to maintain international peace and security. This section 
will analyse how the GOJ found such a situation, based on a question asked in the Diet 
about Japan’s legitimacy in providing logistical support.  
 
Okada Katsuya gave the following example: “an international conflict is taking 
place in the area surrounding Japan, and the US military is providing support to its ally” 
(20 May 2015). PM Abe also explained the situation without specifying the names of the 
countries: “when country A [North Korea] is invading country B [South Korea], the US 
is active to stop the invasion due to the relation of security allies. For sure, (…), there is 
the possibility for Japan to be involved in the conflict [between North Korea and South 
Korea]. In this situation, Japan could not save the US vessels because there is no physical 
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violation to Japan. However, I have an awareness of the issue: this is why the TNC are 
set. What we need is to judge whether the situation meets the TNC or not” (3 July 2015). 
While PM Abe did not specify the names of countries, this dissertation clarifies the 
situation by assuming that there is an international conflict between North Korea and 
South Korea, and US vessels are in operation to protect South Korea under the security 
treaty.  
 
 
When Japan is facing the situation shown in Figure 5-5 above, North Korea is not posing 
a serious threat to Japan; therefore, the GOJ would not order JSDF personnel to protect 
Japan and its people. However, Japan may provide logistical support to the US military 
by applying Article 1 of the Armed Attack Situations Response Act.  
 
 Based on this scenario, an opposition party member asked PM Abe the 
following question: “According to Martin Levi van Creveld, a military historian, military 
North Korea 
US Vessels 
Protect 
Military Attack 
South Korea 
Security 
Alliance 
Security 
Alliance 
Japan 
Military Attack 
Figure 5-5 Providing Logistical Support  
(Source: Author, based on the hypothesis presented by PM Abe (26 July 2015)) 
 177 
logistics comprises 90 percent of the work in wars. What Japan would provide to the US 
military is logistical support (kōhō shien), and military logistics means logistical support 
in Japanese. Although Japan does not have the intention to attack the offender [North 
Korea], there would be a higher possibility of retaliating against Japan because Japan is 
the country fulfilling the military logistics needs of the US” (Kakizawa Mito, 15 May 
2015). He did not ask PM Abe whether it would be legitimate for Japan to provide 
logistical support to the US; however, he did ask whether PM Abe was aware of the 
possibility that North Korea would engage in retaliation activity against Japan (ibid). PM 
Abe responded as follows: “when JSDF personnel are providing logistical support to the 
US military, it is necessary to avoid the danger of attack. Also, we [Japan] need to provide 
suitable logistical support. Therefore, JSDF units would not be active in an area where it 
is difficult to maintain their safety. Also, the JSDF units would stop engaging in 
operations until their safety is maintained. JSDF personnel would not use military 
weapons [against the enemy] to continue their operations” (15 May 2015). Although 
Cabinet members explained that there is a fewer possibility for JSDF personnel to be 
endangered, the Cabinet did not respond to the Kakizawa’s comment on Japan’s 
possibility to retaliating of attacking North Korea.  
 
5. 3. 2. Quality and Quantity of International Military Operations 
 
While the right intention for participating in international military operations was 
specified in the first and second conditions in the TNC, the quality and quantity of 
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international military operations is specified in the third condition as follows: “use of 
force should be limited to the minimum extent necessary” (the Government of Japan, 
2016). As seen in the previous chapters, the term “minimum extent necessary” has 
frequently been recited by Diet members when discussing the quality and quantity of 
international military operations; however the definition of “minimum extent necessary” 
has yet to be clarified. Thus, questions about the definition of “minimum extent necessary” 
use of force were brought to the floor of the Diet.  
  
 When Diet members asked for the definition of “minimum extent necessary,” 
the Director-General of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau replied as follows: “the meaning 
of ‘minimum extent necessary’ used in the third condition is the ‘minimum extent 
necessary use of force’ to protect our country [Japan] on the assumption of the second 
condition, to ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people” (Yokohata Yūsuke, 28 May 
2015). Based on this response, a Diet member probed further on the quality and quantity 
of operations: “(…) [you mean] Japan would take military action when the attack against 
another country [the US] occurs. Japan would take military action to exclude the violence; 
therefore, [the government] would not consider whether Japan’s quality and quantity of 
military action is proportional to the attack taken by the offender [North Korea] because 
the purpose of Japan’s military action is to ensure its survival and protect its people” 
(Kitagawa Kazuo, 28 May 2015). On another occasion, the then Minister of Foreign 
Affairs specified that Japan’s original understanding of the “minimum extent necessary” 
use of force is as follows: “the term is typically used to paraphrase the principle of 
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proportionality; however, Japan has set the original conditions to exercise the right to self-
defence” (Kishida Fumio, 8 July 2015). Continuing, he explained the Japanese 
interpretation of the “minimum extent necessary” use of force as follows: “the quality 
and quantity of Japanese use of force is sufficient to ensure its survival and to protect its 
people. (…) the government subjectively decide on the quality and quantity of Japanese 
use of force” (ibid).  
 
 The Cabinet’s explanation was not sufficient for Diet members; therefore, the 
quality and quantity of force used to protect Japan was raised as a question to the floor of 
the Diet. An opposition party member asked whether it is possible to ‘beat up’ the offender 
[North Korea] if the government found it necessary to take military action to ensure its 
survival and protect its peoples (Terada Manabu, 8 July 2015). The a General-Director of 
the Cabinet Legislation Bureau responded as follows: “it depends on how the third 
condition is applied to the situation. Bringing the offender [North Korea] under control 
might be better for Japan to maintain Japanese safety; however, our country has a 
restriction on the use of force under the JCL. Due to this restriction, Japan is allowed to 
take military action to drive the offender out of Japan” (Yokohata Yūsuke, 8 July 2015). 
He continued as follows: “(…) Japan cannot take the quality and quantity of military 
power to ‘beat up’ the offender. Speaking of the minesweeping operations, disposing of 
marine mines is surely a threat to the lives and survival of our civilians; therefore, the 
blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is applicable with the second and third conditions of the 
TNC” (ibid).  
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 The answers in the Diet demonstrate that the GOJ interprets the “minimum and 
necessary” use of force as the quality and quantity necessary to secure Japan’s survival 
and the lives of its citizens. In this sense, Japan is not willing to attack the offender with 
the same quality and quantity of attack that Japan has incurred. However, the quality and 
quantity of Japan’s logistical support to the US was not discussed in the Diet.  
 
5. 3. 3. The Situation of Using Military Weapons against Others 
 
When the related discussions on the roles of JSDF personnel were held in the Diet, Diet 
members were conscious of when military weapons would be used. This is seemingly due 
to the restriction on the use of weapons under the JCL and the anxiety about sending JSDF 
personnel to dangerous areas. The Director-General of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau 
explained the possibility of violating Article 9 of the JCL as follows: “the ‘use of force’ 
specified in the first paragraph of Article 9 means, basically, the act of hostilities between 
our country and another sovereignty or organisations treated the same as a sovereignty 
state” (Yokohata Yūsuke, 12 June 2015); therefore, he identified that the use of force to 
ensure Japan’s survival and to protect Japanese people is not war potential as specified in 
Article 9 of the JCL.  
 
 Since the Cabinet explained that JSDF military activity would not violate the 
JCL, the conditions under which JSDF personnel could use military weapons were 
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discussed in the Diet. The Cabinet decision specifies the conditions under which JSDF 
personnel may use military weapons as follows: “(…) our country [Japan] has set the 
limitation for JSDF personnel to use military weapons to protect themselves and to protect 
military weapons.” As the Cabinet Decision specifies, Cabinet members explained the 
legitimacy of using military power to protect JSDF personnel as follows: “I have 
understood that the use of military force to protect the lives and equipment of JSDF is not 
identified as war potential which is prohibited by the JCL because protecting the lives 
and equipment of the JSDF is identified as a natural right” (Yokohata Yūsuke, 12 June 
2015). On another occasion, PM Abe also specified that self-defence is categorised as a 
natural right (29 July 2015). Referring to natural rights, Cabinet members explained that 
JSDF personnel may use military weapons when their lives are threatened.  
 
The use of military weapons against others is not only to protect JSDF 
personnel who are active in international military operations; they may also be used when 
the JSDF is in the operation of so-called kaketsuke keigo (Ministry of Defense, 2017, p. 
246). Although the so-called kaketsuke keigo operation is specified in the Cabinet 
Decision, this operation was not defined until 25 August 2015, when PM Abe replied to 
an opposition party member asking about the possibility that kaketsuke keigo would 
violate Article 9 of the JCL (Fukushima Mizuho, 25 August 2015). PM Abe responded as 
follows: “when the local security authority cannot deal with maintaining domestic peace 
and security, the units of PKO which are to maintain the local facilities are dispatched to 
take the place of the local security authorities. The units of PKO would be on the operation 
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based on the request from the other PKO participants and NGOs” (Abe, 25 August 2015). 
Although PM Abe explained the situation of kaketsuke keigo, his explanation was not 
sufficiently clear to draw a picture; however, the situation is explained in the booklet of 
Defense of Japan published annually by the Ministry of Defense as follows: “when a 
Japanese NGO was active in one of the refugee camps in Goma, Zaire, a vehicle was 
robbed by some refugees. Due to this incident, the members of the NGO sought the JSDF 
to be dispatched to Goma to rescue the other refugees” (Ministry of Defense, 2016, p. 
219). The incident in Goma occurred in 1994; however, the GOJ seemingly repented of 
not being able to dispatch the JSDF to support the members of the NGO. From the lesson 
of this experience, it seems that the Abe Cabinet was willing to dispatch JSDF personnel 
when NGO members or PKO civilian staff are seeking support from the JSDF.  
 
 The two scenarios described above demonstrate that the purpose of using 
military weapons against others is to protect the lives of Japanese civilians; however, the 
GOJ has also established another situation in which JSDF personnel may take military 
action against others; that is safety-ensuring operation. The operation is explained as 
follows: “uniformed [J]SDF personnel are permitted to use weapons within the limits 
judged reasonably necessary according to the circumstances, when reasonable grounds 
are found for the unavoidable necessity to protect the lives, bodies, or property of 
themselves or other individuals, or to eliminate obstructive behavior for their duties 
(however, inflicting injury on a person is permitted only in the case of legitimate self-
defense and aversion of clear and present danger)” (Ministry of Defense, 2017, pp. 246–
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7). Based on this definition, JSDF personnel may use military weapons against others to 
protect local people’s lives, bodies, and/or property. Although this is specified in the 
booklet Defense of Japan, no discussions were held in the Diet on the possibility for JSDF 
personnel to use military weapons against others to protect the lives and local people. 
 
5. 3. 4. Quality and Quantity of JSDF Personnel  
 
This issue concerns permissible activities for the JSDF when participating in international 
military operations. As noted in Chapters Three and Four, the key point is whether the 
quality and quantity of JSDF personnel would be balanced so as not to overturn the 
offenders.  
 
 The quality and quantity of military measures used by the JSDF during in 
international military operations should comprise the “minimum extent necessary” (the 
Government of Japan, 2016). However, a point of controversy in the Diet was that the 
“minimum extent necessary” measure may violate Article 9 of the JCL (interview with a 
then DPJ member of the House of Representatives, 15 May 2015). To clarify how the 
“minimum extent necessary” measure would avoid violating Article 9 of the JCL, it is 
necessary to analyse the Diet members’ discussions on the use of military power. The 
term “minimum and only necessary use of force” was first used in the Diet on 13 
November 1972. Yoshikuni Ichirō, the then Director-General of the Cabinet Legislation 
Bureau, spoke the words to define Japan’s war potential (13 November 1972). Since then, 
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“minimum and only necessary use of force” has been used as a concept of Japan’s war 
potential; therefore, there seems to have been consensus among Japanese politicians and 
government officials that the JSDF would only employ military measures to the degree 
of “minimum extent necessary” use of force. However, the quality and quantity of JSDF 
personnel deployed while participating in international military operations had not been 
discussed in the Diet, seemingly because the GOJ was satisfied that JSDF personnel 
would not kill or harm others.  
 
5. 3. 5. Japan’s Participation in Reconstruction Activities 
 
The final situation proposed in the Diet was the necessity for Japan to provide logistical 
support to maintain international peace and order, using the example of Japan’s 
participation in the reconstruction activity in Iraq (see Chapter Four). Compared with 
the Act on Cooperation with the United Nations Peace Keeping Activities, the 
International Peace Support Act allows Japan to participate in reconstruction activities 
conducted not only by the UN or international organisations authorised by the UN, such 
as the UNHCR, but also by regional organisations, such as the European Union 
(Ministry of Defense, 2017, p. 245). Furthermore, the International Peace Support Act 
allows Japan to participate in reconstruction activities with a Cabinet Order, which 
means that the Cabinet can decide when to participate in reconstruction activities. In 
this sense, the enactment of the International Peace Support Act will increase the 
opportunity for the JSDF to participate in reconstruction activities.  
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Although this marked a significant change from the past, Diet members did not query the 
Cabinet or the GOJ regarding what situation would prompt participation in reconstruction 
activities. They did ask, however, about the possibility for JSDF personnel to be 
endangered if the situation was not sufficiently stable; however, Japan’s legitimacy 
regarding when to dispatch JSDF personnel to reconstruction activities was not discussed 
in the Diet.  
 
5. 3. 6. The Quality and Quantity of Measures during Reconstruction Activities 
 
According to the booklet Defense of Japan, the possible measures for JSDF personnel to 
take during reconstruction activities are specified as follows:  
  
Iraq 
JSDF 
UN International 
Organizations 
UNHCR 
Cabinet Order 
Battlefield 
Non-battlefield 
Reconstruction 
Support 
Figure 5-6 The Possible Situation of Cooperating in Reconstruction Activities 
(Source: Author based on the hypothesis presented by the Government of Japan (2016)) 
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 Type of 
Measures 
Measures 
Difference between Existing 
Law 
Cooperation 
and Support 
Activities 
Supplies 
and 
Services to 
Armed 
Forces of 
Foreign 
Countries 
Supply 
Allows the “provision of 
ammunition” and “refuelling 
and maintenance of aircraft 
ready to take off for combat 
operations” 
Transportation 
Repair and Maintenance 
Medical Services 
Communications 
Airport and Seaport 
Services 
Base Services 
Lodging 
Storage 
Use of Facilities 
Training Service 
Construction 
Search and Rescue Activities 
Ship Inspection Operations (those set forth in the Ship Inspection Operation Law) 
Figure 5-7 Measures of JSDF Personnel under the International Peace Support Act 
(Source: based on Defense of Japan (2017, p.249)) 
 
Again, no discussion was held in the Diet regarding the quality and quantity of measures 
which JSDF personnel may use during reconstruction activities although the International 
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Peace Support Act allows Japan to provide ammunition.  
 
5. 4. Jus ad Bellum 
 
Based on analyses of Diet reports, this section will examine whether the GOJ considered 
the normative principles of jus ad bellum. It will first examine whether Japan’s right 
intention for participating in international military operations fit with the principle of 
necessity in jus ad bellum. As seen in Chapter Two, having the right intention is an 
essential factor required to justify the use of force; therefore, the GOJ needs to consider 
this before participating in international military operations. This section will then 
examine whether the GOJ considered the principle of proportionality in jus ad bellum. 
For the purposes of these two examinations, the hypothetical cases established in 5.2. will 
be applied where necessary. By this means, we will clarify whether the GOJ considered 
the normative principles of jus ad bellum when discussing the development of Japanese 
security legislation in the Diet.   
 
5. 4. 1. The Principle of Necessity 
 
The GOJ discussed Japan’s legitimacy in participating in international military operations 
in two parts, because there are two different situations of engaging in international 
military operations: Japan’s participation to international military operations to protect its 
survival and peoples and Japan’s participation to international military operations to 
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provide logistical support to its allies. This subsection will, therefore, consider each of 
situations so as to separately examine whether the GOJ took the principle of necessity in 
jus ad bellum into consideration when related discussions were held in the Diet.  
 
The first situation in which the GOJ participates in international military 
operations is “when an armed attack against Japan occurs or when an armed attack against 
a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens 
Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, 
liberty, and pursuit of happiness” (the Government of Japan, 2016). Referring to the 
principle of necessity in jus ad bellum, Japan needs to have the right intention to commit 
international military operations. According to Walzer, the international military 
operation should be the only way for Japan to maintain peace and security. As the TNC 
specifies “when there is no other appropriate means available to repeal the attack,” it is 
evident that the GOJ considered the principle of necessity before participating in 
international military operations. From Rawls’ perspective, we may say that the GOJ 
considered the moral-philosophical perspectives of Japan’s participation in international 
military operations because the purpose of such operations is to rescue Japan from the 
“danger of fundamentally overturning people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of 
happiness” (the Government of Japan, 2016). Referring to May’s theory, it combines the 
conditions specified by Walzer and Rawls; therefore, it is possible to justify Japan’s 
participation in international military operations. The result of examination demonstrates 
that the GOJ has focused on the right intention for participating in international military 
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operations when developing its security regime. However, this chapter points out that, by 
examining the Diet records, Cabinet members proposed the possibility for Japan to take 
a pre-emptive attack (see 5.3.1.). Although the government official replied that the 
government will decide based on the situation, the Cabinet specified that there is a 
possibility of engaging in international military operations without being attacked by 
offender. Japan’s possibility of engaging in international military operations without 
being attacked by offender, therefore, brings the conclusion that the GOJ did not 
sufficiently consider the principle of necessity in jus ad bellum.  
 
The second situation in which the GOJ participates in international military 
operations is “when the situation essentially affects Japan’s peace and security” (see 5.3.1. 
(b)). Compared with the former situation, Japan would not participate in this international 
military operation directly: instead, Japan is attempting to provide logistical support to 
the military of its close-relationship countries, such as the US military. Again, the GOJ 
sets the condition to provide logistical support to the US military, for instance, by 
referring to the first condition of the TNC: “when an armed attack against Japan occurs 
or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan 
occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally 
overturn people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness” (the Government of Japan, 
2016). Compared with the former situation, the Cabinet is, at the moment, not planning 
to provide logistical support unless armed attack occurs against its close-relationship 
countries; therefore, the GOJ seemingly has considered the principle of necessity in jus 
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ad bellum.  
 
By examining the two possible situations in which Japan would participate in 
international military operations, this subsection concludes that the GOJ should have been 
considered the principle of necessity in jus ad bellum when developing the Japan’s 
Legislation for Peace and Security.  
 
5. 4. 2. The Principle of Proportionality 
 
As the quality and quantity of military force used by Japan is specified with the words 
“minimum extent necessary” use of force, the GOJ seemingly considered the principle 
and proportionality when enacting Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security. However, 
this chapter will point out that the lack of consideration given the quality and quantity of 
operations in which Japan would participate.  
 
 The first reason for this conclusion is that the GOJ has depended on the words 
“minimum extent necessary” use of force. These words indicates that the GOJ concerned 
the quality and quantity of operations in which Japan would participate; however, as the 
response from Kishida demonstrates, the quality and quantity of operations was not an 
important factor for consideration before participating in international military operations. 
All three just war theorists mentioned, in terms of quality and quantity, the damage 
incurred by the operations should take human rights into consideration; however, the GOJ 
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seemingly paid no attention to this, as Kishida’s comment demonstrates.  
 
 The second reason is that the GOJ seemingly did not consider the quality and 
quantity of logistical support which Japan would provide. When related discussions 
occurred on providing logistical support to Japan’s close-relationship allies, no questions 
were asked by Diet members regarding the quality and quantity of support to be provided. 
Thus, it is possible to conclude that the GOJ did not consider about the principle of 
proportionality in jus ad bellum when discussing Japan’s Legislation for Peace and 
Security.  
 
5. 5. Jus in Bello 
 
This section will separately consider the two normative principles of jus in bello. It will 
first examine the roles of JSDF personnel with respect to the principle of necessity in jus 
in bello and then apply the principle of proportionality to the extent of the JSDF’s 
weaponry in international military operations. As the use of force must be balanced or 
proportional to be justified from a moral-philosophical perspective, it is necessary to 
consider the GOJ’s discussions when passing security-related bills. Through these two 
examinations, we can establish whether the GOJ sufficiently considered the moral-
philosophical perspectives in related discussions in the Diet.  
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5. 6. 1. The Principle of Necessity 
 
According to GOJ reports, JSDF personnel can take military action to protect their lives 
or their weapons or equipment (the Government of Japan, 2016). Based on this statement, 
it is necessary to clarify whether the GOJ’s policy accords with the principle of necessity 
in jus in bello; in other words, whether the GOJ considered the potential violation of the 
human rights of North Korean civilians through military action.  
 
 According to the GOJ’s statement, protecting the people of Japan or South 
Korea is more important than protecting North Koreans because Diet members only paid 
attention to the lives and bodies of JSDF personnel and collaborators. Thus, it 
demonstrates a lack of discussion regarding the protection of North Korean soldiers or 
civilians. In terms of protecting human rights, this neglected issue is one of the significant 
aspects of the normative principles in jus in bello. However, the GOJ did not consider the 
necessity to protect human rights in general. This tendency is also evident in the GOJ’s 
dispatch of JSDF personnel to participate in OIF (see 4.3.1. and 4.4.2). Furthermore, the 
interviewees did not answer the related questions because they believe that JSDF 
personnel would not use military weapons against others to violate the rights of civilians 
in North Korea without any evidence. Overall, it can be concluded that the GOJ did not 
consider the principle of necessity when discussing security-related bills.  
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5. 6. 2. The Principle of Proportionality 
 
As analysed in 5.4.4., the GOJ established the quality and quantity of JSDF weaponry in 
such operations based on the principle of “the minimum and only necessary use of force.” 
However, with regard to JSDF measures and weapons in such operations, the GOJ did 
not clearly specify either qualitative or quantitative aspects. Notwithstanding the 
difficulty of determining the quality and quantity of weapons that JSDF personnel would 
use during international military operations, the GOJ could have specified the situation 
in which military force would be used against others. However, seemingly adopting the 
position that it was more important to protect the human rights of Japanese and/or South 
Koreans than those of North Koreans, the GOJ evidently did not properly consider the 
quality and quantity of appropriate measures to accomplish this goal. Thus, while in the 
previous section we found that the GOJ did not consider the principle of proportionality 
in jus ad bellum, here we see that it also failed to consider the principle of proportionality 
in jus in bello.  
 
5. 6. Jus post Bellum 
 
The final stage, jus post bellum, focuses on whether the GOJ considered the normative 
principles thereof. As the International Peace Support Act allows Japan to provide 
logistical support to maintain international peace and security, this section will examine 
whether the GOJ considered the normative principles of jus post bellum when holding 
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discussions in the Diet.  
 
 This section will be divided into two to separately consider the two normative 
principles of jus post bellum. First, it will examine whether the conditions necessary for 
the GOJ to provide logistical support to maintain international peace and security fit with 
the normative principle of necessity. This scrutiny is necessary as Japan’s support could 
potentially violate the principle of non-intervention in the international affairs of other 
countries (see Article 2.7. of the UN Charter). Second, it will examine the extent to which 
the GOJ’s decision accords with the normative principle of proportionality in jus post 
bellum, based on the possible measures to be taken by JSDF personnel during 
reconstruction activities. These two examinations will clarify whether the GOJ’s 
discussions in developing Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security was moral-
philosophically justified.  
 
5. 7. 1. The Principle of Necessity 
 
The principle of necessity will clarify whether the GOJ considered it necessary to 
contribute to PKO activities as stipulated in the International Peace Cooperation 
Activities. Since the UN Charter requires all members to follow the principle of non-
interventionism, a state should not engage in PKO activities unless required to do so by 
the country in which the reconstruction activity was conducted. The widening range of 
situations in which Japan can contribute to PKO activities will be examined in this section.  
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The new condition whereby Japan can participate in reconstruction activities is 
when “(…) specified by a Cabinet order” (the Government of Japan, 2016). This 
statement demonstrates that Japan can participate in reconstruction activities not only 
pursuant to request from international organisations and the pertinent country but also 
based on a decision of the Japanese Cabinet. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude that the 
GOJ has been considered on the principle of necessity in jus post bellum.  
 
5. 7. 2. The Principle of Proportionality 
 
The second principle, proportionality, examines whether the GOJ considered the scale 
and contents of the support Japan will provide for reconstruction activities. Since 
reconstruction activity should be conducted pursuant to the request of the host country, 
the host should take control. However, it seems that no debates occurred on the scale and 
contents of the support to be provided by Japan for reconstruction activities. Moreover, 
none of the interviewees considered this issue. Thus, in the absence of related discussions 
in the Diet, this dissertation infers that the GOJ did not consider the principle of 
proportionality in jus post bellum when the security-related bills were brought to the Diet. 
Overall, the GOJ did not recognise that, as regards the normative principles, the scale and 
contents of the support Japan will provide for reconstruction activities could be 
problematic.  
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5. 7. Conclusion 
 
Since this chapter’s analyses were based on hypothetical situations, it was difficult to 
examine whether the GOJ considered the normative principles of Just War Theory. To 
conclude this chapter, this section will illustrate what the GOJ failed to consider in 
enacting Japan’s legislation for peace and security.  
 
 First, the GOJ did not sufficiently consider the principles of jus ad bellum, 
despite holding many discussions on this issue in the Diet. While Diet members did 
focused on the principle of necessity, it seems that they did not consider the principle of 
proportionality to the same degree. In particular, though many arguments were held in the 
Diet on the principle of proportionality, the GOJ seemingly did not consider the scale and 
content of the support Japan would provide when participating in international military 
operations. Some may say that Diet members focused on the principle of proportionality 
based on their frequent use of the term “minimum and only necessity use of force;” 
however, this is seemingly insufficient because this term does not specify the quality and 
quantity of the operation. 
 
 Second, the examinations on jus in bello demonstrates that the GOJ did not 
consider the protection of human rights in general. Diet reports demonstrate that the GOJ 
paid attention to the safety of JSDF personnel; however, the normative principles of jus 
in bello specify that innocent peoples should not be violated. This means that the GOJ 
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should have considered not violating or harming the rights of North Koreans in general 
when JSDF personnel engage in international military operations to protect the survival 
of Japan and its peoples. Although the normative principles set limits on whom may be 
attacked, the GOJ seemingly did not pay attention to this issue. The lack of consideration 
on violating innocent people might be due to the confidence that JSDF personnel would 
not use military weapons against innocent peoples; however, the GOJ should have 
considered the possibility of violating innocent people when participating in international 
military operations.  
 
 Finally, the examinations of jus post bellum revealed that the GOJ did not 
consider why logistical support should be provided for reconstruction activities. Although 
the GOJ should have clarified the criteria for participating in such activities, it seems to 
perceive that so doing to maintain international peace and security is always a positive 
action, despite the potential violation of the tenet of non-interventionism.  
 
 In conclusion, the GOJ neglected moral-philosophical discussions that should 
have been included in its decision-making process on participating in international 
military operations.  
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Chapter Six. Conclusion 
 
This dissertation has focused on whether the GOJ took normative principles into 
consideration when deciding to participate in international military operations. Through 
the evidence presented in the preceding chapters, this dissertation has reached the 
conclusion that the GOJ did not consider the moral-philosophical issues sufficiently. This 
result supports the fact that there is no moral-philosophical evaluation research on Japan’s 
participation in international military operations: although jurisprudence researchers have 
evaluated the US’s or the UK’s decisions to conduct international military operations 
from the legal and moral-philosophical perspectives, Japan’s participation has never been 
examined. Moreover, the lack of moral-philosophical consideration is evident from the 
interviews conducted for this dissertation (see Appendix): some of the interviewees did 
not feel comfortable with the normative principles of Just War Theory, despite playing an 
important role in decision-making on, particularly Japan’s security policy. To conclude 
this dissertation, this chapter will demonstrate how this dissertation affects the research 
on Japanese Studies and jurisprudence.  
 
 This chapter comprises six sections: reassessment of previous studies; 
recapitulation of the methodology; the findings from the examinations; research 
contributions; and future research. The first section will reassess the previous studies 
reviewed in Chapter One. It will then explain the normative principles of participating in 
international military operations. Based on the basic knowledge required to complete this 
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research, this chapter will demonstrate the gap between the GOJ’s intentions and the 
moral conceptions shared internationally on international military actions. To clarify this 
gap, the third section will draw on the research results from the three case studies and 
then summarise the contributions to two different fields of study: jurisprudence and 
Japanese Studies. The final section of the conclusion, and indeed this dissertation itself, 
will demonstrate the necessity of continuing this research in light of the contributions of 
this dissertation.  
 
6. 1. Reassessing the Literature 
 
This research was motivated by the lack of moral-philosophical consideration when Japan 
participates in international military operations. This is in spite of the fact that some 
politicians in Western countries, such as George W. Bush, Tony Blair, and Michael 
Ignatieff, have adopted the normative principles based on Just War Theory when making 
the decision to participate in international military operations. This dissertation began by 
introducing and reviewing the existing literature on Japan’s participation in international 
military operations. It noted the GOJ’s evident lack of moral-philosophical examination 
when making the decision to participate in international military operations.  
 
6.1.1. Legal Approach 
 
This dissertation first reviewed what discussions have been held in Japan with regard to 
 200 
the legalities of Japan’s participation in international military operations. Japanese 
scholars, particularly specialising the JCL, tends to focus on whether the GOJ’s decision 
would violate Article 9 of the JCL, which specifies the renunciation of war. This section 
will summarise these two conflicting positions to clarify how legal scholars perceive 
Japan’s participation in international military operations.  
 
 The idea of absolute renunciation of war is widely supported by Japanese jurists, 
including legal scholars, who believe it is important for all Japanese people to follow the 
JCL’s fundamental principles. Since pacifism (heiwa shugi) is specified in the Preamble 
and Article 9 of the JCL, they contend that Japanese people should strictly uphold the 
idea of pacifism as written in the Constitution. Overall, then, these scholars believe that 
the GOJ’s decision to participate in international military operations violates the JCL.  
 
 While proponents of the absolute renunciation of war claim that the GOJ’s 
decision to participate in international military operations is illegitimate, those who adopt 
the position of limited renunciation of war contend that those fundamental principles are 
only guidelines, and that strict adherence to their written provisions is not required. 
Therefore, they believe that the decision to participate in international military operations 
should depend on the situation of international society and the situation of Japan.  
 
 In addressing practical cases, the latter position has been widely supported by 
Diet members, particularly LDP members. Examining previous cases of Japan’s 
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participation in international military operations reveals a distinct gap between the 
theories of the JCL and how its provisions are applied in practice: while the theory 
specifies the necessity of strictly following the JCL’s written provisions, the GOJ has 
established its international policy without considering the JCL’s fundamental principles.  
 
6.1.2. Political Approach 
 
While legal scholars have examined whether the GOJ’s international policy violates the 
JCL, political scientists have focused on how Japan’s diplomatic strategies can be 
analysed using IR theories. This dissertation has focused on two IR theories, realism (neo-
realism), liberalism (neo-liberalism), and constructivism, and reviewed how IR scholars 
evaluate Japan’s behaviour when participating in international military operations.  
 
 Focusing on the first IR theory, realism (neo-realism), Japan’s behaviour when 
participating in international military operations can be explained based on the given 
situation. “Security dilemma” and “fear of abandonment,” the conceptual ideas of realism, 
are sufficient to demonstrate why Japan seeks to strengthen its relationship with the US. 
While realists explain the strengthening of this relationship from the perspective of 
“security dilemma” and “fear of abandonment,” neo-realists see it as being due to the US-
Japan Security Treaty. As the US military has remained in Okinawa, Japan has arguably 
depended on the US for national security. In this context, the US has applied invisible 
pressure or external pressure (gaiatsu) upon Japan.  
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 The liberalism-derived theory, on the other hand, explains Japan’s behaviour in 
participating in the UNPKO. Pursuing the common goods of maintaining international 
peace and order is the key idea of liberalism; therefore, the GOJ has put the brake on its 
military reform and the possession of nuclear weapons.  
 
The last IR theory reviewed in this dissertation is constructivism. The 
constructivism-derived theory develops to review Japan’s security policy by combining 
the ideational factors and the material factors. By combining these two factors, the 
constructivism-derived theory reviews that Japan’s security policy sets the two different 
objectives: setting the “culture of anti-militarism” to reassure Japan’s neighbourhood 
countries and expanding its military capability to show the physical power.  
 
Although two different approaches have been taken to review Japan’s 
participation in international military operations, the existing literature have not answered 
to the research question set for this dissertation: “whether or not the GOJ took the 
normative principles of Just War Theory into consideration when deciding to participate 
in international military operations.” By answering this research question, this 
dissertation aims to review whether the GOJ’s perspectives on participating in recent 
international military operations accord with the normative principles of countermeasures 
to international military operations.  
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6. 2. Methodology: Just War Theory  
 
To answer the research question proposed above, it is necessary to clarify what elements 
states should consider when deciding to participate in international military operations. 
As the basis of the normative principles for international military operations, Just War 
Theory seems the most suitable methodology because it has influenced public 
international law on wars. Therefore, the principles of Just War Theory provided the 
frameworks for this dissertation’s methodology. 
 
 Focusing on four scholars, Michael Walzer, John Rawls, Larry May, and Brian 
Orend, this dissertation elaborated the elements of Just War Theory that are applicable 
and relevant to the contemporary situation. These scholars developed Just War theory 
through three stages: jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum. In each stage, they 
developed their own theories to explain the conditions and situations in which states and 
soldiers may take military action against an enemy. To organise each aspect of the theory, 
this dissertation adopted two principles that are applied by public international law to 
elaborate the legitimacy of war and are commonly recognised in customary international 
law: the principle of necessity and the principle of proportionality. By combining the two 
applicable principles of public international law with the three stages of Just War Theory, 
this dissertation developed the methodological frameworks which is used in the 
examinations.  
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6. 3. Findings from the Examinations 
 
Based on this research methodology, this dissertation examined whether the GOJ took the 
normative principles into consideration. To clarify the Japanese security regime, this 
dissertation used three empirical cases as the target of examination: OEF, OIF, and 
Japan’s legislation for peace and security. By examining Diet discussions in each case, 
this dissertation found a gap between the normative principles of Just War Theory and the 
governmental decision to participate in international military operations. Therefore, this 
section will focus on each of the findings to clarify what the GOJ should have considered 
when deciding to participate in international military operations.  
 
6.3.1. Japan’s Participation in Operation Enduring Freedom 
 
Commonly called the Afghanistan War of 2001, OEF, was conducted in retaliation for 
9/11. Most scholars and politicians regard the military force of OEF as having a just cause; 
however, for several reasons, it is difficult to justify OEF from the moral-philosophical 
perspective.  
 
 The first reason is due to the lack of justification for OEF. Although some Diet 
members noted the necessity of considering this issue before deciding to participate in 
OEF, the Japanese Cabinet did not address this point clearly. Instead of considering the 
right intention for attacking Afghanistan, the Japanese Cabinet focused on responding to 
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the US’s request by participating in OEF. In addition, the discussions on enacting the 
ATSML concerned how Japan would participate in OEF without revising the JCL. By 
analysing the related discussions in the Diet, it is clear that OEF’s moral justification was 
not taken into consideration.  
 
 The second reason for concluding that the GOJ did not take the normative 
principles into consideration is the lack of attention paid to the protection of human rights. 
The GOJ particularly focused on protecting the lives of JSDF personnel, contrary to the 
normative principles that states should not violate human rights in general. If the OEF 
participation was premised on maintaining international peace and security, the GOJ 
needed to consider the non-violation of human rights in general, particularly the rights of 
civilians in Afghanistan. Thus, the GOJ seemingly neglected to consider the moral-
philosophical perspective when deciding to participate in OEF.  
 
6.3.2. Japan’s Participation in OIF 
 
Compared with the previous operation, a large number of scholars and politicians 
disagree with OIF because there was no right intention for attacking Iraq. Although 
controversial among the majority of scholars and politicians, the GOJ decided to provide 
logistical support to the US because the Koizumi administration believed that they had 
adopted the right intention for attacking Iraq. However, it is difficult to justify Japan’s 
participation in OIF from the moral-philosophical perspective for the following reasons.  
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 First, there was a lack of legal and moral-philosophical justification for 
attacking Iraq. Iraq did not attack any UN members before OIF was conducted; therefore, 
there is a higher possibility that the attack by the US and its allies comprised an illegal 
use of force. The lack of legal justification for attacking Iraq was mentioned in the Diet; 
however, the Koizumi Cabinet did not pay sufficient attention to the issue well when 
deciding to participate in OIF.  
 
 Second, there was a lack of consideration when deciding to participate in 
reconstruction activity. Since no official requests for participation were made by the US 
or Iraq, the GOJ made an autonomous decision to participate in the reconstruction activity. 
This behaviour can be explained with IR theory, particularly neo-liberalism; however, 
this dissertation noted the necessity to consider non-interventionism, as specified in the 
UN Charter. The examination demonstrates the lack of consideration given to the 
principle of jus post bellum.  
 
6.3.3. Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security 
 
The final case study on which this dissertation focused was Japan’s Legislation for Peace 
and Security. By enacting this statute, Japan expanded its security regime, enabling it to 
participate in international military operations without enacting any temporary statutes, 
as had been required to participate in OEF and OIF. Since Japan was yet to apply the 
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statute to any concrete cases, this dissertation established hypothetical cases to examine 
whether the GOJ took the normative principles into consideration when enacting Japan’s 
Legislation for Peace and Security.  
 
 Through this examination, it was noted that the GOJ did not sufficiently 
consider the principles of jus ad bellum. Referring to the UN Charter, Diet members 
focused on the principle of necessity: however, they did not consider the principle of 
proportionality to the same degree. Diet members have often cited “minimum and 
necessary use of force” to demonstrate that they have paid attention to the principle of 
proportionality; however, the use of this term does not reflect that Diet members took the 
principle of proportionality in jus ad bellum into due consideration.  
 
 The second issue noted is the lack of consideration given to protecting human 
rights in general. Referring to jus in bello, the GOJ should have considered non-violation 
of human rights while participating in international military operations; however, Diet 
members only considered the human rights of JSDF personnel and its collaborators. As 
the normative principles set limits on attacking innocent peoples, the GOJ should have 
considered whom to attack and whom to protect when the related discussions were held 
in the Diet.  
 
 The third issue is the lack of consideration given to the reason for participating 
in reconstruction activities. IR theories have been used to review Japan’s participation in 
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reconstruction activities, such as the UNPKO, as pursuing common interests. However, 
this dissertation noted that participating in reconstruction activities without requests is 
not justified from the legal or moral-philosophical perspectives. The UN Charter specifies 
non-interventionism; therefore, participating in reconstruction activities without requests 
might violate this principles. The GOJ seemingly believes that participating in 
reconstruction activities always comprises good behaviour: however, this dissertation 
addressed the necessity to consider whether Japan should participate in reconstruction 
activities and how much degree of support Japan would participate in such activities.  
 
6. 4. Research Findings  
 
While ascertaining whether the GOJ took the normative principles of Just War Theory 
into consideration when deciding to participate in international military operations, this 
dissertation has made several contributions to two fields of research: jurisprudence, 
particularly Just War Theory, and Japanese Studies. This section will expand on these 
contributions. 
 
6. 2. 1. Contribution to Jurisprudence 
 
This dissertation has made three contributions to Just War Theory: first, it has summarised 
the influence of Just War Theory on current international law on war by analysing 
classical Just War Theory; second, it has elaborated the normative principles of Just War 
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Theory by classifying current works according to two principles required in the so-called 
customary international law, which comprise the habitual practice between countries; and 
third, it has provided an in-depth analysis of Japanese cases yet to receive sufficient 
attention from jurisprudence scholars.  
 
 The first contribution to Just War Theory is in demonstrating its influence on 
the current international law on wars. Prior research on Just War Theory has been 
developed by individually reviewing the works of philosophers and jurists, such as Cicero, 
St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Francisco de Vitoria, Francisco Suarez, and Hugo 
Grotius; however, this dissertation discussed the influence of their works on the current 
international law on wars. As introduced in Chapter Two, the origins of Just War Theory 
lie with Cicero, who developed his theory with reference to the duties of people; however, 
St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas developed their respective Just War Theories based 
on Christianity. Furthermore, their respective discussion demonstrate that Just War 
Theory was originally constructed for application to the case of murders committed 
within the state; therefore, it was sufficient for them to develop their theories based on 
religious ideas because it is comfortable for peoples with understanding the theory. Later, 
Francisco de Vitoria developed his Just War Theory to apply not only to Christians but 
also to non-Christians. This comprised a significant change and almost certainly 
influenced public international law on wars because it applied to all global citizens. 
Commencing with Francisco de Vitoria, Just War Theory developed as a draft of public 
international law on wars. However, few jurisprudence scholars today have examined the 
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longitudinal development of Just War Theory and, therefore, the contribution of this 
research in so doing is beneficial not only for jurisprudence but also public international 
law on war.  
 
 The second contribution of this research is in adopting two principles required 
by customary international law on war, namely necessity and proportionality, to elaborate 
the contemporary Just War Theory. The theories developed by four different researchers, 
Michael Walzer, John Rawls, Larry May, and Brian Orend, have been formulated under 
three categories: jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum; however, each author 
developed their own factors to identify the legitimate use of force. Walzer, for instance, 
developed his theory of jus ad bellum by building on the theory of aggression, according 
to which, “nothing but aggression can justify war” (Walzer, 2006, p. 62); therefore, states 
can exercise the right to self-defence to repel an aggressor. Rawls, on the other hand, 
developed his theory of jus ad bellum as retaliation to aggressors who cannot follow the 
“Laws of the Peoples” (Rawls, 2006, pp. 89–90). Finally, May’s theory discussed when 
the right to self-defence can be exercised; however, he paid attention to non-violation of 
non-combatants because it is difficult to identify today whom the combatants are. This 
dissertation then elaborated and combined the various Just War Theories of these scholars 
to ascertain a common sense in contemporary Just War Theory. This elaboration is also 
an efficient way to demonstrate the differences between the theories, as each scholar 
developed different terms. This effort is also believed to be important for both the fields 
of jurisprudence and of public international law on war because few prior works have 
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elaborated on contemporary Just War Theory.  
 
 The third contribution is to bring Japanese cases into the examination. Michael 
Walzer and John Rawls, in particular, examined whether the global hegemony states, such 
as the US, have taken the normative principles into consideration when determining 
whether or not to conduct international military operations. For example, they 
demonstrate why US President Trumann’s decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki was not moral-philosophically justified (Rawls, 2006, pp. 100–2; Walzer, 
2006, pp. 480–9). Furthermore, Walzer examined whether or not the US commitment to 
OEF was justified by applying his own Just War Theory to the situation (Walzer et al., 5-
16, pp. 5–10). However, these authors did not apply their theories to cases in which non-
hegemonic states, such as Japan and South Korea, participate in international military 
operations. Furthermore, no Japanese scholars of jurisprudence have examined whether 
Japan’s decisions to provide logistical support to the US military meet with the normative 
principles of Just War Theory. As Just War Theory comprises the normative principles on 
international military operations, their theories should have been widely accepted by 
peoples in non-hegemonic states, as Francisco de Vitoria, Francisco Suarez, and Hugo 
Grotius did; however, this dissertation has reached the conclusion that the normative 
principles of Just War Theory have not been accepted, at least by the GOJ. This result is 
essential for jurisprudence scholars because it means that Just War Theory either cannot 
be defined as the “norm” or is not influential among global citizens.  
 
 212 
6. 2. 2. Contribution to Japanese Studies 
 
While this dissertation has made three contributions to jurisprudence, it has also made 
two contributions to the field of Japanese Studies: first, it has identified a gap between 
the elements considered by the GOJ and those it should have taken into consideration 
when setting international and national security policies; and second, it has suggested 
analysing Japanese security policy from the perspective of moral-philosophical theories.  
 
 Regarding the first contribution, it has been clarified that the GOJ has only 
considered pursuing Japanese national interests by participating in international military 
operations. Under Just War Theory, however, governments should consider protecting 
human rights before engaging in international military operations. Following this theory, 
Japanese Diet members should have considered these normative principles when deciding 
whether or not to participate in OEF and OIF. Despite the essential nature of the normative 
principles for setting national and international security policies, the interviewees 
confessed that they had never heard of Just War Theory. This might reflect their lack of 
knowledge; however, it is necessary to further investigate the moral-philosophical criteria 
applied by Diet members, particularly on the issue of maintaining international peace and 
security.  
 
 The second contribution is in demonstrating the necessity to evaluate Japanese 
security policy not only from IR perspectives but also from the moral-philosophical 
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perspective. International military operations, which are the focus of this dissertation, are 
one of the significant issues to be solved in international society. It is believed that IR 
theories, such as realism, liberalism, and constructivism, are developed to review states’ 
behaviour to security policy. Before participating in any international events or 
phenomena, such as international military operations, however, this dissertation points 
out that governments should consider whether such operations violate human rights in 
general because this is the fundamental principle that needs to be considered before using 
military force against others. As the constructivism-derived theory pays attention to the 
ideational factors as well as the material factors, this dissertation why is the moral-
philosophical evaluation, which is the basis of the “ideational factor” in constructivism, 
less active in examining Japan’s participation in international military operations? By 
examining Japan’s participation in international military operations from the moral-
philosophical perspective, this dissertation has contributed by demonstrating the 
necessity for researchers in Japanese Studies to pay attention to the normative principles 
of Just War Theory. By influencing the necessity to take the normative principles of Just 
War Theory into consideration when determining the dispatch of JSDF personnel, Diet 
members and government officials in Japan will become familiar with Just War Theory 
and hopefully focus on its legitimacy when participating in future international military 
operations rather than focus on strengthening the relationship with the other nations, e.g. 
the US to pursue national interests. Since Japan has been in dispute with Russia over the 
Kuril islands, with China over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Island, and with South Korea over 
the Liancourt Rocks, the awareness of the normative principles of Just War Theory may 
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find a rationale solution in solving territorial disputes. Also, the normative principles of 
Just War Theory may give a guideline for Japan in dealing with North Korea. Since Japan 
has been conscious of being attacked by North Korea, as it is identified as offender in 
formulating in the hypothetical situations in Chapter Five, the awareness of the normative 
principles of Just War Theory might give a suitable resolution in dealing with the issue 
on North Korea.  
 
6. 5. Research Implications  
 
Based on the research contribution, this section will demonstrate the research 
implications for both the fields of jurisprudence and Japanese Studies. As a research 
implication, this dissertation leaves the problem of developing a Just War Theory which 
is widely accepted by global citizens.  
 
The three case studies demonstrate that Diet members favoured bringing to 
the discussion the legal legitimacy and political factors. However, this dissertation notes 
the necessity to consider the normative principles provided by Just War Theory, which 
is the basis of current international law on wars.  
 
The necessity of following the normative principles of Just War Theory can be 
explained using the case of Japan because Japan has experienced these principles in its 
reconstruction after WWII. Establishing a new constitution, for instance, is an example 
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of the reconstructing work that occurred as the Empire of Japan collapsed. Regarding 
Japan’s reconstruction after WWII, a large number of people in the victor states, such as 
the US, wanted to execute Emperor Hirohito without war trials or to accuse him of war 
crimes (Leavitt, 2015, p. 319). However, General Douglas MacArthur believed that the 
key to securing Japan’ future was to maintain the Emperor in situ; thus he made the 
decision to leave the Imperial system in place, against the will of the US (Harvey 2006, 
331). MacArthur also had great insight into Japanese identity: although he was 
uncomfortable playing a dignified person, his behaviour helped Japan to begin its 
reconstruction. Through this characteristic, we may deduce that MacArthur respected 
Japanese culture.  
 
Since this dissertation does not focus on Japan’s reconstruction after WWII, 
we will not go into depth as to whether or not the work of GHQ was successful; 
however, it is possible to emphasise the necessity of respecting the culture of a defeated 
state when victor states are engaging in its reconstruction. While respecting the native 
culture is a rough idea that should be followed, the principles of necessity and 
proportionality of jus post bellum will provide a theoretical foundation for victor states 
when engaging in reconstruction activities.  
 
To summarise, the normative principles of Just War Theory are the basic idea 
of public international law on war: the idea of what principles states should follow to 
legitimate the use of force (jus ad bellum and jus in bello), and, simultaneously, what 
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principles victor states should follow to legitimate the reconstruction activity of defeated 
states (jus post bellum). Following only the regulations of public international law on war 
is not always sufficient to legitimate a role in international military operations because 
there are several situations in which public international law is not applicable. For 
instance, it is difficult to apply public international law on war to engaged in international 
military operations to eliminate the numbers of the so-called new wars, identified by Mary 
Caldor in the book . However, the normative principles of Just War Theory are applicable 
on all occasions in international military operations.  
 
6. 6. Future Research 
 
Although this dissertation has made various contributions to the fields of jurisprudence 
and Japanese Studies, further research should be conducted on Japan’s security policies  
because Japan has applied its Legislation for Peace and Security to dispatch JSDF 
personnel to South Sudan, and is planning to dispatch JSDF personnel to Egypt by 
applying the legislation sooner. Furthermore, there have been several well-known 
international conflicts between Japan and its neighbouring countries, such as China, 
North Korea, South Korea, and Russia, while the current situation in the South China Sea 
remains unstable. To solve these international conflicts between Japan and its 
neighbouring countries, there is an increasing possibility that Japan may participate in 
international military operations. Since this dissertation has clarified the GOJ’s past 
failures to sufficiently consider the normative principles of Just War Theory, these 
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findings should be reflected in future international military operations in which Japan 
might participate. Finally, this dissertation would like to touch upon the case of 
dispatching JSDF personnel to South Sudan; in doing so, we will clarify what elements 
which the GOJ should have considered, by applying the principle of legitimacy for peace 
and security, when deciding to dispatch JSDF personnel.  
 
 The decision to dispatch JSDF personnel to South Sudan occurred during the 
Noda administration (term of office: 2 September 2011 - 26 December 2012) in response 
to a request from the UN (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2011). The request was 
made by Ban Ki-moon, the former Secretary-General of the UN (term of office: January 
2007 - December 2016) because the situation in South Sudan was too unstable for 
civilians to live in peace and order (Ferrie, 2011). This unstable situation was caused by 
the independence of the states from Sudan in 2011 (Al Jazeera, 2011), although the 
majority of people agreed that South Sudan was independent from Sudan (Southern 
Sudan Referendum 2011, 2011). In response to a request from the UN, the Kan Cabinet 
(term of office: 8 June 2010 – 17 September 2010) first decided to dispatch two JSDF 
personnel to South Sudan: one specialist in military logistics and one person trained in 
collecting information (Ministry of Defense, 2011).  
 
 Based on the request from the UN which was made on 21 September 2011, the 
then Defense Minister, Ichikawa Yasuo, held a defence meeting on 22 September to 
prepare headquarters for the dispatch to South Sudan. The operation mainly comprised 
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nation-building; therefore, the GOJ could apply the International Peace Cooperation Law. 
As no temporary statute was enacted to send JSDF personnel to South Sudan, it only took 
41 days for the GOJ to decide in favour of the dispatch. During these 41 days, however, 
several Diet members queried Japan’s justification for participating in the operation 
(Ishiba Shigeru, 27 September 2011; Tanioka Kuniko and Satō Masahisa, 27 October 
2011 and, Saitō Tetsuo and Shigeno Yasumasa, 1 November 2011) and asked about the 
possibility that JSDF personnel would be armed (Ishiba Shigeru and Ishii Keiichi, 27 
September 2011 and Inoguchi Kuniko, 27 September 2011). Compared with the numbers 
of questions regarding Japan’s right to participate in the operation, which is named the 
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS,) more Diet members were concerned 
with how meaningful Japan’s participation in UNMISS was (Noda Yoshihiko, 27 
September 2011; Ichikawa Yasuo and Genba Koichirō, 21 October 2011; Watanabe 
Yoshihiko, 25 October 2011; Genba Koichirō and Ichikawa Yasuo, 25 October 2011; 
Yamauchi Kōichi and Fujimura Osamu, 26 October 2011 and Ichikawa Yasuo, 27 October 
2011). By scanning the minutes of the Diet, the concerns of Diet members were twofold: 
the possibility of dispatching JSDF personnel to the battlefield and the possibility of 
violating Japanese regulations.  
 
 Following the enactment of Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security, a new 
order was provided, specifying that JSDF personnel would carry out a kaketsuke keigo 
operation: this order provided for the possibility of JSDF personnel using military 
weapons when there is an imminent threat to Japanese civilians in South Sudan (Nihon 
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Keizai Shimbun, 2016). Although the JSDF was given the order to carry out the operation, 
the units of the Japanese PKO were withdrawn from South Sudan on 25 May 2017 
(Sankei Shimbun, 2017) for reasons that are not yet clear. However, the Chief Cabinet 
Secretary specified as follows: “(…) With South Sudan entering a new stage of nation 
building, Japan considers that the engineering activities undertaken by the JSDF in Juba 
have now come to a close” (Suga Yoshiie, 10 March 2017). Although Japan had 
accomplished its operation in South Sudan, the UNMISS had been active since 2011; 
therefore, it is believed that the reason proposed by the GOJ for withdrawing the JSDF 
from South Sudan was tatemae (Sankei Shimbun, 2017).  
 
 By skimming through Diet records on Japan’s participation in UNMISS, it 
emerges that the GOJ devoted less consideration to the normative principles which the 
government should have considered before participating in international military 
operations. The GOJ is now considering about dispatching the Ground Japanese Self-
Defence Force to join in the Multinational Force and Observers, which is currently active 
in Egypt. To participate in this operation, the GOJ is planning to identify the case as an 
international peace cooperative situation engaged in cease-fire monitoring activity 
between Egypt and Israel (Tokyo Shimbun, 2018). Again, there is the possibility for JSDF 
personnel to carry out a kaketsuke keigo operation; therefore, the GOJ should consider 
the right intention or a just cause for participation. The GOJ should also consider the 
quality and quantity of roles played by JSDF personnel during the operation. According 
to an article by Tokyo Shimbun, the GOJ is planning to dispatch several JSDF personnel 
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to Egypt in early 2019. Despite the governmental decision to dispatch the JSDF to Egypt, 
no related discussion was held in the Diet.  
 
 Thus, Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security could be said to have an 
advantage for the GOJ because this legislation does not require Japan to prove its right 
intention for participating in international military operations; however, the legislation 
also has a disadvantage in that it simplifies the decision-making process for participating 
in international military operations. Further research should be conducted on Japan’s 
application of Legislation for Peace and Security to participate in international military 
operations to ensure that the GOJ does not to make an irreversible error, such as violating 
human rights in general, by participating therein.  
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6 July 2015 Ōno Motohiro, member of the House of Councillors 
6 July 2015 Ōtsuka Kōhei, member of the House of Councillors 
24 July 2015 Masuda Kōhei, former director-general of the Ministry of Defense 
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